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Summary
This Article, the third in a series of five, examines 
the meaning of “navigable waters” under the Clean 
Water Act . It traces the traditional judicial interpreta-
tion of navigable waters and how Congress and EPA 
attempted to extend its meaning, then examines how 
the term has been applied in the context of tributar-
ies and wetlands, isolated waters, groundwater, and 
EPA’s unitary theory of navigable waters . The author 
then analyzes EPA and the Corps’ 2014 proposed 
amendments to the definition of “waters of the United 
States,” and concludes that those amendments may 
resolve much of the interpretive crisis .
I. Introduction
The Clean Water Act (CWA)1 in §301(a) prohibits “the dis-
charge of any pollutant by any person,”2 unless in compliance 
with several listed sections authorizing the issuance of two 
types of permits3 and specifying their substantive require-
ments . In §502(12), the statute defines “discharge of a pol-
lutant” to mean “any addition of any pollutant to navigable 
waters from any point source .”4 In sum, the subsection pro-
hibits (1) any addition (2) of any pollutant (3) to navigable 
waters (4) from any point source (5) by any person, except in 
compliance with a CWA permit . Justice Ruth Bader Gins-
burg has called this the CWA’s “core command .”5
This Article reviews the meaning of “navigable 
waters”—a traditional Commerce Clause jurisdictional 
phrase denoting waters associated with transportation, but 
with a short CWA statutory definition having nothing to 
do with waterborne transportation .6 The Article examines 
the U .S . Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) 2014 
proposed amendments to its definition of “waters of the 
United States” and concludes that those proposed amend-
ments may resolve much of the interpretive crisis . The Arti-
cle also examines EPA’s theory that all navigable waters are 
one (the unitary navigable waters theory), and argues that 
the theory is inconsistent with the CWA and should be 
disavowed by EPA and rejected by the courts .
In §502(6), the CWA defines navigable waters to mean 
“the waters of the United States, including the territorial 
seas .” Of all the elements in the CWA’s core command, only 
“navigable waters” had a developed legal meaning before 
1 . Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U .S .C . §§1251-1387, ELR Stat . FWPCA 
§§101-607 .
2 . 33 U .S .C . §1311(a) .
3 . Permits issued pursuant to CWA §402, 33 U .S .C . §1342, regulate water 
pollution; permits issued pursuant to CWA §404, 33 U .S .C . §404, 33 
U .S .C . §1344, regulate filling streams or wetlands .
4 . 33 U .S .C . §1362(12) . Because the term defined in CWA §502(12), “dis-
charge of a pollutant,” is not exactly the same as the term used in CWA 
§301(a), “the discharge of any pollutant,” the definition in §502(12) argu-
ably does not apply to the phrase used in §301(a) . However, courts rou-
tinely refer to §502(12) as defining discharge of any pollutant in §301(a), 
without noting the difference . (Emphases added throughout .) See Jeffrey G . 
Miller, Plain Meaning, Precedent, and Metaphysics: Interpreting the “Addition” 
Element of the Clean Water Act Offense, 44 ELR 10770 n .4 (Sept . 2014) 
[hereinafter Miller, Addition] . In any event, discharge itself is defined to in-
clude the discharge of a pollutant, §502(16), the term defined in §502(12) .
5 . Coeur Alaska Inc . v . Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U .S . 261, 
298 (2009) . The author has called it elsewhere the basic prohibition of the 
CWA . See Jeffrey G . Miller et al ., Introduction to Environmental 
Law: Cases and Materials on Water Pollution Control 141 (2008) .
6 . 33 U .S .C . §1362(7) . The touchstone of “navigable waters” for Commerce 
Clause jurisdictional purposes is use in waterborne navigation . See The Dan-
iel Ball, 77 U .S . 557 (1870) .
Author’s Note: The author acknowledges and thanks Laura Young, 
Pace 2014, for her assistance in completing the research and analysis 
for and editing of this Article, and Christine Swatzell, Pace 2012, 
for her assistance in the initial research and analysis for the Article.
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enactment of the statute . First, the U .S . Supreme Court 
developed that legal meaning in one dozen decisions over 
the preceding century and a half, establishing the extent of 
the U .S . Congress’ constitutional authority to develop and 
regulate waterways under the Commerce Clause . Second, 
the statutory definition of navigable waters, “the waters 
of the United States,” attempts to broaden the element’s 
meaning, while the statutory definitions of the other ele-
ments narrow their meanings . (For example, the statutory 
definition of “pollutant” limits it to specifically listed mate-
rials and categories of materials .7) Third, Congress devoted 
substantial legislative history to the intended broad reach 
of navigable waters, while providing far less legislative his-
tory to the meanings of the other elements .8
The courts’ historical familiarity with interpreting navi-
gable waters suggests they should be more comfortable 
interpreting the term under the CWA than interpreting 
other elements of the CWA offense . Indeed, this is the 
case; the Supreme Court and lower courts have interpreted 
navigable waters far more often than they have interpreted 
any of the other elements .9 The historical role of the courts 
in shaping the meaning of the term navigable waters also 
suggests that they should be more willing to disregard or 
overrule an Agency interpretation of the term than to dis-
regard or overrule Agency interpretations of other elements 
of the CWA offense . Indeed, this too is the case; the Court 
has twice overruled EPA and U .S . Army Corps of Engi-
neers (the Corps) interpretations of navigable waters, but 
has not overruled their interpretations of other elements 
in the CWA offense .10 Finally, the availability of one cen-
tury and a half of judicial decisions interpreting navigable 
waters prior to the CWA makes it unsurprising that courts 
7 . CWA §502(6), 33 U .S .C . §1352(6) . The listed categories of materials, how-
ever, cover a vast territory . See Jeffrey G . Miller, Plain Meaning, Precedent, 
and Metaphysics: Interpreting the “Pollutant” Element of the Federal Water 
Pollution Offense, 44 ELR 10960, 10963-64 (Nov . 2014) [hereinafter Mill-
er, Pollutant] .
8 . Compare the discussion of the legislative history of “navigable waters” in 
this Article with the discussions of legislative history in Miller, Addition, 
supra note 4, at 10773; and Miller, Pollutant, supra note 7, at 10962-63 .
9 . The Court has interpreted navigable waters in six decisions: Los Angeles 
County Flood Control Dist. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 133 S . Ct . 710, 43 
ELR 20004 (2013); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U .S . 715, 36 ELR 20116 
(2006); South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 
U .S . 95, 34 ELR 20021 (2004); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 U .S . 159, 31 ELR 20382 (2001); 
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U .S . 481, 17 ELR 20327 (1987); 
and United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U .S . 121, 16 ELR 
20086 (1985) . It has interpreted “addition” in two decisions and “pollutant” 
in three decisions . See Miller, Addition, supra note 4, at 10804-05; Miller, 
Pollutant, supra note 7, at 10981-83 . The author’s research (set out in tbl . A 
to this Article) has found that lower courts interpreted navigable waters in 
137 decisions; addition in 63 decisions, see Miller, Addition, supra note 4, at 
10804-05; and pollutant in 68 decisions, see Miller, Pollutant, supra note 7, 
at 10981-83 . The greater number of navigable waters decisions also results 
from parties challenging interpretations of that element more than the other 
elements, but that probably results from the same factors .
10 . Rapanos, 547 U .S . 715; SWANCC, 531 U .S . 159 .
use precedent more often than other interpretive devices 
such as plain meaning to determine the meaning of the 
term in the CWA . And indeed they have done so: Prec-
edent is by far the most commonly used device for judicial 
interpretation of navigable waters,11 while plain meaning is 
the most commonly used device for judicial interpretation 
of some of the other elements .
The major tension in interpreting the CWA’s navigable 
waters element is the inherent conflict between judicial 
interpretation of Congress’ authority to develop and regulate 
navigable waters for promoting interstate and foreign com-
merce, and Congress’ subsequent use of the term to establish 
expansive EPA authority for improving and maintaining 
water quality . The importance of a waterway for transporta-
tion may have little connection to water quality . Congress 
appeared to have understood this disconnect and to distance 
CWA jurisdiction from waterborne commerce by defining 
navigable waters as “the waters of the United States,” a more 
expansive term having nothing to do with transportation . 
But because Congress used “navigable waters” as an element 
of the CWA offense, it invited judicial focus on the term 
rather than on its definition, because courts were familiar 
with that term, having interpreted it for over one century 
and a half . Courts understood the historical meaning of 
navigable waters far more than they understood the mean-
ings of “waters of the United States” or of the CWA’s other 
elements . And because of the Supreme Court’s current fas-
cination with textualism, it has great difficulty divorcing 
navigable waters entirely from waterborne transportation; 
“navigable” must mean something .
If the CWA dealt only with pollution control under 
the §402 permit program,12 the disconnect between pro-
motion of interstate commerce and protection of water 
quality might not have ripened into a jurisdictional crisis . 
The primary issue would have been whether particular 
tributaries of navigable waters were within the jurisdic-
tion of the CWA, when those tributaries themselves had 
never and could never support waterborne transportation . 
Because tributaries, even remote ones,13 contribute both 
water and pollution to the navigable waters into which 
they flow, they directly affect those navigable waters . The 
water volumes they contribute increase the navigability of 
the receiving waters, and the water pollution they contrib-
11 . In the 137 lower court decisions the author found interpreting navigable 
waters, precedent was used in 124 decisions . Courts used the second most 
popular interpretive device, broad interpretation to achieve statutory goals, 
in only 51 decisions . The statistical analysis is set out in tbl . B to this Article . 
By contrast, in the 68 decisions interpreting pollutant, courts used plain 
meaning in 55 decisions, but precedent in only 27 decisions . See Miller, 
Pollutant, supra note 7, at 10806-07 .
12 . 33 U .S .C . §1342 .
13 . Headwater streams, for instance, contribute 60% of the total flow to north-
eastern streams and rivers . See 79 Fed . Reg . 22188, 22224 (proposed Apr . 
21, 2014) (scientific support for EPA’s proposed amendments) .
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ute may interfere with the navigability of the receiving 
waters . The Court had recognized congressional power to 
develop flood control projects in watersheds of navigable 
waters to protect against floods on the navigable waters 
into which the tributaries directly and indirectly flowed .14 
The same rationale applies to controlling discharges of 
pollutants into tributaries of navigable waters to protect 
the water quality of the navigable waters into which the 
tributaries flow .
But the CWA did not deal only with pollution control 
under the §402 permit program; it also dealt with filling 
wetlands under the §404 permit program .15 While wet-
lands contribute both water and pollutants to the naviga-
ble waters into which they flow and protect those navigable 
waters from flooding and pollution,16 their contributions 
to adjacent or downstream navigation and water quality 
may not be apparent to the uninitiated . Moreover, wet-
lands may not exhibit surface water for months at a time, 
when to the untrained eye they may be indistinguishable 
from the surrounding dry land . Wetlands pose two prob-
lems for the Court’s historical view or even for the plain 
meaning of navigable waters: Wetlands do not directly 
support waterborne navigation and, at least when they are 
dry, are not waters at all .
Unfortunately, narrowing interpretations of naviga-
ble waters to defeat §404 jurisdiction over wetlands may 
also defeat §402 jurisdiction over tributaries of navigable 
waters, because terms are to be interpreted in the same 
manner throughout a statute,17 unless the statute explicitly 
indicates otherwise . The CWA reiterates this interpretive 
canon by beginning its definitional §502 “[e]xcept as oth-
erwise specifically provided, when used in this chapter  .  .  . 
‘navigable waters’  .  .  . ‘means’  .  .  .  .” And it does not provide 
in §402, §404, or elsewhere that the term has different 
meanings in §§402 and 404 .
Aside from the Corps’ initial, interim regulatory defi-
nition of navigable waters, which merely repeated the 
Court’s traditional interpretation of the term, EPA and the 
Corps’ regulatory definitions have followed legislative his-
tory to interpret the term broadly . After recent setbacks 
from the Supreme Court,18 however, the two agencies have 
recently proposed an amended definition of “waters of the 
United States” that preserves much of their earlier regula-
tions’ breadth, but retrenches it where the Court’s recent 
decisions give the agencies no room to do otherwise . The 
preamble to the proposed rulemaking offers a detailed jus-
14 . See Oklahoma ex rel . Phillips v . Atkinson, 313 U .S . 508 (1941) .
15 . 33 U .S .C . §1344 .
16 . The Court briefly surveyed the benefits of wetlands in United States v. Riv-
erside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U .S . 121, 134-35, 16 ELR 20086 (1985) . 
For a more extensive treatment of the subject, see William L . Want, Law 
of Wetlands Regulation §2 .01[1] (1993) .
17 . William N . Eskridge Jr ., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 324 
(1994); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A . Garner, Reading Law 170-73 
(2012) .
18 . See Rapanos v . United States, 547 U .S . 715, 36 ELR 20116 (2006); Solid 
Waste Agency of N . Cook Cnty . v . United States Army Corps of Eng’rs 
(SWANCC), 531 U .S . 159, 31 ELR 20382 (2001) .
tification for the controversial portions of the definitions, 
much of it scientific .19
These dynamics frame the interpretive battles exam-
ined in this Article . We begin by tracing the development 
of the traditional judicial interpretation of navigable 
waters and how Congress and EPA attempted to extend 
its meaning . The Article then examines the primary bat-
tlefields for interpreting navigable waters: tributaries and 
wetlands, isolated waters, groundwater, and EPA’s unitary 
theory of navigable waters .20 Along the way, the Article 
takes sidelong glances at a wild card in these interpre-
tive battles, the development of the CWA’s §404 program 
regulating the filling of wetlands . The §404 program has 
provided proponents of narrowly interpreting “navigable 
waters” with the rhetorical support that EPA and the 
Corps’ broad interpretations of the term metaphorically 
make water of dry land .
II. The Traditional Legal Meaning of 
Navigable Waters
The legal concept of navigable waters originated in medi-
eval England . The Crown owned the land beneath waters 
used for navigation and the public had a common-law 
right to use navigable waters for fishing and transport .21 
We know this public right today as the navigable servi-
tude . Upon independence, the American colonies suc-
ceeded to ownership of the beds beneath navigable waters, 
subject to the common-law navigable servitude . As the 
United States acquired new territories, it took ownership 
of the beds beneath their navigable waters, again subject 
to the common-law navigable servitude . When new states 
were formed from those territories, ownership of the beds 
beneath the navigable waters transferred to those states, 
again subject to the navigable servitude .22
At the time that the 13 colonies formed the United States, 
only waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide were con-
sidered navigable waters .23 This limited concept of navigabil-
ity expanded to meet a growing and industrializing nation’s 
needs for federal improvement and regulation of water-
borne commerce and transportation . In Propeller Genesee v. 
Fitzhugh,24 the Court held that navigable waters included 
freshwater . Not long after, it held in Gibbons v. Ogden25 that 
19 . 79 Fed . Reg . 22188 (proposed Apr . 21, 2014) . The scientific support is pro-
vided at 79 Fed . Reg . 22222-52, but is referenced throughout the preamble .
20 . For more information on EPA’s unitary theory of navigable waters and its 
exemption of water transfers and diversions from §402, see Miller, Addition, 
supra note 4, at 10781-94 .
21 . Martin v . Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U .S . 367, 407-14 (1842), traces this history 
back to the Magna Carta .
22 . Pollard v . Hagen, 44 U .S . 212 (1843) . The U .S . Constitution did not grant 
the shores of navigable waters and the soil beneath them to the United 
States, impliedly reserving them to the states . New states have the same 
rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over navigable waters as the original 
states . This is known as the “equal footing” doctrine: New states are ad-
mitted to the Union on an equal footing with the original states . See also 
Illinois Cent . R .R . v . Illinois, 146 U .S . 387 (1892), in which the navigable 
servitude gave rise to the public trust doctrine .
23 . Wilson v . Blackbird Creek Marsh Co ., 27 U .S . 245 (1845) .
24 . 53 U .S . 443 (1851) .
25 . 9 Wheat . 1; 21 U .S . 1 (1866) .
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the U .S . Constitution’s Commerce Clause26 conferred on 
Congress authority to regulate interstate commerce, includ-
ing the authority to regulate navigation . Finally, in The 
Daniel Ball,27 it held that waters forming a highway or part 
of a continuous highway of foreign or interstate commerce 
were subject to Commerce Clause jurisdiction .
The Court has subsequently broadened Commerce 
Clause jurisdiction to include waters that were once navi-
gable, Economy Power & Light Co. v. United States28; waters 
that presently are capable of use for navigation, The Monti-
cello29; and waters that could be made navigable with rea-
sonable improvements, United States v. Appalachian Electric 
Power Co.30 The Court has also recognized that Commerce 
Clause jurisdiction extends to tributaries of navigable waters 
or even to entire watersheds, where necessary to accomplish 
Commerce Clause-justified purposes; for example, flood 
control, as in Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Atkinson.31
Traditional federal navigable water jurisdiction, there-
fore, extends to waters subject to the ebb and flow of the 
tide; waters that are navigable in fact, or once were navigable 
in fact, or could be made navigable in fact with reasonable 
improvements; and, for some purposes, to their tributar-
ies or watersheds . But this is somewhat simplified, because 
it reflects an amalgam of decisions interpreting “navigable 
waters” for different purposes: ownership of land beneath 
navigable water; public rights to use navigable waters for 
fishing and transportation; admiralty jurisdiction; and 
Commerce Clause jurisdiction .32 Of these uses, the defini-
tion of navigable waters for the purpose of delineating land 
ownership is, predictably, the most conservative, while the 
definition for Commerce Clause jurisdiction is more flexi-
ble .33 Those differences are not significant for interpreting 
navigable waters in the CWA, however, because, as dis-
cussed below, Congress intended that term to include all 
waters within Congress’ constitutional authority .
III. Congressional Action: Statutory 
Definition and Legislative History of 
Navigable Waters
A. Statutory Definition
Section 502(6) of the CWA defines navigable waters to 
mean “the waters of the United States, including the ter-
26 . U .S . Const ., art . I, §8, cl . 3 .
27 . 10 Wall . 557; 77 U .S . 557 (1871) .
28 . 256 U .S . 113, 123 (1921) .
29 . 20 Wall . 430, 441-42; 87 U .S . 430, 441-42 (1874) .
30 . 311 U .S . 377, 406 (1940) .
31 . 313 U .S . 508 (1941) .
32 . For more information on these uses of navigable waters, see A . Dan Tar-
lock, The Law of Water Rights and Resources (Clark Boardman 
1988) .
33 . See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v . United States, 444 U .S . 164, 10 ELR 20042 
(1979), in which a privately owned pond separated from an ocean bay by 
a barrier beach became navigable water for purposes of Commerce Clause 
navigational regulation under 33 U .S .C . §403 when the owners construct-
ed a channel between the pond and the bay, but the private property did 
not become subject to the navigational servitude for public access without 
just compensation .
ritorial seas .”34 As discussed above, the term “navigable 
waters” has a well-established legal meaning . “The waters 
of the United States,” on the other hand, has no well-estab-
lished meaning . Congress defined the limited “navigable 
waters” with the expansive “waters of the United States” to 
extend the CWA’s jurisdiction to the constitutional limits 
of congressional authority for water pollution control .
But wording the underlying element to suggest tra-
ditional linkage with waterborne commerce was an odd 
way to accomplish expansiveness . The navigable waters 
formulation of the element has caused and continues to 
cause interpretive conflict . EPA and the Corps have pro-
mulgated detailed regulatory definitions of waters of the 
United States, claiming a broad reach for jurisdiction 
under the CWA .35 Indeed, EPA ultimately abandoned 
reference to navigable waters, using waters of the United 
States throughout its regulations, perhaps hoping that 
others would forget the origin of the statute’s jurisdiction 
in waterborne transportation . If so, it has not fooled the 
Supreme Court, which has twice ruled that the govern-
ment’s actions under §404 exceeded its statutory jurisdic-
tion over navigable waters .36
B. Legislative History
1. Section 402
The CWA draws on two distinct statutory lineages, with 
different pollution control strategies and different jurisdic-
tional bases . These lineages have their origins in the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) and the Refuse 
Act . Congress enacted the FWPCA in 194837 and has since 
amended it repeatedly .38 The FWPCA initially encouraged 
and provided technical and financial support for state water 
pollution control programs, as well as partial funding for 
the construction of municipal sewage treatment facilities . 
Its goal was to achieve state-established water quality stan-
dards .39 It evolved from providing a passive federal role to 
establishing an active, although secondary, federal role . 
Its strongest federal role was to abate interstate pollution, 
assisting states in achieving their water quality standards 
when they were unable to do so themselves because of pol-
lution originating beyond their jurisdictions in other states . 
34 . 33 U .S .C . §1362(6) .
35 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .2 (EPA); 33 C .F .R . §328 .3 (Corps) .
36 . See Rapanos v . United States, 547 U .S . 715, 36 ELR 20116 (2006); Solid 
Waste Agency of N . Cook Cnty . v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 
531 U .S . 159, 31 ELR 20382 (2001) .
37 . Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 62 Stat . 1155 (1948) .
38 . FWPCA Amendment Acts: 66 Stat . 755 (1952); 70 Stat . 498 (1956); 
Pub . L . No . 86-90, 73 Stat . 141 (1959); Pub . L . No . 86-624, 74 Stat . 411 
(1960); Pub . L . No . 87-88, 75 Stat . 204 (1960); Pub . L . No . 89-234, 79 
Stat . 903 (1965); Pub . L . No . 89-753, 80 Stat . 1246 (1966); Pub . L . No . 
91-224, 84 Stat . 91 (1970); Pub . L . No . 91-611, 84 Stat . 1818 (1970); Pub . 
L . No . 92-50, 85 Stat . 124 (1971); Pub . L . No . 92-240, 85 Stat . 47 (1972) .
39 . For a description of the development of the program, see William L . An-
dreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States: State, 
Local and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972; Part II, 22 Stan . Envtl . L .J . 215 
(2003); N . William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of 
Water Quality, 52 Iowa L . Rev . 186, 432, 799 (1966/1967) .
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Not surprisingly, the FWPCA’s jurisdictional basis was 
“interstate waters .”40
On the other hand, the Refuse Act41 was enacted as part 
of a revision of navigation laws in the Rivers and Harbors 
Act of 1899 .42 The Refuse Act protected navigation by 
prohibiting the discharge of refuse into navigable waters 
or their tributaries, except for flow from streets and sew-
ers (that is, regulating industrial discharges but excluding 
municipal discharges) without a permit from the Secretary 
of the Army . Pursuant to a 1970 Executive Order,43 the 
Corps and EPA adapted this statute for water pollution 
control . The Corps processed applications for and issued 
Refuse Act permits to industries discharging wastes to 
navigable water, conditioned on the industries’ treatment 
of the wastewater to achieve standards established by EPA 
based on the technological treatment capabilities of differ-
ent industrial categories . Not surprisingly, the Refuse Act’s 
jurisdictional basis was “navigable waters .”
Environmentalists brought the Refuse Act Permit Pro-
gram to a halt by winning a suit against the Corps to 
require it to comply with the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act (NEPA)44 when issuing each of the thousands of 
anticipated pollution control permits .45 In comprehensive 
amendments to the FWPCA in 1972, Congress adopted 
the permit program from the Refuse Act for all industrial 
and municipal point sources of pollution . CWA permits 
were to be conditioned on the permit holders meeting 
both state-established water quality standards, originally 
established under the FWPCA, and EPA-established tech-
nology-based standards under the CWA, much like those 
EPA had established under the Corps/EPA Refuse Act per-
mit program .46 The new statute exempted the issuance of 
CWA §402 permits from compliance with NEPA, except 
for permits to new sources,47 on the theory that for existing 
sources CWA permits require reduction of existing pollu-
tion, to the benefit of the environment, while new sources 
would add to existing pollution .
40 . Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub . L . No . 89-234, 79 Stat . 903 (1965) . Al-
though EPA continues to include interstate waters in its definition of waters 
of the United States, see 40 C .F .R . §122 .1 (2013), and its proposed revi-
sion of that definition, see 79 Fed . Reg . 22188, 22267 (proposed Apr . 21, 
2014), there is no explicit constitutional authority for Congress to regu-
late interstate waters unless they are also parts of the highways of interstate 
commerce . Indeed, EPA identifies no such authority in its discussion of 
jurisdiction over interstate waters in the preamble to its proposed amended 
definition of navigable waters . See 79 Fed . Reg . at 22254-55 . It has been 
argued that such jurisdiction does not exist . See William Funk, 1 Law of 
Environmental Protection §13:117 (2014) . EPA, however, argues that 
the Court inherently recognized Congress’ authority to regulate pollution 
of interstate waters when it held in Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U .S . 304, 
11 ELR 20406 (1981), that the CWA preempted the federal common law 
of interstate water pollution . See EPA’s legal justification for its proposed 
amendment of its definition of waters of the United States, 79 Fed . Reg . 
22188, 22256-57 .
41 . Refuse Act, 33 U .S .C . §407 .
42 . Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U .S .C . §§401-148 .
43 . Exec . Order No . 11574, 3 C .F .R . §1966-70, 35 Fed . Reg . 19627 (Dec . 23, 
1970) . For a description of the program, see 42 Fed . Reg . 37122-23 (July 
19, 1977) .
44 . 42 U .S .C . §§4321-4370f, ELR Stat . NEPA §§2-209 .
45 . See Kalur v . Resor, 335 F . Supp . 1, 1 ELR 20637 (D .D .C . 1971) .
46 . 33 U .S .C . §§1311, 1342, CWA §§301, 402 .
47 . CWA §511(c)(1), 33 U .S .C . §1371(c)(1) .
The legislative history of the CWA is replete with state-
ments that Congress intended the statute’s jurisdiction to 
be expansive, indeed to reach the outer limits of congres-
sional jurisdiction under the Constitution . Both houses 
of Congress, however, used “navigable waters” as a juris-
dictional element for their respective bills . The U .S . Sen-
ate bill defined navigable waters to mean “the navigable 
waters of the United States, portions thereof, and the tribu-
taries thereof, including the territorial seas and the Great 
Lakes .”48 The U .S . House of Representatives bill defined it 
to mean “the navigable waters of the United States, includ-
ing the territorial seas .”49 Insofar as both bills defined “nav-
igable waters” as “navigable waters,” the definitions were 
circular . The Committee Report accompanying the Senate 
bill explained the rationale for the shift from the model of 
the earlier FWPCA to the model of the Refuse Act:
Through a narrow interpretation of interstate waters the 
implementation of the 1965 Act was severely limited . 
Water moves in hydrological cycles and it is essential 
that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source . 
Therefore reference to the control requirements must 
be made to the navigable waters, portions thereof, and 
their tributaries .50
The Conference Committee changed the circular defini-
tions of navigable waters in both bills to the present “waters 
of the United States” and explained that “[t]he conferees 
fully intend that the term ‘navigable waters’ be given the 
broadest possible constitutional interpretation unencum-
bered by agency determinations which have been made or 
may be made for administrative purposes .”51 Sen . Edmund 
Muskie (D-Me .), widely credited as the author of the leg-
islation, explained the Conference Committee bill to the 
Senate as containing the “broadest possible constitutional 
interpretation” of navigable waters .52 Rep . John Dingell 
(D-Mich .), chief sponsor of the legislation in the House, 
explained that the
conference bill defines the term “navigable waters” broadly 
for water quality purposes  .  .  .  . It means “all of the waters 
of the United States” in a geographical sense . It does not 
mean “navigable waters of the United States” in a techni-
cal sense as we sometimes see it in some laws . This new 
definition clearly encompasses all water bodies, including 
48 . S . 2770, 92nd Cong . §502(h) (1971), reprinted in 2 A Legislative His-
tory of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 
[hereinafter Legis . History), at 1534, 1698 .
49 . H .R . 11896, 92nd Cong . §502(8) (1971), reprinted in 1 Legis . History, 
supra note 48, at 1069 .
50 . S . Rep . No . 92-414, at 77 (1971), reprinted in 2 Legis . History, supra note 
48, at 1419, 1495 . The explanations that water moves in hydrological cycles 
and that pollution must be treated at its source are not helpful . The hydro-
logical cycle goes far beyond either navigable or interstate waters, encom-
passing groundwater beneath and water vapor in the clouds above Kansas . 
Congress did not intend the CWA to regulate discharges to groundwater 
and there is no hint in the statute itself or in its legislative history that Con-
gress intended the CWA to reach water vapor in the clouds above Kansas .
51 . S . Rep . No . 92-1236, at 144 (1972) (Conf . Rep .), reprinted in 1 Legis . His-
tory, supra note 48, at 327 .
52 . 118 Cong . Rec . S16876 (daily ed . Oct . 4, 1972) (statement of Sen . 
Muskie), reprinted in 1 Legis . History, supra note 48, at 166 .
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main streams and their tributaries for water quality pur-
poses. No longer are the old, narrow definitions of naviga-
bility, as determined by the Corps of Engineers, going to 
govern matters covered by this bill.53
The repeated references to old, narrow determinations 
of navigable waters referred to formal determinations the 
Corps had made that particular waterways were navi-
gable and therefore eligible for spending federal funds to 
improve them.
This legislative history suggests that Congress made a 
deliberate choice to base the CWA’s jurisdiction on navi-
gable waters rather than on interstate waters because it 
believed navigable waters jurisdiction to be broader.54 It also 
indicates that Congress intended the CWA’s jurisdiction to 
be as broad as constitutionally possible, encompassing “all 
water bodies .  .  . including their tributaries.”55 Whether 
the congressional choice of navigable waters jurisdiction 
accomplished its expansive goals is questionable. Repre-
sentative Dingell himself explained the reach of navigable 
waters jurisdiction by describing judicial interpretation of a 
term denoting waterborne commerce.56 And while the Sen-
ate Committee Report urged that the “Committee fully 
intends that the term ‘navigable waters’ be given the broad-
est possible interpretation,” it prefaced that statement by 
confessing that “[o]ne term that the Committee was reluc-
tant to define was the term ‘navigable waters.’ The reluc-
tance was based on the fear that any interpretation would 
be read narrowly.”57 The Committee’s observation was not 
initially justified, but ultimately proved prescient.
Congress’ choice of navigable waters jurisdiction for the 
CWA appears not to extend to the full limits of Commerce 
Clause jurisdiction, because navigable waters evokes only 
the first of the three prongs of Commerce Clause jurisdiction 
the Supreme Court enunciated in United States v. Lopez58: 
(1)  channels of interstate commerce; (2)  instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce; and (3) activities substantially 
affecting interstate commerce. With regard to the CWA’s 
jurisdiction to regulate water pollution sources under the 
§402 permit program, many polluting discharges are not 
53. 118 Cong. Rec. H33756-57 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972) (statement of Rep. 
Dingell), reprinted in 1 Legis. History, supra note 48, at 250.
54. Congress was correct in this regard. The traditional definition of navigable 
waters under the Commerce Clause does not distinguish between inter-
state and intrastate waterways, as long as an intrastate waterway is part of 
a highway of foreign or interstate commerce. On the other hand, none of 
the enumerated powers in the Constitution explicitly or inferentially grant 
Congress the power to regulate interstate waters that are not highways or 
parts of a highway of interstate or foreign commerce.
55. It could be argued, however, that abandoning “the tributaries” in the Sen-
ate bill’s definition of navigable waters narrowed the definition to exclude 
tributaries. The more expansive definition from the Conference Commit-
tee, “waters of the United States,” coupled with the expansive language of 
the Conference Committee Report and the expansive meanings attributed 
to it by the sponsors on the House and Senate floors, however, rebut this 
negative inference.
56. 118 Cong. Rec. H9114-35 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972) (House Consideration 
of the Report of the Conference Committee), reprinted in 1 Legis. His-
tory, supra note 48, at 250.
57. S. Comm. on Pub. Works, Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972, S. Rep. No. 92-911 (1972), reprinted in 1 Legis. 
History, supra note 48, at 818.
58. 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
to traditional navigable waters, but instead to waters that 
are directly or indirectly tributary to traditional navigable 
waters. An industrial discharge of pollutants, for instance, 
may be to a ditch flowing into a small stream, which in 
turn flows into a larger stream that eventually flows into a 
navigable-in-fact river. An ordinary ditch59 is not a channel 
of interstate commerce in the traditional sense, although a 
discharge to the ditch might be considered an indirect dis-
charge to navigable waters, because the tributaries to a nav-
igable water in the aggregate contribute most of the flow of 
that water as well as most of the pollutants discharged to it, 
invoking either the first or third prong of Lopez.60
Municipal and industrial pollutants also might be con-
sidered instrumentalities of interstate commerce, analo-
gous to liquid and solid wastes that the Court has held are 
items in interstate commerce when they are transported on 
interstate roadways, invoking the second prong of Lopez.61 
Moreover, the discharge of pollutants to non-navigable 
water, aggregated with other discharges to the same or 
similar smaller waterways, can have adverse impact on the 
navigable waters they eventually flow into, again implicat-
ing the Lopez third prong of Commerce Clause jurisdiction 
and the Necessary and Proper Clause.62 Those arguments, 
however, are beyond the scope of this Article, because it 
interprets navigable waters in the CWA, not as a term of 
Commerce Clause jurisdiction.63
Congressional choice of navigable waters as the CWA’s 
jurisdictional basis implicitly limits its claim of jurisdiction 
only to the first of the three Lopez prongs of Commerce 
Clause jurisdiction, and that prong alone does not reach the 
59. Writing the plurality opinion in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 
735-36, 36 ELR 20116 (2006), Justice Antonin Scalia argues that a ditch 
cannot be navigable water because a ditch is a “point source.” The §502(14) 
definition of point source is a “discernible, confined and discrete convey-
ance,” and incorporates a list of inclusive examples, including “ditch.” He 
argues that a ditch cannot be “navigable water” because it is already a “point 
source” and the same thing cannot be two elements. Justice Scalia’s argu-
ment is a non sequitur, however. True, a ditch is a conveyance; it conveys 
water, whether or not navigable, but often polluted. A ditch is not water and 
therefore cannot be navigable water, although it can convey navigable water. 
Justice Scalia has confused the issue by conflating a ditch with the water it 
conveys, and conflating “point source” with “navigable waters.” Navigable 
waters are distinct from their beds, a distinction that underlies the doctrine 
that the public may use navigable water for fishing or transport, regardless 
of who owns the land beneath the waters.
60. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 743, 36 ELR 20116 (2006).
61. C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 24 ELR 20815 (1994); 
Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 22 ELR 20909 (1992); 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 8 ELR 20540 (1978). The anal-
ogy is not perfect, because the transportation of municipal garbage to and 
the disposal of it in landfills are compensable services, and hence traditional 
interstate commerce, while dumping liquid wastes in navigable waters or 
their tributaries is a free substitute for otherwise compensable services. That 
implicates Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), extending Commerce 
Clause jurisdiction to activities that would in themselves escape Commerce 
Clause jurisdiction but for their aggregate effect on interstate commerce.
62. U.S. Const., art I, §8, cl. 18.
63. Justice John Paul Stevens’ dissenting opinion in Solid Waste Agency of N. 
Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 192-
96, 31 ELR 20382 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting), joined by three other 
Justices, outlined the case for Commerce Clause jurisdiction over isolated 
ponds as habitat for migratory birds. Circuit courts had earlier reached simi-
lar conclusions. See, e.g., United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1209-11, 9 
ELR 20757 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 
504 F.2d 1317, 1325-28, 4 ELR 20784 (6th Cir. 1974).
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outer limits of Commerce Clause jurisdiction . Congress 
attempted to reach the outer limits of Commerce Clause 
jurisdiction by defining “navigable waters” as the expan-
sive “the waters of the United States” in CWA §502(7) and 
by repeated pronouncements in the legislative history to 
the effect that it intended to confer jurisdiction as broad 
as constitutionally possible . Despite the initial willingness 
of courts to interpret the term expansively, however, the 
jurisdictional term is still “navigable waters” and textualist 
jurists insist that “navigable” must have something to do 
with floating commerce .64
The CWA’s definition of navigable waters as the waters 
of the United States does not solve the problem, because 
while “navigable waters” has an established meaning, 
“waters of the United States” has no commonly under-
stood meaning . Representative Dingell’s explanation that 
waters of the United States is used in a geographical sense is 
ambiguous . The term could include the water in the glasses 
on our desks, the water vapor in the clouds above Kansas, 
water 500 feet below the surface that never flows into sur-
face water, or water on federal lands . “Waters of the United 
States,” standing alone, might be interpreted to break out 
of the first prong of the Lopez test to incorporate all three 
prongs . But for textualist jurists, defining navigable waters 
as waters of the United States does not abandon entirely the 
concept of waterborne transportation in navigable waters, 
because it evokes only the first prong of the Lopez test .
The issue is exacerbated by §404’s protection of wet-
lands, which EPA and the Corps interpret to include areas 
that might be dry land part of the year . Dry land does 
not appear to most people to be water, let alone navigable 
water . The Court has fixated on this issue .65 Three of the 
six Supreme Court decisions interpreting navigable water 
were §404 cases,66 and the Court reached narrow interpre-
tations of the term in two of those three decisions . These 
narrow interpretations affect §402 pollution control cases, 
where they raise the question of whether §402 governs 
additions of pollutants to remote or intermittent tributaries 
of navigable waters, in turn making it difficult to control 
the pollution of indisputably navigable waters into which 
these pollutants ultimately flow .67 If the CWA does not 
64 . See Rapanos, 547 U .S . at 734 (“The plain language of the statute simply 
does not authorize the ‘Land is Water’ approach to federal jurisdiction .”); 
SWANCC, 531 U .S . at 172 (“We cannot agree that Congress’ separate defi-
nitional use of the phrase ‘waters of the United States’ constitutes a basis for 
reading the term ’navigable waters’ out of the Statute .”) .
65 . Id.
66 . The six cases are Los Angeles Cnty. Flood Cont. Dist. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 133 S . Ct . 710, 43 ELR 20004 (2013); Rapanos, 547 U .S . 
715; South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U .S . 
95, 34 ELR 20021 (2004); SWANCC, 531 U .S . 159; International Paper 
Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U .S . 481, 17 ELR 20327 (1987); and United States 
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U .S . 121, 16 ELR 20086 (1985) . Of 
these six, Rapanos, SWANCC, and Riverside Bayview were all §404 decisions, 
and form the focus of the Article’s discussion .
67 . Compare United States v . Robinson, 505 F .3d 1208 (11th Cir . 2007), decid-
ed after Rapanos, with United States v . Texas Pipe Line Co ., 611 F .2d 345, 
10 ELR 20184 (10th Cir . 1979); United States v . Ashland Oil & Transp . 
Co ., F .2d 1317, 4 ELR 20784 (6th Cir . 1974); and Sun Enters ., Inc . v . 
Train, 394 F . Supp . 1212 (C .D .N .Y . 1975), all decided before Riverside Bay-
view, the first Supreme Court CWA decision interpreting navigable water . 
provide the agencies with jurisdiction to stop additions of 
pollutants to remote or intermittent tributaries of navigable 
waters, it cannot stop those pollutants from flowing into 
navigable waters, thwarting admitted congressional juris-
diction to control pollution of navigable waters .
2. Section 404
The role of §404 in wetlands protection is obvious today, 
but it was not obvious when Congress enacted the CWA in 
1972 . The initial §404 contained only §404(a)-(c), which 
have scarcely been altered since .68 The word “wetland” did 
not then and does not now appear in §404(a)-(c) . Indeed, 
the word wetland did not appear in the descriptions and 
explanations of §404 in any of the committee reports 
accompanying the House, Senate, or Conference Com-
mittee bills or in any of the congressional debates over the 
bills leading to enactment of the 1972 legislation . A close 
reading of §404(a)-(c) and its legislative history suggests 
Congress intended to establish a program regulating the 
disposal in open water of spoil from dredging rivers and 
harbors for navigation maintenance, rather than a pro-
gram regulating the filling of wetlands . Indeed, the legis-
lative history demonstrates that is exactly what Congress 
intended it to be .
Dredging is essential to waterborne commerce . Har-
bors and navigational channels must be dredged or they 
will fill with silt and become impassable . Construction in 
navigable waters also requires dredging bottom sediments 
to make way for the foundations of bridges, jetties, and 
other water-related structures . To carry out such activities, 
vast quantities of bottom sediment, commonly known as 
dredged spoil, must be removed and disposed . Existing 
legislation prohibited dredging in navigable waters without 
a Corps permit .69 As part of a permit for a dredging proj-
ect, the Corps specified where and how the dredged spoil 
generated by the project would be disposed .
As a result of NEPA70 and the Fish and Wildlife Coor-
dination Act,71 the Corps increasingly took environ-
mental concerns into account in dredged spoil disposal 
decisions .72 Rather than designating individual disposal 
sites for each project, the Corps began to designate 
regional sites that could be used for multiple dredging 
All four circuit court decisions involved discharges to remote tributaries, 
flowing through several intermediary tributaries to navigable water .
68 . Compare Pub . L . No . 92-500, §404, 86 Stat . 816, 884 (1972), with 33 
U .S .C . §1344 (2006) .
69 . 33 U .S .C . §403 .
70 . See 42 U .S .C . §§4321-4370h . NEPA requires federal agencies to consider 
environmental impacts when taking actions . Indeed, when an agency takes 
a major federal action, it must produce an environmental impact statement 
disclosing the environmental consequences of proposed action and alterna-
tive actions .
71 . Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U .S . C . §§661-666 . This statute 
requires federal agencies taking actions that will alter a water body to consult 
with the U .S . Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) to preserve wildlife resources .
72 . See Want, supra note 16, at §2 .02[1] . The Corps’ “public interest review” 
began in 1968, when it began to take environmental and public interest 
factors into account in issuing permits . See 33 C .F .R . §209 .120(d) . For 
a description of one such disposal project, see American Dredging Co. v. 
Dutchshyn, 480 F . Supp . 957 (E .D . Pa . 1979) .
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projects in an area, thereby limiting the number of envi-
ronmental reviews required for disposal areas . Hence, 
the Corps has authority to issue discharge permits “at 
specified disposal sites” in §404(a) . Although dredged 
spoil could be disposed on land, it was more feasible to 
dispose of this semi-solid ooze in open water, includ-
ing the ocean .73 Hence, EPA has authority in §404(b) to 
develop guidelines for the Corps to use in designating 
“each such disposal site .” While environmental advo-
cates were only becoming aware of environmental con-
cerns from the disposal of dredged spoil in open waters, 
maritime interests were acutely aware that delays in the 
use of disposal sites would interrupt dredging necessary 
for maritime commerce .
The legislative history of §404 reflected a policy con-
flict between prevention of water pollution and promo-
tion of waterborne commerce . The Senate bill, S . 2770, 
the primary model for much of the CWA, contained no 
§404, but instead treated dredged spoil as just another 
pollutant subject to the §402 permit program .74 Senators 
proposed an amendment in the Public Works Committee 
to authorize the Corps rather than EPA to regulate the 
disposal of dredged spoil, but the Committee rejected the 
amendment .75 In the Senate debate on S . 2770, Sen . Allen 
Ellender (D-La .) asserted that “strict adherence to the 
published standards [for pollution control] would result 
in 90 per cent of the ports and harbors of the United 
States being closed, until such time as land disposal areas 
are provided . This would create a catastrophic situation 
with respect to our foreign and domestic commerce .”76 
Senator Muskie, tacitly acknowledging the problem,77 
offered an amendment to the Senate bill adding §402(m), 
which basically required EPA to issue permits for the dis-
charge of dredged material certified by the Corps unless 
EPA found that the disposal would adversely affect water 
supplies, fisheries, shellfish beds, and so forth . The Senate 
adopted this amendment .78
Maritime interests had greater success in the House . The 
House bill authorized the Corps to issue permits for the 
discharge of “dredged or fill material” where it would not 
unreasonably affect human health or the environment .79 
Although it required the Corps to apply EPA guidelines 
for such discharge, it allowed the Corps to disregard the 
guidelines if there was no economically feasible alternative 
reasonably available .80 Again, the concern was that “until 
73 . See 1 Legis . History, supra note 48, at 177-78 .
74 . S . 2770, 92nd Cong . §§402, 504(f ) (1971), reprinted in 2 Legis . History, 
supra note 48, at 1534, 1685, 1697 .
75 . S . Rep . No . 92-414, at 92 (rollcall votes during Committee consideration), 
id . at 1415, 1509 .
76 . 117 Cong . Rec . S . 2770 (daily ed . Nov . 2, 1971) (statement of Sen . El-
lender), id. at 1386-88 .
77 . After all, he was a senator from Maine, where Portland is one of the most 
active ports on the East Coast because it receives oil tankers offloading cargo 
for transfer by pipeline to Canada .
78 . 117 Cong . Rec . S . 2770 (daily ed . Nov . 2, 1971), reprinted in 2 Legis . 
History, supra note 48, at 1392-93 .
79 . H .R . 11896, reprinted in 1 Legis . History, supra note 48, at 1063 .
80 . H .R . Rep . No . 92-911, at 130 (1972), reprinted in 1 Legis . History, supra 
note 48, at 816 . 
such time as economic and feasible alternative methods are 
available, no arbitrary or unreasonable restrictions shall be 
imposed on dredging activities essential for the mainte-
nance of interstate and foreign commerce .”81 The wording 
of the Conference Committee Report underlined congres-
sional intention to deal with spoil from dredging to main-
tain navigation . Thus “specific spoil” was to be deposited at 
a site; the section dealt with the “disposal of dredged spoil”; 
and advancing technology would eventually end the need 
for “dumping dredged spoil” in water .82
The relationship between CWA §§403 and 404 under-
scores that §404 was aimed at open-water disposal of spoil 
from dredging rivers and harbors . Section 403(c) required 
EPA to develop guidelines to protect human health and 
welfare and marine life and diversity, from the discharge 
of pollutants into the territorial seas, contiguous zone, and 
ocean . Section 404(b) forbade the issuance of a §404 per-
mit not meeting the §403 guidelines unless the “economic 
impact of the site on navigation and anchorage” (empha-
sis added) outweighs compliance with the guidelines . The 
§403 criteria are designed to protect marine waters and are 
irrelevant to filling wetlands, again suggesting that Con-
gress intended §404 to regulate the open-water disposal 
of spoil from dredging rivers and harbors rather than fill-
ing wetlands . The Corps’ authority to override EPA’s cri-
teria because of their economic impact on navigation and 
anchorage reiterates the section’s purpose to address spoil 
from dredging for navigation purposes .
Nevertheless, §404(a)-(c) authorized the Corps to regu-
late the discharge of “dredged or fill material” (emphasis 
added) into navigable waters . The entire wetlands protec-
tion tilt of CWA §404 derives from the inclusion of fill 
material in §404 . That term, however, is at best ambiguous 
in addressing protection of wetlands from landfilling activ-
ities . Fill material could mean material to fill abutments, 
jetties, and other marine structures, but it has come to 
include material removed from high elevations in a wetland 
and then redeposited at lower elevations in the same wet-
land, thus converting it to fast land . The term originated 
in H .R . 11896, §404, which provided that discharges of 
dredged or fill material “will not unreasonably degrade or 
endanger  .  .  . the marine environment,” (emphasis added) 
evidencing legislative intent to deal with dredged spoil dis-
posed in marine waters rather than filling wetlands . The 
Report accompanying the bill expressed the intent of the 
House Committee on Public Works that the Corps “shall 
act promptly on the dredging permits essential for the 
maintenance of interstate commerce,”83 emphasizing the 
same intent to regulate the dredging of navigable chan-
nels . The absence of congressional intent to regulate filling 
of wetlands in §404 is also evident from the disconnect 
between “fill” and “pollutant” in the CWA; the definition 
81 . Id. at 817 .
82 . 1 Legis . History, supra note 48, at 117, 236, 177 .
83 . H .R . Rep . No . 92-911, at 129-30 (1972), reprinted in 1 Legis . History, 
supra note 48, at 816-17 .
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of pollutant in §502(6) includes dredged spoil, but does 
not mention fill or dredged or fill material .84
Even when the Corps first promulgated regulations to 
administer §404, the program it described was for dis-
posing of dredged spoil from maintaining navigational 
waterways . Although those regulations acknowledged the 
importance of wetlands, the only wetland protections the 
regulations anticipated was care in discharging dredged 
spoil from navigational maintenance into wetlands . 
Indeed, the Corps did not include wetlands in its defini-
tions of navigable waters .85 EPA’s initial regulatory defini-
tion of navigable water did not mention wetlands either .86
Section 404 is so associated with wetlands protec-
tion today that its original goal to facilitate navigational 
dredging is forgotten or altogether unknown . The consid-
erable legislative history expressing concern that §404 not 
interfere with the maintenance of navigation or anchorage 
and the complete absence of legislative concern that §404 
not interfere with agriculture and development, points 
directly at disposal of spoil from navigational dredging, 
rather than filling wetlands, as the focus of §404 . Even 
the story told by the Corps’ general counsel when the 
agency began to administer the section to protect wet-
lands acknowledges that the section was not designed to 
protect wetlands from landclearing .87
While protection of wetlands contributes to the control 
of pollution in navigable waters and provides other envi-
ronmental and economic benefits, such a significant expan-
sion of a statute’s jurisdiction would not ordinarily be made 
without notice to both legislative chambers . Yet, there was 
no such notice in any of the following: the draft legisla-
tion; reports of the House Public Works Committee, Sen-
ate Public Works Committee, or Conference Committee; 
debates on the bills in either chamber; or the explanations 
of the Conference Committee’s actions to either the House 
or the Senate . The omissions in this legislative history raise 
significant questions on the legitimacy of the entire initial 
wetlands protection orientation of EPA and the Corps’ ini-
tial wetlands protection program under §404 .
84 . This omission does not affect the reach of the section’s jurisdiction, because 
most fill material is composed wholly or partially of material defined as a 
pollutant in §502(6); for example, sand or rock . See Miller, Pollutant, supra 
note 7, at 10974-77 .
85 . The Corps’ proposed regulations addressed “policy, practice and procedures 
 .  .  . in connection with [the Corps’] performance of Federal dredging proj-
ects .” 39 Fed . Reg . 6113 (Feb . 19, 1974) (emphasis added) . The final regu-
lations addressed those policies, practices, and procedures “in connection 
with  .  .  . the review of Federal projects performed by the Corps of Engineers 
which involve the disposal of dredged material in navigable water .” 39 Fed . 
Reg . 26635 (July 22, 1974) (emphasis added) . Both required the Corps to 
consider the “effect on wetlands” of proposed projects, 39 Fed . Reg . 6114, 
26637, but neither mentioned wetlands outside of that narrow paragraph . 
These regulations dealt only with “Federal dredging projects .” The Corps 
traditionally had conducted projects to dredge navigable channels and har-
bors . Private landclearing activities to convert wetlands to other uses are not 
“Federal dredging projects .”
86 . 40 C .F .R . §125 .1(o), 38 Fed . Reg . 13528, 13529 (May 22, 1973) .
87 . See Charles D . Abalard & Charles Boru O’Neill, Wetlands Protection and 
Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972, 1 Vt . 
L . Rev . 51 (1975), at 71-74 .
In 1977, Congress enacted a set of “mid-course correc-
tion” amendments to the CWA .88 One of the chief con-
troversies in the congressional deliberations was over the 
scope of §404 . Farming and development interests, asleep 
at the switch when Congress enacted §404 in 1972, now 
launched a coordinated effort to scale back the scope of 
regulations on filling wetlands . While interest regarding 
§404 during the enactment of the 1972 legislation was 
focused entirely on allowing disposal of spoil from dredg-
ing rivers and harbors to maintain navigation, interest 
regarding §404 during the 1977 legislation was focused 
entirely on the scope of regulation on filling wetlands to 
promote agriculture and development .89 Although efforts 
for significant reductions in the jurisdiction of the pro-
gram were unsuccessful, considerable accommodations 
to agricultural and development interests were adopted,90 
increasing the section to more than nine times its original 
length .91 The depth of attention to §404 in 1977 suggests 
that if Congress had been aware in 1972 that the section 
could be used to regulate filling of wetlands, at least some 
legislative attention would have been devoted to wetlands 
in 1972 .
IV. Administrative Action: Regulatory 
Definitions of Navigable Waters and 
Wetlands
A. Navigable Waters
Although EPA implements the CWA §402 permit program 
for the discharge of pollutants, EPA and the Corps share 
administration of the CWA §404 program for the dis-
charge of dredged or fill material . Pursuant to §404(a) & 
(s), the Corps issues §404 permits and enforces against vio-
lations of the section . EPA, however, supervises the Corps’ 
conduct of the program . Pursuant to §404(b), EPA issues 
guidelines that the Corps must follow in deciding whether 
to issue and how to condition permits; under §404(c), 
EPA may veto Corps-proposed permits as contrary to the 
requirements of the CWA; and it is authorized by §404(n) 
to enforce against the discharge of dredged or fill material 
without a §404 permit or in violation of the terms of a 
§404 permit . In §404(g), Congress also gave EPA author-
ity to approve state programs to administer §404 in place 
of the Corps, except in traditionally navigable waters; and 
in §404(i), Congress authorized the Agency to withdraw 
approval if a state no longer meets the requirements for 
approval . Both EPA and the Corps have promulgated regu-
88 . See Weyerhaeuser Co . v . Costle, 590 F .2d 1011, 43, 9 ELR 20284 (D .C . 
Cir . 1978) .
89 . Pub . L . No . 95-217, 91 Stat . 1556 (1977) . See H .R . Rep . No . 95-139 
(1977), reprinted in 4 Legis . History, supra note 48, at 1195, 1215-20; 
and additional views of Reps . Robert Edgar and John Myers, id. at 1247-51 .
90 . Pub . L . No . 95-217, §67(a) & (b), 91 Stat . 1556, 1600-06 (1977) .
91 . Subsections 404(a)-(c) have changed little since their enactment in 1972 . 
All the following subsections were added later . In the 2006 edition of the 
U .S . Code, §404 occupies nine page-long columns, of which §404(a)-(c) 
occupies less than one column . See id . at 950-54 .
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latory definitions of navigable waters92; moreover, each has 
promulgated two definitions of the term, one for use only 
under §404, and one for use under other programs that the 
agencies administer .93
Prior to the CWA’s enactment, the Corps had promul-
gated a regulatory definition of navigable waters for use in 
all of its water-related programs, reflecting the traditional 
judicial interpretation of “navigable waters .” A few weeks 
prior to the statute’s enactment, the Corps amended that 
definition to reflect extensive, up-to-date research on judi-
cial interpretation of the term: “those waters of the United 
States which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, 
and/or are presently, or have been in the past, or may be 
in the future susceptible for use for purposes of interstate 
or foreign commerce .”94 The Corps continued to use that 
definition under §404 .95
EPA’s initial definition of navigable waters, adopted for 
the §402 permit program, expanded it beyond the tradi-
tional judicial interpretation to include: (1)  tributaries of 
navigable waters; (2)  interstate waters; and (3)  intrastate 
waters (a)  used by interstate travelers for recreation and 
other purposes, (b) from which fish or shellfish are taken 
and sold in interstate commerce, or (c) utilized for indus-
trial purposes by industries in interstate commerce .96 But 
that definition made no mention of wetlands . Shortly 
thereafter, EPA promulgated interim final guidelines under 
§404(b)(1), including a definition of navigable waters that 
did not mention wetlands or tributaries, but incorporated 
by reference the Corps’ general definition of navigable 
waters .97 EPA’s guidelines, however, stated that destruc-
tion of wetlands was one of the most egregious results of 
discharges of dredged and fill material .98 Although the 
interim final nature of the guidelines invited comments 
and promised revisions if warranted by the comments, EPA 
did not revise the guidelines for several years . When the 
Agency did revise, it adopted the definition it had subse-
quently developed for “waters of the United States” under 
§402, including tributaries and adding wetlands adjacent 
to other waters of the United States .99
The significant differences between the Corps and 
EPA’s initial definitions of navigable waters were contrary 
to the interpretive canon that words are interpreted con-
92 . Compare 40 C .F .R . §122 .2 (EPA definition), with 33 C .F .R . §328 .3 
(Corps definition) .
93 . EPA’s 40 C .F .R . §122 .2 definition applies to the §402 permit program 
and its 40 C .F .R . §230 .3 definition applies to the §404 permit program . 
The Corps’ 33 C .F .R . §328 definition applies to the §404 permit program 
and its 33 C .F .R . §329 definition applies to the programs it administers in 
aid of navigation .
94 . Abalard & O’Neill, supra note 87, at 65 . See also 37 Fed . Reg . 18289 (Sept . 
9, 1972) .
95 . See the Corps’ initial regulations under §404 at 33 C .F .R . §209 .145(d)(1)
(1975), 39 Fed . Reg . 26635, 26637 (July 22, 1974) . In that definition of 
navigable waters, the Corps referenced and incorporated the more-detailed 
definition it had earlier developed for all its water-related programs, then 
contained in 33 C .F .R . §209 .260 . Neither definition mentioned wetlands 
adjacent to navigable waters or tributaries of navigable waters .
96 . 40 C .F .R . §125 .1(p) (1974) .
97 . 40 C .F .R . §230 .2(b), 40 Fed . Reg . 41292-93 (Sept . 5, 1975) .
98 . 40 C .F .R . §320 .4-1(a), 40 Fed . Reg . 41292, 41294 (Sept . 5, 1975) .
99 . 45 Fed . Reg . 85340, 85346 (Dec . 24, 1980) .
sistently throughout a statute unless the statute explic-
itly required otherwise . The introductory phrase in CWA 
§502, “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided, when 
used in this chapter  .   .   .” a term, e .g ., “navigable waters,” 
reiterates the canon . Nothing in the CWA specifically pro-
vides that the term navigable waters has different mean-
ings in §§402 and 404 . The differences between EPA and 
the Corps’ initial regulatory definitions of navigable water 
reflected the Corps’ historical authority to make improve-
ments in aid of navigation, covering traditional Com-
merce Clause highways of commerce jurisdiction; and 
EPA’s recent mission to reduce water pollution in all of 
the nation’s waters, reaching beyond traditional highways 
of commerce jurisdiction . The difference led to confusion 
and conflict within the executive branch and between the 
executive branch and the interested publics .
Both EPA and the U .S . Department of Justice (DOJ) 
believed that the Corps’ initial definition of navigable 
waters was too narrow, particularly with regard to its fail-
ure to include wetlands, and they unsuccessfully urged 
the Corps to expand its definition . Environmental advo-
cates won an early case challenging the Corps’ regulations 
as too narrow, particularly because they did not include 
wetlands .100 The Corps was dissatisfied with DOJ’s repre-
sentation in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway 
because DOJ agreed with EPA; accordingly, DOJ allowed 
the Corps to present its views to the district court .101 Find-
ing with little analysis that Congress intended to confer 
in the CWA “federal jurisdiction over the nations’ waters 
to the maximum extent permissible under the Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution,” the court ordered the Corps to 
promulgate a more expansive definition .102 That, plus some 
nudging by DOJ,103 led the Corps to promulgate a defi-
nition of navigable waters parallel to EPA’s, but including 
wetlands adjacent to navigable waters .104 The Corps began 
a practice of publishing two definitions of navigable waters, 
one for all of its water-related programs except for §404, 
and another for §404 . It continues that practice today .105
EPA’s initial regulations defined and used “navigable 
waters” and did not define or use “waters of the United 
States .”106 In 1980 amendments to its regulations, EPA 
ceased defining navigable waters or using that term; 
instead, the Agency defined and used the term waters of 
the United States .107 EPA explained it did so “for the same 
100 . Natural Resources Defense Council v . Callaway, 392 F . Supp . 685, 5 ELR 
20285 (D .D .C . 1975) . See also Abalard & O’Neil, supra note 87, at 63, 
n .68 .
101 . Callaway, 392 F . Supp . 685 .
102 . Id. at 686 .
103 . DOJ issued an opinion stating that EPA rather than the Corps had author-
ity to interpret the term navigable waters in §404 because EPA administers 
the entire CWA, which is premised on navigable waters jurisdiction, while 
the Corps’ role is limited to implementing §404, and the CWA authorizes 
EPA to oversee the Corps’ administration of §404 . See 43 U .S . Op . Atty . 
Gen . 197 (Sept . 5, 1979) .
104 . See Want, supra note 16, at §2 .02[3] .
105 . 33 C .F .R . §328 (definition for the §404 program), 33 C .F .R . §329 (defini-
tion for other Corps programs) .
106 . 45 Fed . Reg . 33290, 33298 (May 19, 1980) .
107 . Id. at 33424 .
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reason that [“the waters of the United States”] is used 
in the Clean Water Act: the Act covers much more than 
waters that are traditionally ‘navigable .’”108 The Corps’ reg-
ulations under §404 also switched from defining navigable 
waters to defining waters of the United States .109 Neither 
EPA nor the Corps can amend the CWA to eliminate navi-
gable waters from its text . Perhaps, the agencies hoped that 
if they began to articulate the jurisdictional basis of the 
CWA exclusively as waters of the United States rather than 
navigable waters, the world would follow . In any event, the 
Supreme Court did not .
As currently framed, EPA’s regulatory definition of the 
waters of the United States means: (a)  traditionally navi-
gable waters; (b)  interstate waters, including wetlands; 
(c) other waters110 whose “use, degradation or destruction 
would  .  .  . or could affect interstate or foreign commerce”111; 
(d) impoundments of waters identified in (a)-(c); (e) tribu-
taries of waters identified in (a)-(c); (f)  the territorial sea; 
and (g)  wetlands adjacent to waters identified in (a)-(f) . 
The definition excludes “waste treatment systems, includ-
ing treatments ponds or lagoons designed to meet the 
requirements of the CWA .”112
This definition was promulgated prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in SWANCC and Rapanos. Subse-
quently, EPA and the Corps eventually issued a guid-
ance document interpreting waters of the United States 
in light of those decisions, and followed with proposed 
revisions of the regulatory definitions .113 The proposed 
definitions are not identical to the guidance, but are 
largely based on it . Rather than describing the guid-
ance, this Article analyzes the proposed regulations as 
the EPA’s latest interpretation of the jurisdictional term . 
The proposed definitions114 would include (a)  tradition-
ally navigable waters; (b)  interstate waters, including 
interstate wetlands; (c) the territorial seas; (d) impound-
ments of navigable waters identified elsewhere in the 
definition; (e)  tributaries of navigable waters identified 
in (a) through (c); (f ) waters, including wetlands, adja-
108 . Id. at 33298 .
109 . Compare 33 C .F .R . §209 .145(d)(1), 39 Fed . Reg . 26635, 26637 (July 22, 
1974), with 33 C .F .R . §328 .3 (2013) .
110 . Including “intrastate lakes, rivers streams (including intermittent streams), 
mudflats, sandflats, ‘wetlands,’ sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, pla-
ya lakes, or natural ponds .”
111 . The definition includes the following uses as potentially affecting interstate 
commerce: (1) use by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other 
activities; (2) harvesting fish or shellfish for sale in interstate or foreign com-
merce; and (3) use or industrial purposes by industries in interstate or for-
eign commerce .
112 . But “the exclusion applies only to manmade bodies of water which neither 
were originally created in waters of the United States [ ] nor resulted from 
the impoundment of waters of the United States .”
113 . The guidance document can be found at http://water .epa/gov/lawsregs/
guidance/wetlands/CWAwaters .efm . The proposed regulation appears at 79 
Fed . Reg . 22188, 22267-68 (proposed Apr . 21, 2014) .
114 . The proposal would amend 10 different EPA and Corps regulations with 
identical or substantially identical definitions of navigable waters or wa-
ters of the United States . See 33 C .F .R . §328 .3, 40 C .F .R . §§110 .1, 112 .2, 
116 .3, 117 .9(i), 122 .2, 230 .3(s) & (t), 232 .2, 300 .5, 300 Appendix E to 
Part 300, 3 .2 .3 and 401 .11, 79 Fed . Reg . 22188, 22262-74 . References 
in this Article are to proposed amendments to 40 C .F .R . §122 .2, EPA’s 
primary definition of waters of the United States, from which most of the 
other amendments are derived .
cent to waters identified in (a) through (e); and (g) on a 
case-by-case basis other waters that, alone or aggregated 
with similarly situated waters, have a “significant nexus” 
to waters identified elsewhere in the definition . The pro-
posal adds definitions of “adjacent” and “tributary” and 
provides that wetlands can be tributaries . Finally, EPA 
provides scientific justifications for its definitions, espe-
cially of adjacency and tributaries .115 (EPA’s current and 
proposed definitions are set forth in Appendix I .)
The proposal makes the most aggressive claim of juris-
diction possible for tributaries and wetlands after the two 
Supreme Court decisions . But it drops any claim of juris-
diction over discharges to groundwater . And it disclaims 
jurisdiction over waters because they are used for fishing 
and recreation or other activities affecting or potentially 
affecting interstate or foreign commerce . The proposal and 
its effects will be analyzed as they impact the categories of 
water discussed below .
B. Wetlands
EPA defines wetlands as “areas that are inundated or satu-
rated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration 
sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances 
do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted 
for life in saturated soil conditions . Wetlands generally 
include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas .”116 The 
Corps’ definition is similar .117 The EPA/Corps’ proposed 
amendment of the definition of waters of the United States 
defines wetlands in the same manner .118 But the Corps and 
EPA went much further to develop a Wetlands Delineation 
Manual, detailing the types of soils and vegetation that are 
typical of saturated soil conditions .119 Avoyelles Sportsmen’s 
League, Inc. v. Marsh provides a good example of a hotly 
contested delineation .120
V. Judicial Interpretation of Navigable 
Waters Under the CWA
Because courts have had no difficulty in finding that dis-
charges into traditionally navigable water, such as tidal 
water,121 the territorial seas,122 and major inland water-
ways123 are within the jurisdiction of the CWA, this Article 
will not discuss such decisions . Instead, it will focus on 
areas of controversy . Most decisions interpreting navigable 
waters have arisen in five contexts: (1) remote or dry tribu-
115 . 79 Fed . Reg . 22188, 22222-52 (proposed Apr . 21, 2014) .
116 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .2 (2013) .
117 . 33 C .F .R . §328 .3 .
118 . 79 Fed . Reg . 22268(c)(6) .
119 . For the history of the Wetlands Delineation Manual, see Want, supra note 
16, at §4 .09 .
120 . 715 F .2d 897, 13 ELR 20942 (5th Cir . 1983) .
121 . United States v . Milner, 583 F .3d 1174, 39 ELR 20232 (9th Cir . 2009) 
(expansion of jurisdiction above mean high tide) . See also Want, supra note 
16, at 2-9 & n .1082; Abalard & O’Neill, supra note 87, at 85 .
122 . Natural Res . Def . Council v . EPA, 863 F .2d 1420, 19 ELR 20225 (9th Cir . 
1998) .
123 . Gibbons v . Ogden, 9 Wheat . 1 (1866) .
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taries; (2) wetlands; (3)  isolated waters; (4)  groundwater; 
and (5) unitary navigable water .
The tributary and wetlands decisions are often inter-
twined and are analyzed together because to be within 
the jurisdiction of the CWA to reach the full extent of 
Congress, wetlands must be adjacent to navigable waters, 
often tributaries of traditionally navigable water . The 
Corps established the adjacency requirement in its regu-
lations .124 No court has explicitly suggested a statutory 
or constitutional requirement of adjacency, apart from this 
regulation, although the suggestion may be inherent in the 
Rapanos plurality’s analysis .125 Thus, whether a wetland 
is within CWA jurisdiction often depends on whether an 
adjacent tributary is navigable; accordingly, many deci-
sions on the navigability of tributaries are §404 decisions . 
The lower courts’ decisions on whether tributaries and 
wetlands are within the CWA’s jurisdiction usually reflect 
the latest Supreme Court decision on the subject . This 
Article, therefore, considers tributary and wetlands deci-
sions together and organizes them by reference to the latest 
preceding Supreme Court decision on the CWA’s navigable 
water jurisdiction .
Prior to any Supreme Court decision interpreting navi-
gable waters in the CWA, the lower courts followed the 
admonition of the CWA’s legislative history to interpret 
the jurisdictional reach of the CWA to the extent of Con-
gress’ constitutional jurisdiction over waters of the United 
States . Lower courts interpreted the term broadly to extend 
to the following: primary tributaries, flowing directly 
into traditionally navigable waters; very remote tributar-
ies, flowing eventually into traditionally navigable waters 
through a series of intermediate tributaries; and their adja-
cent wetlands . These expansive interpretations by the lower 
courts continued after Riverside Bayview,126 the Supreme 
Court’s first CWA decision interpreting §404 or navigable 
waters under the CWA . In that decision, the Court held 
that wetlands adjacent to tributaries of traditionally navi-
gable waters were within the jurisdiction of the CWA . The 
decision did not define which tributaries were within the 
CWA’s jurisdiction, but the tributaries at issue were remote 
and the decision suggested an expansive interpretation of 
navigable waters .
The Court’s next §404 decision, SWANCC,127 did not 
deal with wetlands or tributaries, but held that isolated 
waters were not navigable, signaling that there is a limit 
to the jurisdictional reach of “navigable waters .” After 
SWANCC, a few lower courts began to narrow their inter-
pretations of navigable waters, but only a few . Rapanos,128 
the Court’s latest §404 decision, dealt directly with wet-
lands and tributaries of navigable waters and did so in a 
restrictive manner . Because the Court could not muster a 
124 . 33 C .F .R . §209(d)(2((i)(b), 40 Fed . Reg . 31324 (1975) .
125 . Rapanos v . United States, 547 U .S . 715, 36 ELR 20116 (2006) .
126 . United States v . Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc ., 474 U .S . 121, 16 ELR 
20086 (1985) .
127 . Solid Waste Agency of N . Cook Cnty . v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs
(SWANCC), 531 U .S . 159, 31 ELR 20382 (2001) .
128 . Rapanos, 547 U .S . 715 .
majority opinion, Rapanos’ precedential value is uncertain; 
as a result, lower courts have spent much of their inter-
pretive energies deciphering how to apply it. Nevertheless, 
lower courts have narrowed their interpretations of navi-
gable water to varying degrees, sometimes startlingly so .
Courts have fairly consistently held that isolated waters 
are not navigable . Although courts also have fairly consis-
tently held that groundwater is not navigable, some have 
held that when a defendant adds pollutants to groundwater 
that flows into a nearby navigable water or its tributary, 
the groundwater is navigable, a proposition that has not 
been retested since Rapanos in 2006 and that may have 
difficulty surviving that decision . EPA’s proposed redefini-
tion of waters of the United States excludes groundwater .129 
EPA’s “unitary navigable waters” theory is raised at various 
points, but is particularly relevant to the Agency’s water 
transfer rule and will be discussed in conjunction with that 
rule . Water diversions and transfers raise particular prob-
lems in the context of navigable waters .130
A. Tributaries and Wetlands
The Supreme Court’s traditional interpretation of Com-
merce Clause authority to regulate activities on navigable 
waters did not include tributaries or wetlands unless they 
independently meet the criteria for navigable waters . But 
the Court also has recognized that federally authorized 
activities on navigable waters, such as flood control, often 
can be accomplished only if they also take place on non-
navigable tributaries to navigable waters . Indeed, the Court 
recognized the necessity of and constitutional permissibil-
ity of a watershed approach to flood control,131 an extension 
of Commerce Clause jurisdiction authorized by the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause .132 Congress could not perform 
its Commerce Clause authority to promote and protect 
interstate and foreign commerce, including waterborne 
commerce, from flooding without flood control projects 
on non-navigable tributaries of navigable water .
1. Tributaries
Because the protection of navigable waters from pollution 
requires the protection of their tributaries from pollution, 
it is logical that the CWA’s definition of navigable waters 
includes their tributaries . If the CWA does not control 
the addition of pollutants to the tributaries of a navigable 
water, pollutants added to those tributaries will flow into 
and pollute the navigable water, making it impossible for 
the CWA to control the pollution of traditionally navi-
gable waters . Congress recognized this when it enacted 
the Refuse Act, prohibiting the deposit of refuse “into any 
navigable water of the United States, or into any tributary 
of any navigable water from which the same shall float or 
129 . 79 Fed . Reg . 22188, 22268 (proposed Apr . 21, 2014) . The proposed rule 
would be codified at 40 C .F .R . §122 .2(b)(5)(vi), Waters of the United States .
130 . See Miller, Addition, supra note 4, at 10780-94 .
131 . Oklahoma ex rel . Phillips v . Atkinson, 313 U .S . 508 (1941) .
132 . U .S . Const ., art . I, §8, cl . 18 .
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and succinct answer to Justice Scalia’s concerns is a disap-
pointing aspect of its rulemaking to date .
2. Wetlands
The traditional definition of navigable waters did not 
include wetlands as such . The Corps’ first regulatory defi-
nition of navigable waters did not include wetlands,136 nor 
did EPA’s .137 After Natural Resources Defense Council v. 
Callaway138 overturned the Corps’ regulations as too nar-
row, the Corps promulgated new regulations substantially 
expanding its definition of navigable waters, most notably 
including wetlands adjacent to coastal or inland navigable 
waters,139 and EPA followed suit .
3. Pre-Riverside Bayview Decisions
Twenty-nine of the 108 (27%) lower court decisions inter-
preting navigable waters under the CWA in the context 
of tributaries or wetlands were decided before the first 
Supreme Court decision on §404 and wetlands, Riverside 
Bayview,140 issued in 1985 . All but one of those 29 deci-
sions (that is, 97%) decided that the waters at issue were 
navigable; the one negative decision was based on unusual 
equities rather than reflecting a narrow interpretation of 
navigable waters .141
One of the decisions was in a challenge by environ-
mental groups to the Corps’ initial regulations claiming 
jurisdiction under §404 only for discharges to traditionally 
navigable waters . The court issued a terse decision ordering 
the Corps to promulgate a more expansive definition of 
navigable waters .142 Once the Corps did so, Wyoming and 
Puerto Rico unsuccessfully challenged its more expansive 
regulations as intruding on their jurisdictions over intra-
state or intra-commonwealth waters .143
a. Tributaries
No decisions during this period held that a stream, lake, 
or other tributary was not navigable . Six of the deci-
136 . 33 C .F .R . §209 .102(d)(1) (1975) .
137 . 40 C .F .R . §125 .1(p) (1975) .
138 . 392 F . Supp . 685, 5 ELR 20285 (D .D .C . 1975) .
139 . 33 C .F .R . §209 .120(d)(2)(b) & (h), 40 Fed . Reg . 31320, 31324 (July 25, 
1975) .
140 . United States v . Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc ., 474 U .S . 121, 16 ELR 
20086 (1985) . See tbls . A & B at the end of the Article . In using tbl . B to 
confirm this and other calculations in the text or to make your own calcula-
tions, beware that the groupings of lower court decisions between Supreme 
Court decisions include more than just tributary and wetlands cases . For 
instance, the pre-Riverside Bayview groupings of circuit and district court 
decisions include 33 decisions, of which 29 are tributary or wetlands cases .
141 . See tbl . B . The one exception is United States v. City of Fort Pierre, 747 F .2d 
464, 15 ELR 20177 (8th Cir . 1984) . The Corps’ own dredging and disposal 
of dredge spoil created a wetland on private property, where there had been 
no wetland before . The court viewed it as inequitable that the Corps could 
expand its jurisdiction by its own activities .
142 . Callaway, 392 F . Supp . 685 .
143 . Wyoming v . Hoffman, 437 F . Supp . 114, 8 ELR 20001 (D . Wyo . 1977); 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v . Alexander, 438 F . Supp . 90, 7 ELR 20751 
(D .D .C . 1977) .
be washed into such navigable water .”133 It also forbade the 
deposit of refuse on the banks of navigable waters or their 
tributaries from which it “is liable to be washed into” navi-
gable waters .
The drafters of the CWA were equally aware of the need 
to make tributaries of navigable waters subject to CWA 
jurisdiction . The Senate bill did so explicitly . Although the 
final statute does not mention tributaries in its definition 
of navigable waters as the waters of the United States, that 
definition is at least expansive enough to cover tributar-
ies . The congressional explanations of “navigable waters” 
accompanying the enactment of the CWA describe it as 
reaching far beyond its traditional meaning, to reach the 
limits of Congress’ jurisdiction over water, and many spec-
ify that it includes tributaries .
Assuming that tributaries of navigable waters are within 
the jurisdiction of the CWA, however, the question becomes 
which tributaries? The primary tributaries, the creeks that 
flow into the navigable river? The secondary tributaries, 
the streams that flow into the creeks? The tertiary tribu-
taries? The trickles of water that eventually flow into the 
most remote stream, but only after rainfall events? Does 
it make a difference whether an identifiable drop of water 
from the trickle eventually flows into navigable water or if 
an identifiable molecule of a pollutant added to that trickle 
does? Justice Antonin Scalia warns that expanding the 
interpretation of navigable waters to include those trickles 
may “engulf entire cities and immense arid wastelands . In 
fact, the entire land area of the United States lies in some 
drainage basin, and an endless network of visible channels 
furrows the entire surface, containing water ephemerally 
whenever rain falls .”134 He is correct in asserting that this 
is not what Congress intended . On the other hand, as he 
acknowledges, Congress did not intend to confine CWA 
jurisdiction to traditionally navigable waters . Alas, legal 
decisions are often exercises in line-drawing where there 
are no obvious places to draw lines .
EPA’s proposed amendments to its definition of “waters 
of the United States” include a definition of “tributary” as “a 
water physically characterized by the presence of a bed and 
banks and ordinary high water mark  .  .  . which contributes 
flow, either indirectly or through another water,” to a water 
otherwise defined as “a water of the United States .” The 
Agency’s proposed definition specifies that wetlands, lakes, 
and ponds can be tributaries; and that a tributary does not 
lose its status as such because of natural or man-induced 
interruptions, such as underground flows, impoundments, 
or canals .135 The areas encompassed in the proposed defini-
tion seem to stop short of Justice Scalia’s parade of horribles, 
but it does not tell us exactly how far short . How much of a 
bank or bed is necessary? EPA’s failure to provide a complete 
133 . 33 U .S .C . §407 . Discharge of refuse into a tributary of navigable water 
violated the statute even in the absence of proof that the refuse eventually 
flowed into navigable waters, when it was likely to have done so . See United 
States . v . American Cyanamid Co ., 480 F .2d 1132, 3 ELR 20656 (2d Cir . 
1973) .
134 . Rapanos v . United States, 547 U .S . 715, 722, 36 ELR 20116 (2006) .
135 . 79 Fed . Reg . 22268 (to be codified at 40 C .F .R . §122 .2(c)(5)) .
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sions held that tributaries were navigable . Three of those 
decisions held that discharges to small streams, enter-
ing navigable water only after flowing through four or 
five intermediaries, were discharges to waters of the 
United States .144 A fourth held that discharges to a nor-
mally dry arroyo, flowing eventually to navigable waters 
only after heavy rainfall, were to waters of the United 
States .145 Two more held that discharge to canals leading 
to navigable water were to waters of the United States .146 
Although a 2,000- to 3,000-acre lake was not connected 
to other navigable water, the U .S . Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit held it to be navigable because inter-
state travelers used it for recreational boating .147 Finally, 
another decision held that a small stream that began and 
ended in a single county was a water of the United States 
because it was used to produce agricultural crops sold in 
interstate commerce .148
b. Wetlands
Most of the decisions during this period were in §404 cases 
where landowners argued that their wetlands were not navi-
gable . Only one decision focused solely (and unsuccessfully) 
on whether the landowner’s property factually met EPA and 
the Corps’ definition of wetlands .149 The remaining deci-
sions determined whether wetlands were sufficiently con-
nected to navigable waters or their tributaries to be waters 
of the United States . Nine of them held that various tidal 
wetlands were navigable .150 Three recited that the wetland 
at issue was navigable because it was adjacent to navigable 
water, but did not explain what they meant by “adjacent .”151 
Others defined “adjacent” variously as bordering152; having 
a hydrological connection153; being in close proximity154; 
144 . United States v . Texas Pipe Line Co ., 611 F . 2d 345, 10 ELR 20184 (10th 
Cir . 1980); United States v . Ashland Oil & Transp . Co ., 504 F .2d 1317, 4 
ELR 20784 (6th Cir . 1974); Sun Enters ., Inc . v . Train, 394 F . Supp . 211 
(C .D .N .Y . 1975) .
145 . United States v . Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F . Supp . 1185, 5 ELR 20308 (D . 
Ariz . 1975) .
146 . United States v . St . Bernard Parish, 589 F . Supp . 617, 14 ELR 20794 (E .D . 
La . 1984); Bayou Des Familles Dev . Corp . v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
541 F . Supp . 1025, 13 ELR 20055 (E .D . La . 1982) .
147 . United States v . Byrd, 609 F .2d 1204, 9 ELR 20757 (7th Cir . 1979) .
148 . United States v . Earth Sci ., Inc., 599 F .2d 368, 9 ELR 20542 (10th Cir . 
1979) .
149 . Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc . v . Marsh, 715 F .2d 897, 13 ELR 20942 
(5th Cir . 1983) .
150 . Leslie Salt Co . v . Froehlke, 578 F .2d 742, 8 ELR 20480 (9th Cir . 1978); 
United States v . Ciampitti, 583 F . Supp . 483 (D .N .J . 1984); United States 
v . Robinson, 570 F . Supp . 1157, 14 ELR 20056 (M .D . Fla . 1983); Bayou 
Des Familles Dev . Corp . v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 541 F . Supp . 1025, 
13 ELR 20055 (E .D . La . 1982); United States v . Bradshaw, 541 F . Supp . 
880, 12 ELR 20629 (D . Md . 1981); United States v . Weisman, 489 F . Supp . 
1331, 10 ELR 20698 (M .D . Fla . 1980); Conservation Council of N .C . v . 
Costanzo, 398 F . Supp . 653, 5 ELR 20666 (E .D .N .C . 1975); P .F .Z . Proper-
ties, Inc . v . Train, 393 F . Supp . 1370 (D .D .C . 1975); United States v . Hol-
land, 373 F . Supp . 665, 4 ELR 20710 (M .D . Fla . 1974) .
151 . Robinson, 570 F . Supp . 1157; Weisman, 489 F . Supp . 1331; American 
Dredging Corp . v . Dutchyshyn, 480 F . Supp . 957 (E .D . Pa . 1979) .
152 . Byrd, 609 F .2d 1204; Bradshaw, 541 F . Supp . 880 .
153 . United States v . Lee Wood Contractors, Inc ., 529 F . Supp . 119, 12 ELR 
20421 (E .D . Mich . 1981) .
154 . United States v . Lambert, 589 F . Supp . 366, 14 ELR 20588 (D . Md . 1984) .
being contiguous155; or neighboring .156 Some held that a 
wetland was navigable because it was adjacent to navigable 
water even though it was never flooded by that navigable 
water157 or was separated from it by a 30-foot-wide berm158 
or another tract of land .159 They held that navigable waters 
could include an artificial wetland .160
The government was a party to the case in all but two 
of these 29 decisions .161 The decisions used 10 interpretive 
devices: precedent (26  decisions); broad interpretation to 
serve statutory purposes (19  decisions); legislative history 
(15 decisions); deference (4 decisions); reading harmoniously 
with other statutes (4 decisions); plain meaning (3 decisions); 
interpreting the statute to avoid absurd results (2 decisions); 
structure of the statute (1 decision); give meaning to every 
word (1 decision); the exception proves the rule (1 decision); 
and equity (1 decision)—for an average of 2 .7 interpretive 
devices per decision . Of the 25 decisions citing precedent,162 
12 cited United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co.163 
and 10 cited United States v. Holland,164 the first court of 
appeals and district court decisions, respectively, interpret-
ing navigable water under the CWA . Many of the decisions 
not directly citing legislative history did so indirectly by cit-
ing Ashland Oil or Holland, both of which included an anal-
ysis of the pertinent legislative history . The decisions cited an 
average of 3 .5 precedents .
None of these decisions suggested that courts were trou-
bled by interpreting navigable water expansively to include 
even waters that could not float a boat, despite Congress’ 
use of the term navigable waters as a jurisdictional phrase . 
The lower courts considered and took at face value the leg-
islative history indicating that Congress was exercising its 
full constitutional authority to protect the nation’s waters 
from pollution, and did not question the constitutionality 
of that authority .
4. Riverside Bayview and Subsequent Decisions
The Supreme Court’s first decision interpreting navigable 
waters under the CWA was Riverside Bayview,165 in which 
the Corps sought an injunction against defendants filling 
wetlands, without a §404 permit, to support the subse-
quent construction of a housing development . The U .S . 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit narrowly interpreted 
the Corps’ regulations, defining navigable water to include 
only wetlands adjacent to navigable waters and periodically 
155 . Byrd, 609 F .2d 1204; Lee Wood, 529 F . Supp . 119 .
156 . Lee Wood, 529 F . Supp . 119 .
157 . Byrd, 609 F .2d 1204 .
158 . United States v . Tilton, 705 F .2d 429, 13 ELR 20583 (11th Cir . 1983) .
159 . Lee Wood, 529 F . Supp . 119 .
160 . Track 12, Inc . v . District Eng’r, 618 F . Supp . 448, 16 ELR 20163 (D . Minn . 
1985) .
161 . In some of these decisions, an official of the United States is a named party; 
for example, in Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, John Marsh was 
the Secretary of the Army .
162 . See tbl . B .
163 . 504 F .2d 1317, 4 ELR 20784 (6th Cir . 1974) .
164 . 373 F . Supp . 665, 4 ELR 20710 (M .D . Fla . 1974) .
165 . United States v . Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc ., 474 U .S . 121, 16 ELR 
20086 (1985) .
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inundated or flooded by those adjacent waters .166 Its pur-
pose in interpreting the Corps’ regulations narrowly was to 
avoid the question of whether §404 constituted an uncon-
stitutional taking of the wetlands . In a unanimous opin-
ion written by Justice Byron White, the Supreme Court 
reversed . The Court began its analysis by making clear 
there was no constitutional issue justifying a narrow inter-
pretation of the regulations .167 That decided, the Court had 
no trouble finding that the Corps’ regulations covered the 
wetlands at issue .168
The Court then addressed whether §404 authorized 
the Corps to regulate filling wetlands “adjacent to but not 
regularly flooded by rivers, streams, and other hydrographic 
features more conventionally identifiable as ‘waters .’”169 The 
Court specifically noted that it was not addressing the fill-
ing of nonadjacent wetlands,170 and then commenced a 
quasi-Chevron171 analysis to determine whether the Corps’ 
interpretation of §404 was subject to deference . Skipping 
step one of the Chevron analysis—determining whether the 
statute is ambiguous—the Court moved directly to Chev-
ron step two—determining whether the agency’s interpreta-
tion was a reasonable one . The Court began its analysis by 
observing that although “[o]n a purely linguistic level, it may 
appear unreasonable to classify ‘lands,’ wet or otherwise, as 
‘waters,’” the interpretation is “reasonable because there is no 
fine line dividing the waters of a navigable body of water and 
the waters in an adjacent wetland, both are intermixed parts 
of a continuum in the hydrological cycle .”172 The Court 
concluded that a broad interpretation of navigable waters 
was supported by the CWA’s broad definition of navigable 
waters and the unanimous legislative history that the term 
be interpreted as broadly as constitutionally possible .173
Finally, the Court concluded that Congress’ acquies-
cence in the Corps’ broad interpretation of navigable waters 
during the 1977 amendments to the CWA supported the 
reasonableness of the Corps’ interpretation . Although the 
Court was mindful that subsequent legislative history or 
legislative failure to act are not ordinarily helpful in inter-
preting earlier legislation, it concluded that the unsuccess-
ful efforts in Congress to restrict the Corps’ jurisdiction 
over wetlands in 1977 were pertinent because even the 
proponents of restricting that jurisdiction would not have 
divested the Corps of jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent 
166 . United States v . Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc ., 729 F .2d 391, 14 ELR 
20365 (6th Cir . 1984) .
167 . Riverside Bayview, 474 U .S . at 127-28 . Just because the Corps may deny 
a §404 permit does not mean that it will do so . If the Corps does deny 
a fill permit, there is no taking of the property unless it is deprived of all 
economic value . Even if there is a taking, it is not unconstitutional unless no 
just compensation is given .
168 . Id. at 129-30 .
169 . Id. at 131 .
170 . Id. at 131, n .8 .
171 . Id . at 131 . See Chevron, U .S .A ., Inc . v . Natural Res . Def . Council, Inc., 467 
U .S . 837, 14 ELR 20507 (1984).
172 . Riverside Bayview, 474 U .S . at 132 . The Court also deferred to the expertise 
of the Corps and EPA in dealing with the hydrological cycle, noting that 
the agencies were more capable than courts in determining whether there 
are lines between particular navigable waters and their adjacent wetlands . Id. 
at 134 .
173 . Id. at 133-34 .
to navigable waters, the very waters at issue in Riverside 
Bayview. Thus, the Congress that amended §404 in 1977 
specifically intended that §404 protect such wetlands, even 
if the Congress that enacted §404 in 1972 had no articu-
lated intent with regard to them .
The Court’s recognition that Congress “chose to define 
the waters covered by the Act broadly,”174 and the Court’s 
deference to the interpretations of navigable waters by the 
Corps and EPA175 were taken by lower courts as signals to 
continue construing navigable waters broadly in the con-
text of tributaries and wetlands . Nineteen of the 23 (83%) 
lower court decisions interpreting navigable waters in the 
context of tributaries or wetlands after Riverside Bayview, 
and prior to the next Supreme Court decision interpreting 
navigable waters, held that the waters at issue were navi-
gable .176 The decisions holding the waters at issue not to 
be navigable did so primarily because the plaintiff did not 
carry its factual burden of proof, rather than because the 
courts narrowly interpreted the term navigable waters .177
a. Tributaries
Nine of the decisions considered only whether tributaries 
were navigable . Two of these held that creeks and bayous 
flowing directly into ocean bays or sounds were navigable178 
and one held that an unnamed tributary to interstate waters 
was navigable .179 Two held that discharges to intermittently 
flowing ditches eventually connecting with navigable water 
were navigable,180 but one held that a dry arroyo was not 
navigable, absent proof of a nexus to interstate commerce or 
tributaries to interstate waters .181 Three held that discharges 
to or subsequently flowing through ditches, canals, or other 
man-made waterways were discharges to navigable waters .182 
In holding that a creek was navigable, one court commented 
that “virtually any surface water, navigable or not” is within 
the jurisdiction of the CWA .183
b. Wetlands
Three decisions upheld the government’s delineation of 
wetlands,184 two of them deferring to the agency’s exper-
174 . Id. at 133 .
175 . Id . at 131-34 .
176 . See tbl . B .
177 . Id.
178 . United States v . Gulf Park Water Co ., Inc ., 972 F . Supp . 1056 (S .D . Miss . 
1997) (bayou to Mississippi Sound); United States v . Zanger, 767 F . Supp . 
1030, 22 ELR 20231 (N .D . Cal . 1991) (creek to San Francisco Bay) .
179 . Georgia v . City of East Ridge, Tenn ., 949 F . Supp . 1571, 27 ELR 20782 
(N .D . Ga . 1996) (sewer overflow to unnamed tributary to interstate creek) .
180 . Driscoll v . Adams, 181 F .3d 1285, 29 ELR 21387 (11th Cir . 1999); United 
States v . Eidson, 108 F .3d 1336, 27 ELR 20853 (11th Cir . 1997) .
181 . Friends of Santa Fe Cnty . v . LAC Minerals, Inc ., 892 F . Supp . 1333, 26 ELR 
20135 (D .N .M . 1995) .
182 . Driscoll, 181 F .3d 1285; Eidson, 108 F .3d 1336; United States v . TGR 
Corp ., 171 F .3d 108, 29 ELR 21059 (2d Cir . 1999) (channelized natural 
brook, in places carried below ground in pipes) .
183 . Beartooth Alliance v . Crown Butte Mines, 904 F . Supp . 1168, 26 ELR 
20639 (D . Mont . 1996) .
184 . Golden Gate Audubon Soc’y, Inc . v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 796 F . 
Supp . 1306, 23 ELR 20267 (N .D . Cal . 1992); United States v . Malibu 
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tise .185 Another court, however, held the wetlands at issue 
were not within the Corps’ jurisdiction, because it had 
failed to carry the burden of proof on delineation .186 The 
remaining decisions considered mixed issues of whether 
tributaries and wetlands were navigable . Most considered 
whether wetlands were adjacent to navigable water . Three 
held that wetlands were adjacent to a tidal lake, a tidal 
pool, or other navigable water .187 One held that adjacent 
meant “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring” and that 
a wetland was adjacent to navigable water, although one-
half mile away, because there was a groundwater connec-
tion and a surface water connection during hurricanes .188 
Three held that isolated wetlands were not within the 
Corps’ jurisdiction .189
The government was a party in all but four of the 22 
decisions on tributaries and wetlands during this period . 
The decisions used a total of eight interpretive devices: 
precedent (applied in 19 decisions); broad interpretation 
to serve legislative purpose (8 decisions); deference (5 deci-
sions); structure of the statute (2 decisions); interpret statu-
tory exemptions narrowly (2 decisions); statutory history 
(1 decision); avoid constitutional issues (1 decision); plain 
meaning (1 decision); and legislative history (1 decision) . 
The decisions used an average of 1 .8 interpretive devices . 
Of the 19 decisions citing precedent, nine used Riverside 
Bayview190 and three used Ashland Oil.191
What differences are observable in lower court deci-
sions before and after Riverside Bayview? While the 
pre-Riverside Bayview set of decisions on tributaries and 
wetlands used a total of 10 and an average of 2 .8 interpre-
tive devices, the set of decisions immediately after River-
side Bayview used a total of eight and an average of 1 .8 
devices to interpret navigable waters . While the earlier 
set of decisions used an average of 3 .4 precedents, the lat-
ter set used 1 .8 . While in the earlier set of decisions, 15 
cited legislative history, only one cited it in the latter set 
of decisions . This diminution in the depth of the courts’ 
analyses of the meaning of “navigable waters,” including 
their almost complete disregard of legislative history, sug-
gests that after Riverside Bayview the “navigable waters” 
status of tributaries of navigable waters, even remote 
Beach, Inc ., 711 F . Supp . 1301, 19 ELR 21247 (D .N .J . 1989); United 
States v . Larkins, 657 F . Supp . 76, 17 ELR 20783 (W .D . Ky . 1987) .
185 . Golden Gate, 796 F . Supp . 1306; Larkins, 657 F . Supp . 76 .
186 . In United States v. Hallmark Constr. Co., 30 F . Supp . 2d 1033, 28 ELR 
21438 (N .D . Ill . 1998), the court characterized the wetland as isolated, but 
appeared willing to consider the Corps’ argument that the pond was within 
its jurisdiction because it was used by migratory birds . However, the Corps 
did not carry its burden of proof that the pond actually was used by migra-
tory birds .
187 . Hanson v . United States, 710 F . Supp . 1105, 19 ELR 21074 (E .D . Tex . 
1989) (tidal lake); Malibu Beach, 711 F . Supp . 1301 (tidal pool); Conant v . 
United States, 786 F .2d 1008, 16 ELR 20453 (11th Cir . 1986) (unspecified 
navigable water) .
188 . United States v . Banks, 873 F . Supp . 650, 25 ELR 20776 (S .D . Fla . 1995) .
189 . Hoffman Homes, Inc . v . Administrator, EPA, 999 F .2d 256, 23 ELR 21139 
(7th Cir . 1993); United States v . Wilson, 133 F .3d 251, 28 ELR 20299 (4th 
Cir . 1997); Town of Norfolk v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 968 F .2d 1438, 
22 ELR 21337 (1st Cir . 1992) .
190 . See tbl . B .
191 . Id.
tributaries, and of wetlands adjacent to tributaries had 
become routine and required little analysis .
5. SWANCC and Subsequent Decisions
The Supreme Court next interpreted the CWA’s “navigable 
waters” term in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County 
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC) .192 In that case, 
local governments challenged the Corps’ denial of a §404 
permit to fill a series of ponds remaining from a sand and 
gravel mining operation, to construct a municipal land-
fill . The Corps had found the 31 acres of relatively shal-
low ponds to be navigable under its Migratory Bird Rule, 
which extended its §404 jurisdiction to intrastate waters 
used as habitat by birds protected by migratory bird treaties 
to which the United States is a party or that migrated across 
state lines .193 The five-to-four majority opinion, written by 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, held that isolated waters 
were not subject to the Corps’ jurisdiction . The majority 
first emphasized that Riverside Bayview addressed wet-
lands adjacent to navigable water rather than ponds wholly 
isolated from navigable water . It noted that the Riverside 
Bayview opinion specifically disclaimed addressing waters 
not adjacent to navigable waters .194 While noting that Riv-
erside Bayview had commented “the word ‘navigable’ in 
the statute was of ‘limited import,’” the SWANCC major-
ity retorted that the definition of “navigable waters” as the 
“waters of the United States,” does not “constitute a basis 
for reading the term ‘navigable waters’ out of the statute .”195
The Court then denied Chevron deference to the Corps’ 
regulations and interpretation because the Corps’ interpre-
tation had been inconsistent over time: first adopting the 
traditional interpretation of navigable waters in 1974, then 
adopting a more expansive interpretation the next year,196 
and finally adopting the Migratory Bird Rule in 1986 .197 
The Court noted that deference is particularly inappropri-
ate when an agency interpretation extends jurisdiction to 
the farthest reaches of the Commerce Clause, and alters 
the traditional federal/state balance that leaves regulation 
of land use to state and local authorities .198 The Court also 
192 . 531 U .S . 159, 31 ELR 20382 (2001) .
193 . 531 U .S . at 164 .
194 . SWANCC, 531 U .S . at 167-68 .
195 . Id. at 172 (quoting United States v . Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc ., 474 
U .S . 121, 133, 16 ELR 20086 (1985)) . Justice Scalia commented similarly 
in his dissent to Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 
515 U .S . 687, 718-19, 25 ELR 21194 (1995) (Scalia, J ., dissenting), that 
“take” in the Endangered Species Act, could not be deprived of its tradi-
tional meaning with regard to wildlife by an expansive interpretation of 
“harm” in the statutory definition of “take .”
196 . The Court failed to note that, as discussed above, a court ordered the Corps 
to expand its interpretation of navigable waters, or that EPA adopted a 
much broader definition than the Corps from the outset .
197 . SWANCC, 531 U .S . at 172-74 . This appears to be contrary to Riverside 
Bayview, which had given deference to the Corps’ second interpretation, 
although that interpretation was far more expansive than its first interpre-
tation . At the time, the Corps’ 1986 migratory bird amendment to the 
regulatory definition had yet to be promulgated and accordingly was not 
considered in Riverside Bayview .
198 . Query whether the CWA significantly interferes with state land use deci-
sions? If states want to control CWA permitting decisions, they may admin-
ister the §402 program and much of the §404 program . The §402 program 
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noted that the Commerce Clause did not grant unlimited 
jurisdiction to Congress, citing United States v. Morrison199 
and United States v. Lopez,200 both decided after Riverside 
Bayview. It rejected the relevance of the same legislative 
history of the CWA 1977 Amendments that was cited in 
Riverside Bayview in support of that decision . While that 
legislative history may not have been relevant to the Migra-
tory Bird Rule, promulgated a decade later, the Court 
rejected it on a far broader basis .201
The SWANCC dissent by Justice John Paul Stevens, 
joined by three other Justices, reads as if they had used a dif-
ferent translation of Riverside Bayview than did the major-
ity. The dissent even interpreted different sections of the 
statute: Whereas the majority interpreted navigable waters 
in §404, the dissent interpreted waters of the United States 
in §502(7) .202 The dissent did not characterize the wetland 
at issue in the Court’s earlier Riverside Bayview decision as 
adjacent to navigable waters, but instead characterized it as 
“not itself navigable, directly adjacent to navigable water, 
or even hydrologically connected to navigable water .”203 
The dissent also laid out the argument that the Migratory 
Bird Rule was well within Commerce Clause jurisdiction, 
because of the aggregate effects of piecemeal elimination 
of habitats essential to the multibillion-dollar recreational 
commerce connected to bird-watching and fishing .204
SWANCC did not discuss tributaries or wetlands, but 
merely held that isolated ponds were not navigable waters . 
Nevertheless, the decision’s refusal to defer to the Corps’ 
interpretation of the statute205 and its observation that the 
CWA’s broad definition of navigable waters did not read 
“the term ‘navigable waters’ out of the statute”206 signaled 
to lower courts that there are limits to which tributaries to 
does not involve land use . The permit applicant can make whatever use of 
the land it wants, as long as it treats resulting water pollution to federal and 
state standards . The §404 permit program does not prohibit particular uses 
of land, but it does prevent filling wetlands for any use without a permit . If, 
as Justice Scalia claims, the Corps interprets §404 to include “ripples of sand 
in the desert  .  .  . engulf[ing] entire cities and immense arid wastelands,” see 
Rapanos v . United States, 547 U .S . 715, 722, 36 ELR 20116 (2006), then 
§404’s interference with state land use decisions could be real . However, as 
this Article discusses, that description is overblown .
199 . 529 U .S . 598 (2000) .
200 . 514 U .S . 549 (1995) . In the course of invalidating a federal statute pro-
hibiting possession of firearms near a school, the Court explained that the 
Commerce Clause authorized only federal statutes regulating: (1) highways 
of interstate or foreign commerce; (2) instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce; or (3) activities having a substantial effect on interstate commerce . In 
a 5/4 decision, it held that the effect on interstate commerce of educational 
disruption caused by gun-related violence near schools was too tangential to 
support Commerce Clause jurisdiction .
201 . SWANCC, 531 U .S . at 169-71 . The Court generally disavowed the relevance 
of failed amendments in interpreting a statute, especially failed amendments 
in a later Congress . This was only part of a broader attack on the relevance 
and reliability of legislative history, which has suffered a decline in use since 
the enactment of the CWA . See Miller, Pollutant, supra note 7, at 967-68 .
202 . Compare the majority’s statement of the case, “We are asked to decide 
whether the provision of §404(a) may be fairly extended to the isolated 
ponds,” SWANCC, 531 U .S . at 161, with the dissent’s: “[It] is the definition 
[§502(7)] that is the appropriate focus of our attention,” SWANCC, 531 
U .S . at 182 (Stevens, J ., dissenting) .
203 . SWANCC, 531 U .S . at 175 .
204 . Id. at 192-97 .
205 . Id. at 168-69 .
206 . Id. at 172 .
navigable waters and their adjacent wetlands are navigable . 
The Court stated: “The term ‘navigable’ has at least the 
import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its 
authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdic-
tion over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or 
which could reasonably be so made .”207
In response to the Court’s first restrictive opinion on the 
CWA’s navigable waters jurisdiction, 22 of 24 lower court 
decisions (86%) held the waters at issue to be navigable,208 
a slight increase over the 83% decided between Riverside 
Bayview and SWANCC. Some lower courts interpreted 
SWANCC as narrowly as they had interpreted navigable 
waters broadly, reading SWANCC only to hold that iso-
lated waters are outside the CWA’s jurisdiction .209 Other 
courts, however, took SWANCC ’s reading of Riverside 
Bayview to limit the CWA’s jurisdiction to waters that are 
navigable in fact or are adjacent to navigable-in-fact open 
waters .210 Others wrestled with the meaning of adjacency, 
noting that the Supreme Court did not define it in either 
of its §404 decisions .211 One district court sought to recon-
cile the Court’s two rulings by holding that when “a drop 
of rainwater landing in the [wetlands] is certain to inter-
mingle with water from the [adjacent navigable river],” the 
relationship is direct and therefore a “significant nexus .”212 
SWANCC, however, provided more conservative courts 
with the opportunity to fashion narrower interpretations 
of “navigable waters .”
a. Tributaries
Narrower interpretations of navigable waters by lower 
courts were particularly pronounced with regard to tribu-
taries . In three of these decisions, the courts held tributaries 
not to be within navigable waters jurisdiction,213 based on 
facts very similar to both earlier and contemporary deci-
sions that had held tributaries to be navigable . In a fourth 
decision, the court held the tributary at issue to be naviga-
ble, but rejected the government’s expansive interpretation 
of navigable waters .214
207 . Id. (citing United States v . Appalachian Elec . Power Co ., 311 U .S . 377, 407-
08 (1940)) .
208 . See tbl . B .
209 . North Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass’n v . Holly Ridge Assocs ., LLC, 278 F . 
Supp . 2d 654 (E .D .N .C . 2003) . The U .S . Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F .3d 810, 
32 ELR 20011 (9th Cir . 2001), agreed that an isolated vernal pool was not 
navigable under SWANCC, but its other decisions cited in this segment of 
the Article continue with an expansive interpretation of navigable waters .
210 . In re Needham, 354 F .3d 340 (5th Cir . 2003); Rice v . Harken Exploration 
Co ., 250 F .3d 264, 31 ELR 20599 (5th Cir . 2001); FD & P Enters ., Inc . 
v . U .S . Army Corps . of Eng’rs, 239 F . Supp . 2d 509 (D .N .J . 2003); United 
States v . RGM Corp., 222 F . Supp . 2d 780 (E .D . Va . 2002) .
211 . United States v . Rueth Dev . Co ., 335 F .3d 598 (7th Cir . 2003); United 
States v . Interstate Gen . Co ., 152 F . Supp . 2d 843, 31 ELR 20750 (D . Md . 
2001) .
212 . United States v . Rueth Dev . Co., 189 F . Supp . 2d 874, 877-78 (N .D . Ind . 
2002), aff’d, 335 F .3d 598 (7th Cir . 2003) .
213 . Rice, 250 F .3d 264; RGM Corp., 222 F . Supp . 2d 780; United States v . New-
dunn Assocs ., LLP, 195 F . Supp . 2d 751, 32 ELR 20573 (E .D . Va . 2002) . 
The significance of the two district court decisions, by the same judge, is 
undercut by their invective against the Corps .
214 . In re Needham, 354 F .3d 340 .
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In Rice v. Harken Exploration Co .,215 one of the three 
narrow decisions, the plaintiff brought suit under the citi-
zen suit provision of the Oil Pollution Act (OPA),216 which 
prohibits the discharge of oil into navigable waters . He 
alleged that the defendant discharged oil into intermittent 
streams leading to navigable waters . But there was nothing 
in the record, the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded, “that could convince a reasonable trier of 
fact that  .  .  . any of the  .  .  . intermittent creeks on the ranch 
are sufficiently linked to an open body of navigable water 
as to qualify for protection under the OPA .”217 While this 
appears to be merely a case in which the plaintiff failed to 
carry his burden of proof that the intermittent streams at 
issue ever reached navigable water, the Fifth Circuit stated 
with regard to tributaries that “a body of water is protected 
under the Act only if it is actually navigable or is adjacent 
to an open body of navigable water .”218 This is a narrow 
interpretation of navigable waters with regard to wetlands, 
but it is untenable with regard to tributaries, as discussed 
below . Because the court searched the record for evidence 
that the “intermittent creeks on the ranch are sufficiently 
linked to an open body of navigable water as to qualify for 
protection under the OPA,”219 its use of “adjacent to  .   .   . 
navigable water” may not have been an accurate description 
of the Fifth Circuit’s perception of how tributaries must be 
related to navigable waters to be within the jurisdiction of 
the statute . Unfortunately, the court repeated this mislead-
ing adjacency concept in a later decision .
In re Needham220 was an appeal from the denial by a 
bankruptcy court of the U .S . claim for its costs of reme-
diating an oil spill . The government argued that navigable 
waters included all tributaries “that have any hydrologi-
cal connection with ‘navigable waters .’”221 In the Fifth 
Circuit’s view, however, CWA jurisdiction did not extend 
“over ‘tributaries’ that are neither themselves navigable nor 
truly adjacent to navigable waters,” citing its Rice deci-
sion .222 The government “may not simply impose regula-
tions over puddles, sewers, roadside ditches and the like; 
under SWANCC ‘a body of water is subject to regulation 
 .  .  . if the body of water is actually navigable or adjacent to 
an open body of navigable water,’”223 the court said . It con-
tinued: “[T]he proper inquiry is whether Bayou Folse, the 
site of the farthest traverse of the spill, is navigable-in-fact 
or adjacent to an open body of navigable water .”224 Because 
“Bayou Folse flows directly into the Company Canal,” 
which is navigable in fact, the court allowed the govern-
215 . 250 F .3d 264, 31 ELR 20599 (5th Cir . 2001) . This opinion does not in-
terpret navigable waters under the CWA; instead, it interprets the same ju-
risdictional phrase in the Oil Pollution Act . That statute and §311 of the 
CWA, 33 U .S .C . §1321, both address oil spills into the “navigable waters” 
and are intimately intertwined .
216 . 33 U .S .C . §§2701-2761, ELR Stat . OPA §§1001-7001 .
217 . Rice, 250 F .3d at 271 .
218 . Id. at 270 (emphasis added) .
219 . Id. at 271 .
220 . 354 F .3d 340 (5th Cir . 2003) .
221 . Id. at 345 .
222 . Id.
223 . Id. at 345-46 .
224 . Id. at 345 .
ment’s claim .225 Thus, the Fifth Circuit may be using 
“adjacent” to mean “flowing into,” at least for tributaries .
Determining whether tributaries are navigable waters 
by asking if they are adjacent to navigable-in-fact or open 
water is misdirected for several reasons . First, the focus on 
adjacency originates in the Corps’ §404 regulations, which 
use adjacency only to claim jurisdiction over wetlands adja-
cent to navigable waters, not over tributaries adjacent to 
navigable waters .226 Second, the Supreme Court in River-
side Bayview held that only wetlands adjacent to navigable 
waters were subject to §404’s jurisdiction, not that tribu-
taries adjacent to navigable waters were subject to §402’s 
jurisdiction .227 Third, “adjacent” means “having a common 
border” or “abutting,”228 which may describe the relation-
ship between wetlands and navigable waters, such as a 
river, for wetlands are often next to rivers . Non-wetland 
tributaries of rivers, such as creeks and streams, however, 
cannot be adjacent to those rivers because those tributaries 
do not flow next to, but rather into rivers .
Most lower courts continued to interpret the term 
navigable waters with regard to tributaries and wet-
lands as if SWANCC had never happened . Courts inter-
preted navigable waters to include the following: primary 
tributaries to navigable waters229; remote tributaries to 
navigable waters230; intermittent flows231; man-made 
or man-improved flows, including irrigation canals232; 
ditches233; and waters channelled234 or pumped235 through 
pipes and culverts under roads .
b. Wetlands
Lower court wetlands decisions were largely confined to 
decisions regarding tributaries . Decisions held that wet-
lands adjacent to both primary and remote tributaries were 
navigable waters .236 One court held a wetland to be adja-
cent to navigable water despite being separated from it by a 
225 . Id. at 343 .
226 . 33 C .F .R . §328 .3 .
227 . United States v . Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc ., 474 U .S . 121, 126, 16 
ELR 20086 (1985) .
228 . Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 11 (1967) .
229 . United States . v . Hubenka, 438 F .3d 1026 (10th Cir . 2006); In re Needham, 
354 F .3d 340 (5th Cir . 2003); Aiello v . Town of Brookhaven, 136 F . Supp . 
2d 81 (E .D .N .Y . 2001) .
230 . Parker v . Scrap Metal Processors, Inc ., 386 F .3d 993 (9th Cir . 2004); Unit-
ed States v . Adams Bros . Farming, Inc ., 369 F . Supp . 2d 1166 (C .D . Cal . 
2003); Idaho Rural Council v . Bosma, 143 F . Supp . 2d 1169 (D . Idaho 
2001); United States v . Buday, 138 F . Supp . 2d 1282 (D . Mont . 2001) .
231 . California Sportfishing Prot . Alliance v . Diablo Grande, Inc ., 209 F . Supp . 
2d 1059 (E .D . Cal . 2002) .
232 . Headwaters, Inc . v . Talent Irrigation Dist ., 243 F .3d 526, 31 ELR 20535 
(9th Cir . 2001); Adams Bros., 369 F . Supp . 2d 1166; Idaho Rural Council, 
143 F . Supp . 2d 1169 .
233 . Treacy v . Newdunn Assocs ., LLP, 344 F .3d 407 (4th Cir . 2003); United 
States v . Deaton, 332 F .3d 698 (4th Cir . 2003) .
234 . Treacy, 344 F .3d 407; Adams Bros., 369 F . Supp . 2d 1166; California Sport-
fishing, 209 F . Supp . 2d 1059 .
235 . United States v . Adams Bros . Farming, Inc ., 209 F . Supp . 2d 1059 (E .D . 
Cal . 2002) .
236 . Treacy, 344 F .3d 407; Deaton, 332 F .3d 698; North Carolina Shellfish 
Growers Ass’n v . Holly Ridge Assocs ., LLC, 278 F . Supp . 2d 654 (E .D .N .C . 
2003); United States v . Buday, 138 F . Supp . 2d 1282 (D . Mont . 2001) (the 
discharge was 240 miles from traditionally navigable waters) .
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70-foot-wide berm .237 The government was a party in only 
14 of the 22 cases interpreting navigable waters in the con-
text of tributaries and wetlands . The increased proportion 
of citizen suits did not affect their outcomes, however, as all 
three decisions interpreting navigable waters narrowly were 
in cases in which the government was a party .238 The deci-
sions used 20 interpretive devices: precedent (applied in 
22 decisions); broad interpretation (6 decisions); legislative 
history (6 decisions); deference (6 decisions); plain mean-
ing (5 decisions); finality (4 decisions); avoid constitutional 
issues (4 decisions); structure of statute (3 decisions); len-
ity (1 decision); and read harmoniously with other statutes 
(1  decision) . The decisions used an average of 2 .6 inter-
pretive devices . All 22 decisions cited precedent; 20 cited 
SWANCC and 10 cited Riverside Bayview.239 The decisions 
cited an average of 5 .2 precedents .
While the lower court decisions dating between River-
side Bayview and SWANCC used a total of 8 and an average 
of 1 .8 interpretive devices, the decisions between SWANCC 
and Rapanos used a total of 10 and an average of 2 .6 inter-
pretive devices . While the earlier set of decisions cited an 
average of 1 .8 precedents, the lower court decisions issued 
between Riverside Bayview and SWANCC cited an average 
of 6 .4 . What conclusions can we draw from this quantita-
tive analysis? Decisions on tributaries and wetlands after 
SWANCC undertake their legal and factual analysis in 
considerably more depth than do decisions issued between 
Riverside Bayview and SWANCC. If SWANCC did not 
prompt lower courts to find more frequently that waters 
were non-navigable, it did remind them that expansive 
interpretations of navigable waters were not to be made or 
accepted without careful scrutiny .
6. Rapanos and Subsequent Decisions
The 2006 Rapanos decision240 arose out of enforcement 
actions for filling wetlands without §404 permits . The 
wetlands at issue were adjacent to man-made drainage 
ditches that flowed into a succession of other ditches and 
creeks and ultimately into Lake Michigan . The plurality 
opinion, written by Justice Scalia and joined by three other 
Justices, held that the wetlands at issue were not within the 
jurisdiction of the CWA . In a concurring opinion, Justice 
Anthony Kennedy agreed with the plurality’s result, but 
not with its reasoning . Chief Justice John Roberts joined 
the plurality opinion, but filed a short concurrence lament-
ing that there was no majority opinion and acknowledging 
the difficulty that would pose to lower courts . Justice Ste-
vens wrote a dissent joined by three Justices . In addition to 
joining Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion, Justice Stephen 
Breyer filed his own dissenting opinion .
As discussed above, the lack of a majority opinion in 
Rapanos has required lower courts to spend more of their 
237 . Baccarat Freemont Devs ., LLC v . U .S . Army Corps . of Eng’rs, 425 F .3d 
1150 (9th Cir . 2005) .
238 . See tbls . A & B .
239 . Id.
240 . Rapanos v . United States, 547 U .S . 715, 36 ELR 20116 (2006) .
energy interpreting Rapanos than interpreting the CWA . 
Although the holding of Rapanos is opaque, it is clear that 
the Court’s interpretation of navigable waters has become 
increasingly restrictive since Riverside Bayview.
Two distinct but related questions are at issue in Rapa-
nos. First, and most important, when is a tributary to a 
traditionally navigable water within the CWA’s jurisdic-
tion (that is, a jurisdictional tributary)? Second, when is 
a wetland sufficiently connected to a traditionally navi-
gable water or a jurisdictional tributary for the wetland to 
be within the CWA’s jurisdiction (that is, a jurisdictional 
wetland)? Although the plurality opinion addressed these 
questions, its answers are incomplete . One reason is that 
the plurality’s analyses conflated different elements of 
§301(a) . Another reason is that the plurality’s analyses are 
sometimes obscured by vituperative outbursts against the 
Corps, lower courts, and the dissenting and primary con-
curring opinions .
Justice Scalia began his plurality opinion with what 
can only be described as a tirade designed to demonstrate 
that the Corps “exercises the discretion of an enlightened 
despot”241 by claiming §404 jurisdiction over “storm 
drains, roadside ditches, ripples of sand in the desert that 
may contain water once a year, and lands that are covered 
by floodwaters once every 100 years  .  .  . engulf[ing] entire 
cities and immense arid wastelands .”242 Scalia complained 
mightily that the Corps and the lower courts have con-
tinued to expand §404 jurisdiction “to include ‘ephemeral 
streams’ and ‘drainage ditches’ as ‘tributaries’ .  .  . [extend-
ing] to virtually any land feature over which rainwater or 
drainage passes and leaves a visible mark—even if only the 
241 . Id. at 720 .
242 . Id. at 722 . In particular, Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion criticized Treacy 
v. Newdunn Assocs., LLP, 344 F .3d 407 (4th Cir . 2003); United States v. 
Deaton, 332 F .3d 698 (4th Cir . 2003); Community Ass’n for the Restoration of 
the Env’t v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F .3d 943 (9th Cir . 2002); Headwaters, 
Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 234 F .3d 526, 31 ELR 20535 (9th Cir . 2001); 
United States v. Eidson, 108 F .3d 1336, 27 ELR 20853 (11th Cir . 1997); 
and Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F .2d 126, 15 ELR 20530 (10th Cir . 
1985) . See Rapanos, 547 U .S . at 725-27 . Part of Justice Scalia’s ire is prob-
ably attributable to the fact that lower court decisions more frequently used 
expansive interpretations of navigable waters after SWANCC than before it . 
This could also reflect plaintiffs’ greater care in bringing and arguing cases 
after SWANCC. See also the Fifth Circuit’s diatribe in In re Needham, 354 
F .3d 340, 345 (5th Cir . 2003), against the Corps for claiming jurisdiction 
over “puddles, sewers, roadside ditches and the like .”
  Many of Justice Scalia’s outlandish examples of Corps overreach are 
hyperbole . The Corps does not and never has claimed jurisdiction over 
mud puddles or ripples of sand in the desert . For one thing, sand ripples 
in deserts and dunes are created by wind; when precipitation falls on them, 
it generally percolates down through the sand rather than flowing down 
the outsides of dunes . But when tempered, Justice Scalia’s concerns are 
understandable . Most land is covered at times with water, however thinly, 
although Congress did not claim jurisdiction for the CWA over most land: 
Most land is neither navigable water nor water of the United States . Justice 
Scalia’s inconsistent focus on the permanence of waterways elsewhere in the 
opinion may be seeking a distinction between stormwater runoff and water 
bodies . That is analogous to the distinction Congress established between 
point sources and nonpoint sources . Unfortunately, neither distinction is a 
bright line, any more than the edge between a river and an adjacent wetland 
is a bright line . Sheetwater runoff is stormwater and few would claim that it 
is a tributary of navigable water, although much of it may flow to navigable 
water . On the other hand, many would claim that a desert gully, roaring 
with a flash flood after rains, is a tributary of the navigable river into which 
its flash floods flow .
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presence of litter and debris,” despite the Court’s narrow-
ing of §404 jurisdiction in SWANCC.243
Justice Scalia acknowledged that Congress intended 
CWA jurisdiction to extend beyond traditional navigable 
waters, as the Court had recognized in both Riverside Bay-
view and SWANCC. On the other hand, he noted that in 
SWANCC, the Court took pains to emphasize “that the 
qualifier ‘navigable’ is not devoid of significance”244 and 
that CWA jurisdiction is limited to ‘waters,’ whether qual-
ified by ‘navigable’ or ‘of the United States .”245 He then 
launched into a counterintuitive demonstration that the 
definitions of “water” and “waters” in the 1954 edition of 
Webster’s New International Dictionary lead to the conclu-
sion that “the waters of the United States” is a subset of 
“water of the United States .”246 (Query: How can the plural 
“waters” be a subset of the singular “water”?)
In short, Scalia argues, the CWA’s incorporation of the 
term navigable waters confers jurisdiction “only over rela-
tively permanent bodies of water” and “does not authorize 
[a] ‘Land Is Water’ approach to federal jurisdiction .”247 
(Query: Assuming that the term “the waters of the United 
States” is a subset of “water of the United States,” how does 
that suggest that “navigable waters” include only perma-
nent bodies of water? That is a non sequitur.) Justice Sca-
lia posits that the statute’s definition of another element of 
the water pollution offense confirms this, because ditches, 
channels, and conduits, which typically convey transitory 
waters, are defined as “point sources” and therefore dis-
charge into “navigable waters” rather than carry “navigable 
waters .”248 (Again, this is a non sequitur. Granted that 
point sources convey polluted water to navigable waters, 
how does that establish that the conveyed waters are not 
themselves navigable?) Scalia supports his analysis with 
the need to narrowly interpret statutes when their jurisdic-
tions extend to the outer edges of Congress’ constitutional 
authority or intrude on states’ traditional authority over 
land use without an explicit statement by Congress of its 
intent to do so .249
Justice Scalia then summarizes the plurality’s con-
clusions . Jurisdictional waters (presumably includ-
ing tributaries)
include[  ] only those relatively permanent, standing or 
continuously flowing bodies of water “forming geo-
graphic features” that are described in ordinary parlance 
as “streams[,]  .   .   . oceans, rivers [and] lakes .” [The juris-
243 . Rapanos, 547 U .S . at 724-29 .
244 . Id. at 731 (quoting Solid Waste Agency of N . Cook Cnty . v . U .S . Army 
Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 U .S . 159, 172, 31 ELR 20382 (2001) .
245 . Rapanos, 547 U .S . at 731-36 .
246 . Id. at 732-33 (emphasis added) .
247 . Id. at 734 .
248 . Id. at 735-36 . Ditches, channels, and conduits convey water that is transi-
tory in the sense that the water they convey is in transit . But is the water 
transitory in a temporal sense, as Justice Scalia seems to be using the term? 
Roadside ditches normally flow during and after storm events, but in places, 
they continually convey streamwater that has been rerouted, for instance, to 
pass under roads in culverts . The English Channel is always wet, as is the 
main channel of the Mississippi River, and both are navigable . Moreover, 
Justice Scalia’s argument is a non sequitur, as pointed out in the text .
249 . Id. at 738 .
diction] does not include channels, through which water 
flows intermittently or ephemerally, or channels that peri-
odically provide drainage for rainfall .250
He asserts that this narrower definition of navigable 
waters will not jeopardize the reach of the §402 program, 
because the discharge of pollutants into an intermit-
tent stream from which they will wash downstream into 
navigable waters would still be covered: The statute does 
not require that the discharge be directly into navigable 
water .251 Jurisdictional wetlands are “only those wetlands 
with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are 
‘waters of the United States’ in their own right, so that there 
is no clear demarcation between ‘waters’ and wetlands .”252 
The plurality opinion does not directly address the ques-
tion of whether tributaries of navigable waters are waters 
of the United States, but tributaries are easily susceptible 
to the analysis that the plurality poses for jurisdictional 
waters . Moreover, the plurality commented that “the dis-
charge into intermittent channels of any pollutant that 
naturally washes downstream likely violates §1311(a), even if 
the pollutants discharged from a point source to not emit 
‘directly into’ covered waters .”253 Pollutants discharged to 
tributaries of navigable water naturally wash downstream 
into those navigable waters .
It is difficult to discern the Rapanos plurality’s precise 
conclusion with regard to jurisdictional tributaries, in part 
because its analysis is abstract and largely divorced from 
the facts of the cases before it and in part because it does 
not sharply separate its analysis of whether a tributary is 
jurisdictional from its analysis of whether a wetland is 
jurisdictional . Finally, the plurality opinion is inconsis-
tent on what constitutes a navigable tributary . It begins 
by stating that navigability connotes “continuously pres-
ent, fixed bodies of water, as opposed to ordinarily dry 
channels through which water occasionally or intermit-
tently flows  .   .   . [and does not] encompass[  ] transitory 
puddles or ephemeral flows of water .”254 The opinion does 
not define what it means by “ephemeral flows .” The plural-
ity continues:
[A]pplying the definition [of “navigable waters”] to 
“ephemeral streams,” “wet meadows,” storm sewers and 
culverts, “directional sheet flow during storm events,” 
drain tiles, man-made drainage ditches, and dry arroyos 
in the middle of the desert, the Corps has stretched the 
term “waters of the United States” beyond parody . The 
plain language of the statute simply does not authorize 
this “Land is Waters” approach to federal jurisdiction .255
While some of these examples are admittedly far-
fetched to deem as tributaries to navigable waters, others 
250 . Id. at 739 .
251 . Id. at 742-45 . See also Amil Anthony, Shotguns, Spray, and Smoke: Regulating 
Atmospheric Deposition of Pollution Under the Clean Water Act, 29 UCLA J . 
Envtl . L . & Pol’y 215, 235-37 (2011) .
252 . Rapanos, 547 U .S . at 742 .
253 . Id. at 743 .
254 . Id. at 733 .
255 . Id. at 734 .
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are not . Storm sewers, culverts, and drainage ditches, for 
example, often replace or channel existing natural streams 
that otherwise might be easily categorized as tributaries . 
The opinion dwells on the necessity of “at bare minimum, 
the ordinary presence of water .”256 While the plurality 
acknowledges that ditches, channels, and conduits can 
carry constant flows, it asserts that when they do, they are 
called rivers, creeks, streams, or moats, implying they may 
be navigable waters under those circumstances .257 (Query: 
What about the English Channel, which carries a constant 
flow; should we call it the English River or English moat?)
Finally, the opinion states that “waters of the United 
States” “does not include channels through which water 
flows intermittently or ephemerally, or channels that peri-
odically provide drainage for rainfall .”258 The plurality only 
examined two aspects of whether a tributary is navigable: 
whether it forms a “geographic feature”; and whether its 
flow is permanent . But in a footnote, the plurality admit-
ted that it did not “necessarily exclude seasonal rivers, which 
contain continuous flow during some months of the year 
but no flow during dry months .”259 Indeed, the opinion 
did not distinguish between the intermittency of flow that 
would include or exclude a water body from being “waters 
of the United States,” beyond “[c]ommon sense and com-
mon usage .”260
The Rapanos plurality did not address what constitutes a 
wetland, but limited itself to addressing what types of wet-
lands are jurisdictional wetlands . A jurisdictional wetland 
must be adjacent to a navigable water or a jurisdictional 
tributary of a navigable water . Wetlands adjacent to such 
a water are “only those wetlands with a continuous surface 
connection to  .  .  . ‘waters of the United States’ in their own 
right, so that there is no clear demarcation between ‘waters’ 
and wetlands .”261 The plurality’s test applies to whether a 
wetland is a jurisdictional wetland, not to whether a trib-
utary is a jurisdictional tributary . At the same time, the 
plurality’s concern with whether a water is permanent, sea-
sonal, or ephemeral was in the context of whether tributar-
ies were jurisdictional tributaries, not to whether a wetland 
is permanent, seasonal, or ephemeral, although it is not 
much of an additional step to consider the issue in that 
context, given the plurality’s concern that water not be 
classified as dry land .
The analysis in the concurring opinion by Justice Ken-
nedy focused almost entirely on wetlands . His reading 
of Riverside Bayview and SWANCC is that the Corps’ 
“jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the existence 
of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question 
and navigable waters in the traditional sense .”262 Wetlands 
have a significant nexus with navigable waters “if the wet-
256 . Id.
257 . Id. at 736 n .7 . Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion seeks to dismiss this issue by 
commenting that when ditches do flow constantly, they are called streams, 
a dubious proposition for which he offers no authority .
258 . Id. at 739 .
259 . Id. at 733 n .5 .
260 . Id.
261 . Id. at 742 .
262 . Id. at 779 (Kennedy, J ., concurring) .
lands, either alone or in combination with similarly situ-
ated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters 
more readily understood as ‘navigable .’”263 Adjacency of a 
wetland to navigable-in-fact waters is sufficient to estab-
lish a significant nexus, and adjacency to major tributar-
ies may be sufficient . But adjacency to other tributaries 
requires the Corps to “establish a significant nexus on a 
case-by-case basis .”264
Justice Kennedy would have remanded the cases for a 
determination of whether the wetlands in question had a 
significant nexus to navigable-in-fact waters . His opinion 
does not indicate when a tributary is sufficiently “major” 
for adjacency to satisfy his “significant nexus” test . He 
rejected the plurality’s conclusions that tributaries must 
be permanently flowing and have a continuous surface 
connection to be waters of the United States,265 pointing 
out that the requirement of permanent flow “makes little 
practical sense in a statute concerned with downstream 
water quality .”266
The dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens and three 
other Justices accorded Chevron deference to the Corps’ 
regulations defining navigable waters to include wetlands 
adjacent to navigable waters and their tributaries . Like Jus-
tice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, the dissenting opinion 
provides a point-by-point refutation of the plurality opin-
ion . Not surprisingly, the focus of the plurality is on the 
meaning of navigable waters, while the focus of both Jus-
tice Kennedy’s concurrence and the dissent is on the mean-
ing of waters of the United States .267
Thus, in regard to tributaries, the plurality in Rapanos 
developed a test under which most tributaries of navigable 
waters, even remote tributaries, would be navigable waters, 
but inconsistently drew a line at intermittent tributaries . 
With regard to intermittent tributaries, it suggested that 
the discharge of pollutants into intermittent waters from 
which the pollutants naturally wash downstream into 
navigable waters are indirect discharges to navigable water, 
violating §301(a) . The concurrence did not focus on tribu-
taries . The dissent concluded that tributaries of navigable 
water, major or remote, are navigable water, and argued 
that even intermittent tributaries could be navigable waters . 
None of the Justices argued that tributaries to navigable 
waters were not themselves waters of the United States . As 
to intermittent tributaries, the plurality’s guidance is nega-
tive, but also ambiguous and in the minority .
Post-Rapanos lower court decisions perceive Rapanos as 
game-changing for the interpretation of the terms naviga-
ble waters and waters of the United States, and focus their 
interpretations of those terms on Rapanos. Of the 34 lower 
court decisions issued after Rapanos, 25 of those decisions 
263 . Id. at 780 .
264 . Id. at 782 .
265 . Id. at 769-71 .
266 . Id., at 769 .
267 . Compare Rapanos, 547 U .S . at 723 (plurality), with Rapanos, 547 U .S . at 
759 (Kennedy, J ., concurring), and Rapanos, 547 U .S . at 787 (Stevens, 
J ., dissenting) .
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(74%) held the waters at issue to be navigable, a decrease 
from the findings in 86% of the decisions dating between 
SWANCC and Rapanos. Unfortunately, a large part of the 
lower courts’ attention to Rapanos is devoted to determin-
ing what its holding means in the absence of a majority 
opinion . Chief Justice Robert’s short concurring opinion 
lamented that without a majority opinion, the “[l]ower 
courts and regulated entities will now have to feel their way 
on a case-by-case basis,” citing Marks v. United States .268 
Marks directed lower courts that “[w]hen a fragmented 
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the 
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding  .  .  . may 
be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds .”269
Lower courts struggled mightily to determine whether 
to use the plurality test, the concurrence test, or both . The 
U .S . Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has fol-
lowed the concurrence’s significant nexus test .270 The U .S . 
Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, and Eighth Circuits 
have applied alternately either the plurality or the con-
currence tests .271 The Fifth and Sixth Circuits apparently 
require plaintiffs to prove both tests .272 And the Seventh 
Circuit and U .S . Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
have preferentially employed the concurrence test, but if 
that is not met will look to the plurality test .273
These courts misperceive the Kennedy concurrence’s 
significant nexus test, however, when they apply it to deter-
mine whether a tributary is a water of the United States . 
Justice Kennedy developed and used that test only to deter-
mine whether a wetland is a water of the United States . As 
to tributaries, his concurrence only commented that the 
plurality’s insistence that tributaries must be permanent to 
be waters of the United States was ill-founded . On that 
issue, he joined the four dissenting Justices . A few courts 
have recognized the inapplicability of the significant nexus 
test to tributaries .274 Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus 
test requires a jurisdictional wetland to affect significantly 
the water quality of a wetland and presumes such an effect 
if the wetland is adjacent to traditionally navigable water or 
a major tributary thereof . Because tributaries flow directly 
into navigable-in-fact waters, tributaries inevitably affect 
the water quality of navigable waters; in the aggregate, 
even remote tributaries do so, echoing Justice Kennedy’s 
conclusion that it “makes little practical sense in a statute 
concerned with downstream water quality”275 to require a 
268 . 430 U .S . 188 (1977) .
269 . Id. at 193 .
270 . United States v . Robinson, 505 F .3d 1208, 1219-21 (11th Cir . 2011) .
271 . United States v . Bailey, 571 F .3d 791, 799 (8th Cir . 2009); United States v . 
Donovan, 661 F .3d 174, 76, 42 ELR 20328 (3d Cir . 2011); United States 
v . Johnson, 467 F .3d 56, 66 (1st Cir . 2006) .
272 . United States v . Cundiff, 535 F .3d 200, 210, 39 ELR 20025 (6th Cir . 
2009); United States v . Lucas, 516 F .3d 316, 24 (5th Cir . 2008) .
273 . Northern Cal . River Watch v . City of Healdsburg, 496 F .3d 993, 1000 (9th 
Cir . 2007); United States v . Gerke Excavating, Inc ., 464 F .3d 723, 725 (7th 
Cir . 2006) .
274 . United States v . Vierstra, 2011 WL 1064526, *5 (D . Idaho); Benjamin v . 
Douglas Ridge Rifle Club, 673 F . Supp . 2d 1210, 1215 (D . Or . 2009) .
275 . Rapanos v . United States, 547 U .S . 715, 769, 36 ELR 20116 (2006) (Ken-
nedy, J ., concurring) .
nexus showing for tributaries .276 In this light, EPA’s scien-
tific study277 demonstrating that 60% of the flow of rivers 
and streams in the northeast originate in headwaters, con-
fining the presumption of a nexus to primary tributaries, 
does not make sense .
The government was a party in 20 of the 34 lower court 
tributary and wetland decisions after Rapanos .278 All 34 
decisions used precedent and all cited Rapanos, the first 
time that all precedent-citing decisions cited the same deci-
sion . Fourteen of the decisions cited Riverside Baywiew and 
12 of them cited SWANCC. The decisions cited an aver-
age of 5 .9 precedents . The number of precedents cited by 
the post-Rapanos decisions was comparable to the number 
of decisions cited by lower court decisions issued between 
SWANCC and Rapanos, but the importance of precedent 
as an interpretive device was far greater in the post-Rapanos 
decisions . Although 34 post-Rapanos lower-court decisions 
cited precedent, only 11 used deference,279 10 employed a 
broad interpretation to achieve the statute’s objective,280 6 
each used the structure of the statute,281 5 used its plain 
meaning,282 3 used reading harmoniously with another 
statute,283 2 interpreted exceptions narrowly,284 and 1used 
avoiding constitutional issues .285 While this set of decisions 
used precedent as an interpretive device 34 times, they used 
all other interpretive devices in the aggregate only 38 times, 
compared to the decisions issued between SWANCC and 
Rapanos, which used precedent as an interpretive device 22 
times and all the other interpretive devices in the aggre-
gate 36 times .286 Similarly, 19 of the post-Rapanos decisions 
used precedent as their sole interpretive device, while only 
four of the earlier decisions did so .287
Why did precedent become preeminent as an interpre-
tive device after Rapanos? In part, it is because there were 
by then four Supreme Court decisions interpreting navi-
gable waters under the CWA (three of them under §404), 
twice as many as interpreted any of the other elements of 
the water pollution offense . Unfortunately, it is also in 
part because the principal focus of the lower courts is how 
Rapanos applies to the facts of their cases, a question whose 
276 . While Justice Kennedy made that comment with regard to the plurality’s 
test of permanence and continuing surface connection, the comment ap-
plies as well in this context .
277 . See U .S . EPA, Connectivity of Streams and Wetlands to Down-
stream Waters: A Review and Synthesis of the Scientific Evidence 
(2013) . The draft version of this study is summarized in Appendix A to 
the preamble of EPA’s proposed rule, 79 Fed . Reg . 22188, 22222-52 (Apr . 
21, 2014) . The document may be found at http://yosemite .epa .gov/sab/sab-
product .nsf/fedrgstr_activities/Watershed%20Connectivity%20Report? . 
The study was conducted by EPA’s Office of Research and Development . 
It underwent peer review under the supervision of EPA’s Science Advisory 
Board (SAB) . SAB review was completed in October 2014, and EPA re-
leased the final study in January 2015 . 80 Fed . Reg . 2100 (Jan . 15, 2015) .
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answer is far from clear due to the lack of a majority deci-
sion and the opaqueness of the plurality opinion .
In the wake of SWANCC and Rapanos, EPA and the 
Corps jointly issued a guidance document on their regula-
tory definitions of waters of the United States,288 and more 
recently have published proposed amendments to them . 
This Article focuses on the proposed amendments as the 
latest indication of the agencies’ thinking . For the most 
part, they deal with tributaries and wetlands and continue 
to claim as much jurisdiction as possible in light of the 
decisions . The proposed amendments continue to claim 
jurisdiction over traditionally navigable waters, interstate 
waters, the territorial seas, and their tributaries . For the 
first time, however, the proposed amendments define 
“tributary” . A tributary is “a water physically character-
ized by the presence of a bed and banks and ordinary high 
water mark  .  .  . which contributes flow, either directly or 
through another water, to a water” that is traditionally 
navigable, interstate, a territorial sea, or an impoundment 
of such water .289
The proposed amendments add that “wetlands, lakes, 
and ponds are tributaries (even if they lack a bed and banks 
or ordinary high water mark) if they contribute flow, either 
directly or through another water to a traditionally naviga-
ble water, interstate water, or territorial sea .”290 They add that 
a tributary does not lose its jurisdictional status if its flow is 
interrupted by human causes, such as culverts or dams, or 
natural causes, such as debris piles or underground flow .291 
Finally, they provide that jurisdictional tributaries include 
“rivers, streams, lakes, ponds, impoundments, canals and 
ditches” not otherwise excluded in the proposed regula-
tion .292 The exclusions include several categories of ditches 
and all groundwater .293 The guidance document and the 
preamble to the proposed regulation include both legal and 
scientific justifications for these provisions, although the 
preamble’s are far more extensive .
How does the EPA/Corps joint proposal square with the 
Supreme Court’s two recent decisions? In some respects, it 
follows the decisions . For instance, the Court in SWANCC 
held that the CWA did not extend to waters solely because 
they are habitats for migratory birds . In response, the pro-
posed amendments drop the present claim over other waters 
“the use, degradation, or destruction of which would affect 
or could affect interstate or foreign commerce including  .  .  . 
waters which are or could be used by interstate or foreign 
travelers for recreational or other purposes  .  .  .  .” Although 
there are strong arguments that Congress has the authority 
to cover such waters, under either the Commerce Clause or 
288 . U .S . EPA and U .S . Army Corps of Engineers, Clean Water Act Jurisdiction 
Following the U . S . Supreme Court Decision in Rapanos v. United States 
& Carabell v. United States (June 2007 Legal Memorandum), available at 
http://www2 .epa .gov/cleanwaterrule/documents-related-proposed-defini-
tion-waters-united-states-under-clean-water-act .
289 . 79 Fed . Reg . 22188, 22268 (proposed Apr . 21, 2014), to be codified at 40 




293 . Id., to be codified at 40 C .F .R . §122 .1(b)(4) & (5) .
the Treaty Powers Clause, the Court concluded that Con-
gress did not exercise such powers in the CWA . That leaves 
it open for Congress to explicitly exercise such powers over 
these waters, an action that Congress is unlikely to take in 
the present political climate . For these waters, EPA’s pro-
posed definition substitutes jurisdiction over other waters 
that the Agency determines on a case-by-case basis have 
a significant nexus to traditionally navigable waters and 
jurisdictional tributaries, following Justice Kennedy’s sug-
gestion . That results in an exercise of Agency jurisdiction 
over a narrower set of waters .
The plurality in Rapanos repeatedly demanded that 
jurisdictional waters have continuous surface connec-
tions to traditionally navigable waters . In response, the 
EPA/Corps proposed amendments specifically exclude 
groundwater, although tributaries will not lose their 
jurisdictional status merely because they flow under-
ground for parts of their courses due to natural or 
human-induced conditions . The Court did not consider 
such situations, but they are reasonably in keeping with 
the nature of tributaries . The proposed amendments also 
dropped EPA’s earlier claim over intermittent streams 
and playa lakes affecting interstate commerce, but they 
did not exclude intermittent streams meeting the defini-
tion of tributaries . Moreover, the proposed amendments 
claim jurisdiction over “waters located within the  .   .   . 
floodplain” of a traditionally navigable water, interstate 
water, the territorial seas, or a tributary or impoundment 
of the same .294
Query whether EPA claims jurisdiction over mud pud-
dles on floodplains or standing water after rains in farmers’ 
fields on floodplains? If so, the Rapanos plurality will surely 
demur . The proposed definition’s inclusion of ditches, 
unless specifically excluded, also runs afoul of the Rapanos 
plurality’s observation that ditches are point sources and 
therefore cannot be navigable waters . The plurality further 
observed that ditch flows are intermittent and are called 
streams if their flows are permanent . The Court did not 
deal with the fact that many ditches are rerouted streams, 
no less tributaries than in their original natural beds . All 
of this suggests further litigation on the status of ditches . 
Many ditches fall within the proposed definition or the 
plain meaning of tributaries, especially those that are 
rerouted streams or creeks .
The proposed amendments to EPA and the Corps’ defi-
nitions of waters of the United States continue to claim 
jurisdiction over “all waters, including wetlands adjacent 
to” traditionally navigable waters, interstate waters, the 
territorial seas, and impoundments of and tributaries to 
such waters .295 This changes the tone of the definition from 
focusing on wetlands to focusing on all adjacent waters, 
including wetlands . The proposal uses both the plurality’s 
direct connection test and Justice Kennedy’s significant 
nexus tests for adjacency . The proposed definition is closer 
294 . Id., to be codified at 40 C .F .R . §122 .2(a)(6), (c)(1), (2) & (4) .
295 . Id., to be codified at 40 C .F .R . §122 .2(a)(6) .
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to Justice Kennedy’s test than it is to the plurality’s test .296 
The plurality test for adjacency is whether the surface 
waters from the wetland and the adjacent navigable water 
or tributary intermingle to the extent that they cannot be 
separated . The proposed definition of adjacent is “border-
ing, contiguous or neighboring,” picking up on many lower 
court definitions of the term . It provides that separation by 
natural or human-made dikes, berms, “and the like” does 
not affect adjacency, again drawing on many lower court 
definitions of adjacency . The proposed definition even pro-
vides that waters in floodplains of jurisdictional waters with 
“a shallow subsurface hydrologic connection” to the juris-
dictional waters are neighboring and therefore adjacent to 
those jurisdictional waters .297 This goes beyond the Rapa-
nos plurality’s expressed concept of adjacency . Moreover, it 
seemingly conflicts with the agencies’ expressed exclusion 
of groundwater from the definition . These differences will 
undoubtedly be resolved by further litigation .
The agencies’ special regard for wetlands is expressed in 
their proposed amendments to the definition of waters of 
the United States . For the first time, the agencies assert 
that wetlands themselves often are tributaries .298 They 
are in essence piggybacking §404 jurisdiction on §402 
jurisdiction because both the plurality and Justice Ken-
nedy’s concurring opinions appreciate that pollution flows 
downstream; thus, to be effective, §402 jurisdiction must 
include all tributaries, at least all relatively permanent ones . 
Although this is a clever move by the agencies to bolster 
their §404 jurisdiction, it may have the unfortunate effect 
of undercutting their §402 jurisdiction by narrowing judi-
cial interpretations of tributary .299
B. Isolated Waters
Neither the CWA nor its legislative history state explicitly 
whether the statute’s jurisdiction includes discharges to 
isolated water bodies . EPA and Corps regulations do not 
explicitly claim jurisdiction over isolated waters, but EPA’s 
current regulations include the following: natural ponds, 
which could be isolated; playa lakes, which are usually 
isolated; and “other waters” which “could affect interstate 
commerce .”300 Both regulatory definitions include intra-
state waters that are used by interstate travelers for recre-
ation, which could describe many isolated waters . Isolated 
waters could also affect interstate commerce under the sec-
ond or third prong of Lopez. The CWA’s use of the juris-
dictional term navigable waters, however, suggests to the 
courts that Congress relied on the first prong of Lopez, in 
which jurisdiction rarely extends to isolated waters because 
296 . Id ., to be codified at 40 C .F .R . §122 .2(c)(6) .
297 . Id., to be codified at 40 C .F .R . §122 .2(c)(1), (2) .
298 . Id ., to be codified at 40 C .F .R . §122 .2(c)(5) . In the definition of “Tributary” 
the proposed regulations provide that “wetlands  .  .  . are tributaries  .  .  . if they 
contribute flow” to a navigable water .
299 . After all, as discussed above, all of the Court’s narrow interpretations of nav-
igable waters have been §404 decisions and two have been wetlands cases .
300 . 33 C .F .R . §323 .2(a)(5); 40 C .F .R . §122 .2 . Playa lakes are usually dry and 
without outlets .
few are highways or parts of highways of interstate or for-
eign commerce .301
The isolation of a water body alone, however, does not 
always defeat its status as navigable water under the first 
prong of Lopez. For instance, the Court held in Utah v. 
United States that the Great Salt Lake is navigable, despite 
its isolation from other waters, because it had been used 
as a highway or part of a highway of interstate commerce, 
squarely within the first prong of Lopez.302 The Seventh 
Circuit held in United States v. Byrd303 that a 2,000-to 
3,000-acre isolated lake in Indiana was subject to CWA 
navigable water jurisdiction because interstate travelers 
used it for recreational boating, also placing it within the 
first prong of Lopez, but not as clearly so because the use 
was recreational rather than commercial .304
Such claims cannot be made for most isolated waters, 
however, especially small isolated water bodies . Isolated 
waters, even smaller ones, might be within the second or 
third Lopez prongs of Commerce Clause jurisdiction, but 
the Court has not recognized that Congress intended to 
use such jurisdiction for the CWA . An example of such a 
claim is the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc .,305 hold-
ing that an intrastate stream, located totally within one 
county and unconnected with other waters, was navigable 
based on the use of its waters for agricultural irrigation 
from which products were sold in interstate commerce . 
Isolated water bodies might have an aggregate effect on 
recreational or other interstate commerce, exemplified by 
fishing from boats .
The Supreme Court’s decision in SWANCC on the issue 
of isolated water bodies is not unique, but it is determi-
native . The facts of the case involved a site proposed for 
a landfill that included an aggregate of 31 acres of shal-
low ponds remaining from a sand and gravel operation, 
with no connections to other waters . The Corps did not 
claim jurisdiction over them as natural ponds, presumably 
because they were created by the former mining operations . 
The Corps’ only jurisdictional claim was its Migratory Bird 
Rule, which the Court held was beyond the authority Con-
gress delegated to the Corps in §404 . The Court implicitly 
interpreted the CWA to limit Congress’ claim to Com-
merce Clause jurisdiction to be within the first prong of 
the Lopez test,306 while the dissent would have extended the 
claim to the second and third prongs of the Lopez test and 
would have found that claim to be constitutional .307
Several lower courts have held that the CWA’s jurisdic-
tion does not extend to isolated waters . After Rapanos, the 
301 . For an argument to the contrary, see Jon Devine et al ., The Intended Scope of 
Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, 41 ELR 11118, 11124 (Dec . 2011) .
302 . Utah v . United States, 403 U .S . 9, 1 ELR 20250 (1971) .
303 . 609 F .2d 1204, 9 ELR 20757 (7th Cir . 1979) .
304 . Query: How compelling a distinction is this, when recreational boating is a 
multibillion-dollar business and some recreational boaters rent their vessels 
from commercial mariners?
305 . 599 F .2d 368, 9 ELR 20542 (10th Cir . 1979) .
306 . Solid Waste Agency of N . Cook Cnty . v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs
(SWANCC), 531 U .S . 159, 171-74, 31 ELR 20382 (2001) .
307 . Id. at 192-96 .
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Ninth Circuit held in San Francisco Baykeeper v.Cargill 
Salt Division308 that a 17-acre artificial pond was not nav-
igable although it was adjacent to admittedly navigable 
water, because the adjacency test applied only to wet-
lands, not to ponds . In Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers,309 the Corps, after SWANCC, 
withdrew the portion of its action that had claimed fill-
ing a vernal pond violated §404, and the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the lower court’s ruling that the vernal pond was 
navigable water .
Before SWANCC, the Seventh Circuit in Village of 
Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp.310 held that 
a six-acre retention pond built to collect stormwater 
runoff from a shopping mall parking lot, with no con-
nection to other surface water, was not navigable water . 
The court noted that EPA’s definition of navigable water 
included natural ponds and thereby by implication 
excluded artificial ponds such as the pond at issue . The 
tenor of the opinion, however, suggests that the court 
would have reached the same conclusion even if the pond 
had been natural . In Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Adminis-
trator, EPA,311 the Seventh Circuit held there was no 
CWA jurisdiction over an isolated wetland . Although 
the opinion, issued prior to SWANCC, appeared will-
ing to accept a jurisdictional claim under the Corps’ 
Migratory Bird Rule, the government made no showing 
that the wetland was actually used by migratory birds 
or had other effects on interstate commerce . In United 
States v. Hallmark Construction Co.,312 a district court 
held that an isolated five-acre wetland was beyond the 
Corps’ jurisdiction in the absence of proof of a connec-
tion with interstate commerce .313
EPA’s proposed amendments to its definition of waters 
of the United States do not explicitly include or exclude 
isolated waters . But they no longer include the existing 
claim to jurisdiction over
other waters such as intrastate  .  .  . lakes, prairie potholes, 
wet meadows, playa lakes or natural ponds the use, deg-
radation, or destruction of which would affect or could 
affect interstate or foreign commerce;  .  .  . [including use] 
by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other 
purposes;  .  .  . [use for taking] fish or shellfish  .  .  . [for sale] 
in interstate or foreign commerce;  .  .  . [or use] for indus-
trial purposes by industries in interstate commerce .314
Thus, EPA is abandoning the argument that in enact-
ing the CWA, Congress exercised its Commerce Clause 
jurisdiction under the second or third prongs of Lopez, the 
jurisdictional claim most likely to support regulating some 
isolated waters . Although the proposal notes that ponds 
308 . 481 F .3d 700 (9th Cir . 2007) .
309 . 261 F .3d 810, 816, 32 ELR 20011 (9th Cir . 2001) .
310 . 24 F .3d 962, 24 ELR 21080 (7th Cir . 1994) .
311 . 999 F .2d 256, 23 ELR 21139 (7th Cir 1993) .
312 . 30 F . Supp . 2d 1033, 28 ELR 21438 (N .D . Ill . 1998) .
313 . See also United States v . Wilson, 133 F .3d 251, 28 ELR 20299 (4th Cir . 
1997), in which the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that 
an isolated wetland was not navigable water .
314 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .21, Waters of the United States (c) .
can be tributaries,315 isolated ponds would not benefit from 
the definition of tributaries .
On the other hand, the proposal includes “other waters,” 
which EPA determines on a case-by-case basis “alone or in 
combination with other similarly situated waters” have a 
significant nexus to other waters within the definition of 
waters of the United States . EPA’s scientific justification for 
the proposal includes studies suggesting that many “unidi-
rectional wetlands,” such as prairie potholes, vernal pools, 
and playa lakes with subsurface connections to waters of the 
United States, may be shown to have a significant nexus to 
waters of the United States .316 Indeed, EPA leaves open and 
seeks comments on the option to determine by rule that 
prairie potholes and other specified categories of waters do 
have a significant nexus to “waters of the United States .”317 
Because such examples lack surface connections to navi-
gable waters, the Rapanos plurality is unlikely to agree with 
the Agency’s reasoning . However, Justice Kennedy and the 
Rapanos minority (who together form a majority of the Jus-
tices) may well agree with it .
The decisions discussed above in this section deal with 
both natural and artificial bodies of water . They suggest 
that, even absent SWANCC, courts have not been receptive 
to holding isolated waters to be within the CWA’s jurisdic-
tion, unless they are used as parts of a traditional highway 
of commerce . In any event, SWANCC now requires that 
result . In the unusual case where isolated waters have been 
used, may currently be used, or with reasonable improve-
ments could be used in the future as parts of highways of 
interstate commerce, those isolated waters are arguably 
navigable . But showing that uses of isolated water bod-
ies have an aggregate impact on interstate commerce will 
not make them navigable because the Court has in effect 
ruled that Congress did not intend to exercise the second 
or third Lopez prongs of its Commerce Clause jurisdiction 
in the CWA . Moreover, EPA has impliedly acceded to this 
conclusion in its proposed amendments to its regulatory 
definition of waters of the United States .
Congress could claim expanded jurisdiction by elimi-
nating the use of navigable waters as a jurisdictional term 
in the CWA, perhaps substituting waters of the United 
States, and making findings that water pollution con-
trol of isolated waters, or at least some classes of isolated 
waters, meet the second or third prong of the Lopez test . 
Congress could also claim expanded jurisdiction under 
the Constitution’s federal treaty powers and the imple-
menting Migratory Bird Treaty Act to protect migratory 
birds, including protection of their habitats .318 In the 
meantime, the question of whether transporting boats 
or fishermen across state lines to fish, hunt, or engage 
in other recreational activities on isolated waters makes 
those waters part of the highways of interstate commerce 
315 . 79 Fed . Reg . 22268, to be codified at 40 C .F .R . §122 .2(c)(6) .
316 . Id. at 22225-26 .
317 . Id. at 22250-52 .
318 . U .S . Const . art . II, §2, cl . [2]; Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U .S .C . 
§§703-711 . See Scott Finet, Habitat Protection and the Migratory Bird Pro-
tection Act, 10 Tul . Envtl . L .J . 1 (2003) .
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subject to Commerce Clause jurisdiction remains unde-
cided .319 Although the Court interprets the CWA not to 
claim such jurisdiction, the Court has not addressed, and 
has not needed to address, whether Congress has author-
ity to claim it .
C. Groundwater
Neither the CWA’s general prohibition against the dis-
charge of pollutants to navigable waters in §301(a) nor the 
definition of navigable waters in §502(7) mention ground-
water . The statute, however, is replete with references to 
groundwater .320 These frequent references indicate that 
Congress was aware of groundwater and groundwater 
pollution when it drafted the statute, suggesting that its 
failure to mention groundwater in §301(a) or the defini-
tion of navigable waters was an intentional choice not to 
regulate discharges of pollutants to groundwater . More-
over, the statute’s frequent coupling of “navigable waters 
and ground waters” indicates that Congress viewed them 
as distinct rather than overlapping categories of water .321 
Finally, repeated legislative history explicitly stated that the 
CWA did not regulate discharges of pollutants to ground-
water, and Congress rejected amendments that would have 
included regulation of discharges of pollutants to ground-
319 . One commenter lays out the argument that such recreational use of isolated 
waters will not render them navigable under any prong of Lopez . See Funk, 
supra note 40, at §13:117 . Indeed, he argues that Congress may not have 
the authority to regulate pollution on traditionally navigable waters unless it 
has a negative impact on navigation because the Commerce Clause does not 
give Congress plenary power to regulate navigable waters, but only power 
to protect and promote interstate commerce on navigable waters . For a con-
trary perspective, see FPL Energy Marine Hydro, LLC v. Federal Energy Reg. 
Comm’n, 287 F .3d 1151, 1157 (D .C . Cir . 2002) (three canoe trips establish 
potential for navigational use) .
320 . For example, CWA §§102(a), 104(a)(5), & 106(e)(1), 33 U .S .C . 
§§1252(a), 1254(a)(5), & 1256(e)(1), authorize plans for improving water 
quality in groundwater, monitoring water quality in groundwater, and mak-
ing grants to state agencies to do the same . CWA §§202(a)(2) & 208(b)
(2)(K), 33 U .S .C . §§1282(a)(2) & 1288(b)(2)(K) authorize grants to state 
agencies for programs to protect groundwater quality . CWA §304(a)(1) & 
(e), 33 U .S .C . §1314(a)(1) & (e), authorize EPA to establish water criteria 
for groundwater, factors to restore groundwater quality, and methods to 
control pollution from disposal of pollutant in wells .
  Rep . Les Aspin (D-Wis .) stated on the House floor that groundwater
appears in the bill in every section, in every title, except Title IV . 
It is under the title which provides EPA can study ground water . 
It is under the title dealing with definitions . But when it comes 
to enforcement, Title IV, the section on permits and licenses, then 
ground water is suddenly missing .
 92 Cong . Rec . 10,666 (1972) (statement of Rep . Aspin), reprinted in 1 
Legis . History, supra note 48, at 727 . The author cannot find groundwater 
mentioned in Title V, in which the definitional §502 is located . Most law-
yers would label §309, 33 U .S .C . §1319, the enforcement section rather 
than the sections authorizing permit issuance in Title IV . And many sections 
in Titles I, II, and III do not mention groundwater, e .g ., §§102A, 103, 206, 
207, 307, & 308, 33 U .S .C . §§1252a, 1253, 1286, 1287, 1317, & 1318 . 
Although the statement is demonstrably wrong in several respects, it has 
been uncritically repeated . See, e.g., Anna Makowski, Beneath the Surface 
of the Clean Water Act: Exploring the Depth of the Act’s Jurisdictional Scope 
of Ground Water Pollution,” 91 Or . L . Rev . 495, 513 (2012); Thomas L . 
Casey, Reevaluating “Isolated Waters”: Is Hydrologically Connected Ground 
Water “Navigable Water” Under the Clean Water Act, 54 Ala . L . Rev . 159, 
171 (2002).
321 . All of the statutory references immediately above, except §208(b)(2)(K), 
contain either the phrase “navigable waters and ground waters” or “navi-
gable waters or groundwaters .”
water .322 Legislative history did not distinguish between 
isolated groundwater and tributary groundwater,323 a dis-
tinction courts subsequently developed to justify holding 
discharges to tributary groundwater to be within the juris-
diction of the CWA, while discharges to isolated ground-
water are held not to be .
On the other hand, the legislative history is clear that 
Congress intended that the term navigable waters be given 
its full constitutional reach . The few courts considering 
whether groundwater can be within federal Commerce 
Clause jurisdiction concluded that it could be,324 although 
not under the first prong of the Lopez test, which Con-
gress apparently chose by using “navigable waters” in the 
CWA as its jurisdictional claim . Highways of interstate 
commerce are inherently surface waters . One twist in the 
CWA suggests congressional intent to regulate some dis-
charges to groundwater . Section 402(b)(1)(D) provides that 
EPA can approve a state program for administering and 
enforcing the §402 permit program only if the state has 
authority to issue permits to “control the disposal of pollut-
ants into wells .” In the absence of an approved state §402 
program, §402(a)(3) provides that EPA is to administer the 
322 . In the report accompanying S . 2770 from the Committee on Public Works 
to the Senate, the Committee stated that it recognized that the distinction 
between surface and groundwaters was artificial . Although the Committee 
was concerned with groundwater pollution, it rejected several proposals to 
establish federal standards because “the jurisdiction regarding groundwaters 
is so complex and varied from State to State .” S . Rep . No . 414, at 73 (1971), 
reprinted in 2 Legis . History, supra note 48, at 1491 . The Committee also 
stated that the problem of groundwater pollution, although serious, was not 
as acute as the problem of surface water pollution . Id. It did so after hearings 
on the effect of deep well injection on groundwater pollution . See Hearing 
on S. 2770 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the S. Comm. 
on Pub. Works, 92nd Cong . pt . 7 (1971) . See also Exxon Corp . v . Train, 554 
F .2d 1310, 1329, 7 ELR 20594 (5th Cir . 1977) .
  After passage of S . 2770, the House Committee on Public Works held 
hearings on H .R . 11896, the House counterpart to S . 2770, but differing in 
some respects . During the hearings, Representative Aspin proposed amend-
ments adding groundwater control to the bill, because he understood both 
the House and Senate bills not to authorize regulation of groundwater pol-
lution . See Hearing on H.R. 11896 Before the H. Comm. on Pub. Works, 92nd 
Cong . 727-28 (1972) (statement of Rep . Aspin), reprinted in 1 Legis . His-
tory, supra note 48, at 597 . Those amendments were not adopted by the 
Committee . The only mention of groundwater in the Committee Report 
accompanying H .R . 11896 to the House floor is its expectation that EPA 
will be diligent in gathering information on deep well injection . See H .R . 
Rep . No . 911, at 109 (1972) . When the bill reached the House floor, Rep-
resentative Aspin again introduced his amendment to include groundwater 
pollution control in the legislation . See 118 Cong . Rec . 10666 (1972) . 
Members supporting and opposing the amendment held a lively debate, but 
all agreed that the bill as written did not regulate discharges of pollutants to 
groundwater . Opposition to the amendment focused primarily on the lack 
of information on which to base a regulatory program . After the debate, the 
House rejected the proposed amendment . See 118 Cong . Rec . 10666-69 
(1972), reprinted in 1 Legis . History, supra note 48, at 597 .
323 . “Tributary groundwater” is groundwater that flows into surface water; “iso-
lated groundwater” is groundwater that does not flow into surface water .
324 . Village of Oconomowoc Lake v . Dayton Hudson Corp ., 24 F .3d 962, 965, 
24 ELR 21080 (7th Cir . 1994); Inland Steel Co . v . EPA, 901 F .2d 1419, 
1422, 20 ELR 20889 (7th Cir 1990) . Indeed, groundwater may be inter-
state . Many aquifers underlie and flow between multiple states . The best 
known is the Ogallala aquifer, underlying eight states: Colorado, Kansas, 
Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming . 
Groundwater may not ordinarily be a highway of interstate commerce, but 
it is used in interstate commerce . The Ogallala aquifer, for example, provides 
irrigation water that is a key component in the region’s agriculture . The 
Supreme Court held in Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U .S . 941, 12 ELR 20749 
(1982), that groundwater also can be an article in interstate commerce .
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program in the state under the same terms and conditions 
as an approved state program . This provision implies that if 
EPA is administering the §402 program, it also has author-
ity to issue permits for disposing of pollutants into wells . 
Two references to “well” in the definition section of the 
statute support this argument,325 suggesting that Congress 
intended CWA §402 to regulate discharges through wells . 
Because wells lead to groundwater rather than to surface 
water, congressional intent to regulate discharges through 
wells necessarily includes congressional intent to regulate 
discharges to groundwater .
Predictably, the issue of whether the CWA regulates 
discharges to groundwater was first raised with regard to 
discharges of pollutants into groundwater through waste 
disposal wells, a waste disposal method known as deep 
well injection . In the first reported case, United States 
v. GAF Corp., EPA sought injunctive relief against the 
construction of deep wells for chemical waste disposal 
without a §402 permit .326 EPA relied on the inclusion of 
discharges through wells in §§402 and 502, while the 
defendant relied on the legislative history . The district 
court held that “[d]isposal of chemical wastes into under-
ground waters which have not been alleged to flow into or 
otherwise affect surface waters does not constitute a ‘dis-
charge of a pollutant’ within the meaning of” §301(a) .327 
It so held because of explicit legislative history that the 
CWA did not regulate discharges to groundwater, while 
EPA’s §§402 and 502 arguments were “back-door .”328 
“Congress could not possibly have meant to achieve in 
roundabout fashion what it expressly declined to accom-
plish straightforwardly,”329 the court said . While legisla-
tive history may not trump statutory content as easily 
today,330 it was quite the fashion at the time .331 It is sig-
nificant, however, that the district court in GAF noted the 
polluted groundwater at issue was not tributary ground-
water, suggesting that the court might have been open to 
a different result if the groundwater was tributary .
In the next deep well decision, U.S. Steel Corp. v. 
Train,332 the petitioner sought judicial review of EPA’s per-
325 . The definition of “point source” gives “well” as an example of conveyances 
included in that term, CWA §502(14) . The definition of “pollutant” ex-
cludes “material which is injected into a well to facilitate the production 
of oil or gas” under stated conditions, CWA §502(6) . There would be no 
reason to exclude the injection of material into wells if injection of materials 
into groundwater was not otherwise prohibited by the CWA .
326 . United States v . GAF Corp ., 389 F . Supp . 1379, 5 ELR 20581 (S .D . Tex . 
1975) .
327 . Id . at 1383 .
328 . Id. at 1384 . In his majority opinion in Whitman v. American Trucking 
Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U .S . 457, 468, 31 ELR 20512 (2001), Justice Scalia made 
a similar point more colorfully, saying that Congress does not “hide el-
ephants in mouseholes .”
329 . GAF, 389 F . Supp . at 1385 .
330 . See Eskridge, supra note 17, at 207-38; Scalia & Garner, supra note 17, at 
369-90 (discussing one of their Thirteen Falsities Exposed) .
331 . See Train v . Colorado Pub . Interest Research Grp ., 426 U .S . 1, 10-23, 6 
ELR 20549 (1976), in which the Court held that the inclusion of radioac-
tive materials in the definition of pollutant in CWA §502(6) did not au-
thorize EPA to regulate the discharge of “radioactive materials from nuclear 
power plants,” largely because explicit legislative history trumped the plain 
meaning of the statute .
332 . 556 F .2d 822, 7 ELR 20419 (7th Cir . 1977) .
mit for discharges of pollutants to surface water and for 
discharges to groundwater from a deep injection well at 
the same facility . Upholding EPA’s action, the Seventh 
Circuit distinguished GAF as an action against discharge 
to groundwater alone, not in conjunction with the con-
trol of discharges to surface water .333 The Seventh Circuit 
was convinced by EPA’s argument that §402(a)(1) autho-
rizes the Agency, in the absence of an approved state per-
mit program, to issue permits “subject to the same terms, 
conditions and requirements” as apply to approved state 
permit programs, including the authority to regulate pol-
lutants discharged into wells in §402(b)(1)(D) .334 The court 
found support for that interpretation of the statute in the 
definition of pollutant in §502(6), which excludes material 
injected into wells in association with the production of oil 
and gas, an exclusion that would have no meaning unless 
the material would be a pollutant when discharged into 
wells absent the exclusion .335 Finally, the court found sup-
port for that interpretation in the limited CWA legislative 
history referring to deep well injection, although it ignored 
substantial contrary legislative history regarding discharges 
to groundwater generally .336
The Fifth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion in 
Exxon Corp. v. Train,337 when it reviewed EPA’s claim of 
authority to regulate discharges of wastes through deep 
wells to groundwater as part of a §402 permit that the 
Agency issued to regulate discharges of pollutants to sur-
face waters from the same facility . EPA did not argue that 
§301(a) prohibited discharges to groundwater, but only 
that the Agency had ancillary authority to issue permits 
for deep well injection by facilities also requiring CWA 
permits to discharge into surface navigable water under 
§402(a)(3) and (b)(1)(D) .338 This limited claim of authority 
was articulated in an opinion by EPA’s Office of General 
Counsel .339 While the court commented that EPA’s inter-
pretation was “not implausible,” it concluded that the dis-
tinction the Agency drew between deep well injection at 
a facility with a surface water discharge and injection at a 
facility with no surface water discharge had “the strange 
result of dividing jurisdiction over deep-well injections 
between federal and state authorities, based on the appar-
ently fortuitous factor of whether the person engaging in 
the deep-well injection also happens to be engaging in 
‘associated’ surface discharges .”340
333 . Id. at 851 n .60 .
334 . Id . at 852 .
335 . Id.
336 . Id . at 852-53 . This legislative history was from House and Senate Com-
mittee Reports explaining the exclusion from the definition of pollutant in 
§502(6)(B) of material pumped into a deep well incident to the production 
of oil or gas .
337 . 554 F .2d 1310, 7 ELR 20594 (5th Cir . 1977) . Despite its earlier publica-
tion in the Federal Reporter, Exxon was decided six weeks after the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in U.S. Steel Corp., 556 F .2d 822, although that decision 
does not mention U.S. Steel.
338 . Exxon, 554 F .2d at 1318-19 .
339 . EPA Gen’l Counsel Op . (Dec . 13, 1973), quoted in Exxon, 554 F .2d at 1320 
n .21 . The General Counsel reiterated this interpretation of the CWA in 
1975, distinguishing United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F . Supp . 1379, 5 ELR 
20581 (S .D . Tex . 1975) . See Exxon, 554 F .2d at 1320 n .21 .
340 . Exxon, 554 F .2d at 1322 .
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Consequently, the Fifth Circuit proceeded with an 
exhaustive examination of the statute’s structure and leg-
islative history . It stated that references to groundwater in 
the CWA establish a “pattern  .   .   . of federal information 
gathering and encouragement of state efforts to control 
groundwater pollution but not of direct federal control 
over groundwater pollution .”341 Moreover, the court said 
that the legislative history “demonstrates conclusively that 
Congress believed it was not granting the Administra-
tor any power to control disposals into groundwater .”342 
Acknowledging the logic of EPA’s argument based on 
§402(a)(3) and (b)(1)(D), the court concluded that “[w]
e cannot attribute to Congress an intention to achieve 
silently and by indirection that which it constantly refused 
to do directly .”343 Like the Texas district court in GAF, the 
Fifth Circuit left the door open to the argument that dis-
charges to tributary groundwater were prohibited .344
The controversy over EPA’s authority to regulate deep 
well injection under the CWA subsequently disappeared 
because Congress gave EPA direct regulatory authority 
over deep well injection in the Safe Drinking Water Act 
of 1974 .345 The controversy resurfaced tangentially when 
EPA ordered a steel company to take corrective remedial 
action with regard to its leaking hazardous waste injection 
wells under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA) .346 In Inland Steel Co. v. EPA,347 the respondent 
raised as a defense an exemption in RCRA §6903(27) for 
materials in “industrial discharges which are point sources 
subject to permits under” CWA §402, claiming that the 
well was a point source adding pollutants to groundwa-
ter .348 The Seventh Circuit’s decision by Judge Richard Pos-
ner suggested that its earlier U.S. Steel decision might be 
“all wet” and held the RCRA exemption inapplicable for a 
variety of reasons unrelated to this discussion .349
The issue of whether unpermitted discharges to ground-
water are prohibited by CWA §301(a) shifted from deep 
well injection to the discharge of pollutants from surface 
activities into groundwater . In this context, courts have fre-
quently distinguished between discharges to groundwater 
with no known or alleged connection with surface navi-
gable water, often called isolated groundwater, and ground-
water known or alleged to be tributary to nearby surface 
navigable water, often called tributary groundwater .350
A small number of decisions hold that the CWA does 
not regulate discharges into any groundwater, isolated 
341 . Id.
342 . Id. at 1329 .
343 . Id .
344 . Id. at 1312, n .1 .
345 . Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U .S .C . §§300f to 300j-26, ELR 
Stat . SDWA §§1401-1465 .
346 . 42 U .S .C . §§6901-6992k, ELR Stat . RCRA §§1001-11011 .
347 . 901 F .2d 1419, 20 ELR 20889 (7th Cir . 1990) .
348 . The exclusion is in the definition of solid waste, of which hazardous waste is 
a subset .
349 . Inland Steel, 901 F .2d at 1423-24 .
350 . Makowski, supra note 320, at 506, suggests a possibly more useful set of 
classifications of groundwater, drawn from state groundwater regulation 
statutes: underground streams; percolating groundwater; and subflow from 
surface streams .
or tributary .351 The most considered of those decisions, 
Umatilla Waterquality Protective Association, Inc. v. Smith 
Frozen Foods, Inc.,352 concerned discharges into allegedly 
tributary groundwater . The district court recited the leg-
islative history that Congress rejected legislation covering 
discharges to groundwater in the CWA,353 and the statute’s 
repeated use of the phrase “navigable waters and ground 
waters,”354 suggesting Congress recognized these to be two 
distinct categories of water . Finally, the decision noted that 
“EPA has offered no formal or consistent interpretation of 
the CWA that would subject discharges to groundwater 
to the [National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System] 
NPDES permitting requirement .”355 Indeed, the district 
court quoted from the Opinion of EPA’s General Counsel 
referred to in the U.S. Steel and Exxon decisions that “dis-
charges into ground waters are not included” in the defini-
tion of “discharge of a pollutant” in CWA §502(12) .356
Umatilla cited two instances in which EPA restricted 
its regulatory authority over discharges to groundwater 
to conform to EPA’s general counsel opinion,357 although 
the court ignored the fact that the Agency had sued GAF 
Corp . for unpermitted deep well injection into isolated 
groundwater, as well as the preamble to an EPA rulemak-
ing in which the Agency noted that the NPDES program 
did not apply to groundwater “unless there is a hydrologi-
cal connection between the ground water and a nearby sur-
face water body”—in other words, unless the groundwater 
is tributary to nearby surface water .358 Umatilla criticized 
opinions holding that discharges to tributary groundwater 
were covered by the CWA’s permitting program for failing 
to deal with EPA’s disavowal of authority over discharges to 
groundwater .359 It noted, however, that if EPA amended its 
CWA regulations to cover discharges to tributary ground-
351 . Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Army Corps. of Eng’rs, 968 F .2d 1438, 22 ELR 21337 
(1st Cir . 1992), is sometimes said to be such a precedent . The decision did 
not consider whether a CWA permit was required for a discharge into 
groundwater, but whether groundwater was navigable water in the context 
of the Corps’ consideration of alternatives in determining whether to issue 
a CWA §404 permit for the filling of wetlands . The First Circuit’s analysis 
of the issue was terse, covering only 10 lines . A subsequent district court 
decision analyzing Town of Norfolk concluded that the decision did not hold 
“that groundwater is categorically excluded from consideration as ‘waters 
of the United States,’ but rather that such a determination requires an ‘eco-
logical judgment,’ to be made according to the particular characteristics of 
the site .” Hernandez v . Esso Standard Oil Co ., 599 F . Supp . 2d 175, 179 
(D .P .R . 2009) . Moreover, the First Circuit was not interpreting the CWA, 
but instead the Corps’ regulations, and it was not considering whether dis-
charges to groundwater constituted discharges to navigable water for pur-
poses of CWA jurisdiction . On close examination, Town of Norfolk appears 
to be wholly irrelevant to the inquiry here .
352 . 962 F . Supp . 1312, 27 ELR 21411 (D . Or . 1997) .
353 . Id. at 1318-19 .
354 . Id. at 1318 .
355 . Id. at 1319 . Subsequently, the preamble to EPA’s proposed effluent guide-
lines for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) stated that 
EPA applied a direct hydrologic connection test to determine whether a 
discharge required a §402 permit, see 66 Fed . Reg . 2960 (Jan . 12, 2001), 
but did not reflect that statement in its final rule, see 40 C .F .R . pt . 412 .
356 . Umatilla, 962 F . Supp . at 1319 (emphasis added by the district court).
357 . Id. See 38 Fed . Reg . 13528 (May 22, 1977); 44 Fed . Reg . 32854 (June 7, 
1979) .
358 . 55 Fed . Reg . 47990, 47997 (Nov . 16, 1990) .
359 . Note that the court itself failed to recognize that in GAF, EPA asserted 
jurisdiction over discharges to isolated groundwater .
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water, the court would give that interpretation Chevron 
deference .360 A second district court decision, Kelley v. 
United States,361 covered much the same ground, but in 
lesser detail . The plaintiffs in both cases alleged that pollut-
ants discharged to groundwater flowed into nearby surface 
navigable water .362
Other decisions have held that the CWA’s jurisdiction 
does not extend to groundwater because the plaintiffs did 
not allege the discharges were to tributary groundwater363 or 
alleged only “the possibility” of a hydrological connection 
between the groundwater and surface navigable water .364 
These decisions do not explicitly foreclose the assertion of 
jurisdiction over discharges to tributary groundwater .
Encouraged by a pioneering law review article,365 a 
number of decisions hold that discharges of pollutants to 
tributary groundwater are within the jurisdiction of the 
CWA .366 They all accept that the CWA’s legislative history 
establishes Congress had no intent to protect groundwater 
generally from pollution or to generally regulate discharges 
to groundwater . They counter, however, that, in the words 
of an Idaho district court, “Congress’s decision not to com-
prehensively regulate groundwater as part of the CWA, 
does not require the conclusion that Congress intended 
to exempt groundwater from all regulation—particularly 
under circumstances where the introduction of pollutants 
into the groundwater adversely affects the adjoining sur-
360 . Umatilla, 962 F . Supp . at 1319 n .2 . Another court refusing to interpret 
navigable waters to include groundwater commented that if EPA amend-
ed its regulations to include tributary groundwater, that would “pose a 
harder question .” Village of Oconomowoc Lake v . Dayton Hudson Corp ., 
24 F .3d 962, 966, 24 ELR 21080 (7th Cir . 1994) . But see id. at 966 (con-
curring op .) .
361 . 618 F . Supp . 1103, 16 ELR 20080 (W .D . Mich . 1985) .
362 . Umatilla, 962 F . Supp . at 1313-14; Kelley, 618 F . Supp . at 1104-05 .
363 . In GAF, for instance, EPA did not allege contaminated groundwater flowed 
into navigable waters . See United States v . GAF Corp ., 389 F . Supp . 1379, 
1383, 5 ELR 20581 (S .D . Tex . 1975) . In Exxon, EPA did not allege con-
taminated groundwater flowed into navigable waters and the court specifi-
cally noted that it voiced no opinion on whether CWA jurisdiction would 
exist if the discharge was to tributary waters . Exxon Corp . v . Train, 554 F .2d 
1310, 1312 n .1, 7 ELR 20594 (5th Cir . 1977) .
364 . Village of Oconomowoc Lake, 24 F .3d at 966 . The “possibility” of contami-
nated pond water entering groundwater and thereafter migrating to surface 
navigable waters does not establish CWA jurisdiction .
365 . Mary Christina Wood, Regulating Discharges Into Groundwater: The Critical 
Link in Pollution Control Under the Clean Water Act, 12 Harv . Env’t L . Rev . 
369-426 (1988) . She has been followed by others, all arguing for the rec-
ognition of tributary groundwater as navigable . See, e.g., Makowski, supra 
note 320; James W . Hayman, Regulating Point Source Discharges to Ground 
Water Hydrologically Connected to Navigable Waters: An Unresolved Question 
of Environmental Protection Agency Authority Under the Clean Water Act, 5 
Barry L . Rev . 95 (2005); and Casey, supra note 320 .
366 . Quivira Mining Co . v . EPA, 765 F .2d 126, 15 ELR 20530 (10th Cir . 1985); 
Hernandez v . Esso Standard Oil Co . (Puerto Rico), 599 F . Supp . 2d 175 
(D .P .R . 2009); Idaho Rural Council v . Bosma, 143 F . Supp . 2d 1169 (D . 
Idaho 2001), aff’d on other grounds, 305 F .2d 943 (9th Cir . 2002); Friends 
of Santa Fe Cnty . v . LAC Minerals, Inc ., 892 F . Supp . 1333, 26 ELR 20135 
(D .N .M . 1995); Washington Wilderness Coal . v . Hecla Mining Co ., 870 
F . Supp . 983, 25 ELR 20661 (E .D . Wash . 1994); Sierra Club v . Colorado 
Refining Co ., 838 F . Supp . 1428, 24 ELR 20749 (D . Colo . 1993); McClel-
lan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v . Cheney, 763 F . Supp . 431, 20 
ELR 20870 (E .D . Cal . 1989), 707 F . Supp . 1182, 19 ELR 20124 (E .D . 
Cal . 1988), vacated on other grounds, 47 F .3d 325, 25 ELR 20628 (9th Cir . 
1995) . See also New York v . United States, 620 F . Supp . 374, 381, 16 ELR 
20142 (E .D .N .Y . 1985) (commenting that discharges to tributary ground-
water may be subject to CWA jurisdiction, but not reaching the question) .
face waters .”367 Although none of the decisions discuss it, 
the legislative history simply does not deal with tributary 
groundwater or pollution of surface water by groundwater .
The decisions distinguish most negative precedents as 
dealing with isolated rather than with tributary ground-
water, and conclude that the logic of the decisions hold-
ing tributary groundwater to be protected by the statute 
is, in the words of a Washington district court, “compel-
ling: since the goal of the CWA is to protect the quality 
of surface waters, any pollutant which enters such waters, 
whether directly or through groundwater, is subject to 
regulation .”368 They might add that allowing such pollu-
tion without a permit creates a giant loophole in the CWA; 
a factory adjacent to a river can evade the CWA simply by 
aiming its discharge pipe to dry land rather than the river, 
at least if its flow is low enough to percolate into the soil 
rather than simply running off over the surface into the 
river . (The same could be said of pollution of surface waters 
by converting point source discharges to nonpoint source 
discharges .369) Although some of these decisions held that 
discharges to the tributary groundwater in question were 
regulated by the CWA, most were decisions on preliminary 
motions . When the plaintiffs prevailed on preliminary 
motions, the courts often commented that they would hold 
plaintiffs to a high standard of proof at trial that the pollut-
ants discharged to groundwater actually reached navigable 
surface water .370 Courts sometimes denied the plaintiffs’ 
motions for summary judgment because of conflicting evi-
dence on the facts .371
The plurality in Rapanos did not address these situa-
tions, but its repeated insistence that tributaries or wet-
lands must have surface connections with navigable water 
to be navigable themselves372 suggests that those Justices 
would not be amenable to the argument that groundwater 
tributary to nearby surface water could be navigable . The 
plurality, however, did suggest that additions to navigable 
water need not be direct, implying they may be indirect .373 
This invites the argument that the direct addition of a pol-
lutant to groundwater flowing to nearby navigable water is 
an indirect addition to the navigable water into which the 
groundwater flows . That, however, is an interpretation of 
the “addition” element of the CWA offense, rather than 
of the “navigable waters” element . Because neither Justice 
367 . See, e.g., Idaho Rural Council, 143 F . Supp . 2d at 1180 (emphasis added) .
368 . See, e.g., Washington Wilderness Coal., 870 F . Supp . at 990 .
369 . See the dissent in United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F .3d 643, 653-
54, 23 ELR 21526 (2d Cir . 1993) (dissenting op .) .
370 . See, e.g., Idaho Rural Council, 143 F . Supp . 2d at 1180; Washington Wilder-
ness Coal., 870 F . Supp . at 990 .
371 . See, e.g., Friends of Santa Fe Cnty., 892 F . Supp . at 1358; McClellan Ecological 
Seepage Situation, 763 F . Supp . at 428, 707 F . Supp . 1182, vacated on other 
grounds, 47 F .3d 325 .
372 . Rapanos v . United States, 547 U .S . 715, 742, 36 ELR 20116 (2006) .
373 . Rapanos, 547 U .S . at 743 (“The Act does not forbid ‘the addition of any 
pollutant directly to navigable waters from any point source,’ but rather the 
‘addition of any pollutant to navigable waters .”) . The argument for indirect 
addition by aerial spraying of pesticides near water and other discharges 
to air that reach water is developed in Amil Anthony, Shotguns, Spray, and 
Smoke: Regulating Atmospheric Deposition of Pollutants Under the Clean Water 
Act, 29 UCLA J . Envtl . L . & Pol’y 215 (2011) . The argument is criticized 
in Miller, Addition, supra note 4, at 10797-98 .
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Kennedy’s concurring opinion nor the dissenting opin-
ion insisted on surface connections to navigable waters, a 
majority of the Supreme Court might be persuaded that 
tributary groundwater is a jurisdictional tributary .
The easy answer to whether unpermitted discharges to 
groundwater are prohibited by CWA §301(a) is that they 
are not . That conclusion is supported by the legislative his-
tory, the structure of the statute, and the failures of both 
Congress and EPA to mention groundwater in their defini-
tions of navigable water . The significance of the Agency’s 
omission is underscored by the length and detail of its defi-
nition of waters of the United States, by far the longest and 
most detailed of EPA’s definitions of the CWA’s jurisdic-
tional terms . Some groundwater could be covered by the 
“tributaries” part of EPA’s definition . The easy answer is 
also supported by the plurality decision in Rapanos, which 
twice states that only wetlands “with a continuous surface 
connection” with navigable water are within the regulatory 
jurisdiction of §404 .374 (Rapanos is a §404 case and the 
plurality did not consider the jurisdiction of §402 .) But 
the relevant canon of construction is to interpret a term in 
the same manner throughout a statute .375 Supporting this 
canon, CWA §502 provides that its definitions are to be 
applied throughout the statute unless otherwise specifically 
indicated in the statute .
The difficult answer to the question of whether unper-
mitted discharges to groundwater are prohibited by CWA 
§301 is that unpermitted discharges to tributary ground-
water are prohibited, but not discharges to other ground-
water, including isolated groundwater . In addition to the 
legal arguments against it, this answer requires determin-
ing when groundwater is connected to nearby surface navi-
gable water . Such a determination is difficult both in proof 
and in legal distinction . The flow of surface tributaries to 
navigable waters may be traced visibly by walking beside 
them or by taking images of them from an aerial camera . 
Tracing the flow of underground tributaries is much more 
uncertain . But even when such underground connections 
are known, are there geographic or temporal lines between 
tributary and non-tributary groundwater? Human-caused 
pollution of soil on property adjacent to navigable water, 
when the pollutants visibly enter surface water from the 
flow of groundwater through the bank, either below or 
above the surface of the navigable water, is easy and logi-
cal to classify as tributary water . But what about polluted 
waters that, as the Tenth Circuit put it, “soak into the 
earth’s surface, become part of the underground aquifers, 
and after a lengthy period, perhaps centuries, the under-
ground water moves toward eventual discharge” into 
tributaries of navigable water miles away?376 Because of its 
374 . Rapanos, 547 U .S . at 742 (emphasis added) . Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion rejected this conclusion, see Rapanos, 547 U .S . at 772-74 (Kennedy, 
J ., concurring), as did the dissenting opinion, see Rapanos, 547 U .S . at 804-
06 (Stevens, J ., dissenting) .
375 . See Eskridge, supra note 17 at 324; Scalia & Garner, supra note 17, at 
170-73 .
376 . See Quivira Mining Co . v . EPA, 765 F .2d 126,129, 15 ELR 20530 (10th 
Cir . 1985) .
adjacency, the riverside example might even be approved 
under the plurality opinion in Rapanos, but the remote 
example surely would not .377
Perhaps the tributary groundwater theory should be 
confined to situations where the pollution originates on 
property adjacent to navigable water or its tributary . That 
would prevent most polluters from evading the CWA’s per-
mit requirements by dumping pollutants on the ground 
near a navigable water where they percolate to groundwater, 
which in turn takes them to that navigable surface water . 
The adjacency requirement is analogous to the Refuse Act, 
which prohibits depositing refuse on the bank of navigable 
water or its tributary from which it may wash into the navi-
gable water .378 Legislative history suggests that Congress 
intended the CWA to regulate at least as much pollution 
as the Refuse Act regulated .379 This limited application is 
also analogous to the adjacency requirement for wetlands 
under §404 . Such cases would not involve the parties and 
the courts in protracted and difficult factual inquiries . This 
is a fairly easy limiting principle to apply, unless, of course, 
the adjacent property is the King Ranch or some other very 
large property .
EPA should reconsider its un-nuanced exclusion of all 
groundwater in its proposed definition of navigable waters . 
The Agency could make a credible case for including a 
groundwater tributary to nearby or adjacent surface navi-
gable water within its definition of waters of the United 
States . Indeed, although EPA’s proposed amendment to 
its definition specifically excludes groundwater, it does 
provide that shallow subsurface hydrological connection 
between a wetland and a jurisdictional water may make 
the wetland jurisdictional,380 very much the same as tribu-
tary groundwater . Most courts holding groundwater not 
to be navigable waters did so in cases where there were no 
allegations that the discharges were to tributary groundwa-
ter, and commented that they may have held differently if 
the discharges had been to tributary groundwater .381 Such 
courts may well have ruled otherwise if EPA had promul-
gated a rule including tributary groundwater in its defini-
tion of waters of the United States .
377 . The plurality opinion in Rapanos specifically disapproves of Quivira. Rapa-
nos, 547 U .S . at 726 .
378 . 33 U .S .C . §407 .
379 . The Senate Committee Report accompanying S . 2770 indicated that the 
prohibition of the CWA adopted “the basic formula [from the Refuse Act, 
but added]  .   .   . municipal discharges to it, so [that] before any material 
can be added to navigable waters authorization must first be granted by 
the Administrator .” S . Rep . No . 92-414, reprinted in 1972 U .S .C .C .A .N . 
3742 . See United States v . Hamel, 551 F .2d 107, 110-11, 7 ELR 20253 
(6th Cir . 1977) . The comment was made specifically with regard to the 
definition of pollutant, but applies as well to the broader definition of 
“discharge of a pollutant .”
380 . 79 Fed . Reg . 22188, 22268 (proposed Apr . 21, 2014), to be codified at 40 
C .F .R . §122 .2(b)(5)(vi) [the exclusion of groundwater] and (c)(2) & (3) 
[shallow subsurface hydrologic connections] .
381 . See, e.g., Village of Oconomowoc Lake v . Dayton Hudson Corp ., 24 F .3d 
962, 966, 24 ELR 21080 (7th Cir . 1994); Exxon Corp . v . Train, 554 F .2d 
1310, 1312 n .1, 7 ELR 20594 (5th Cir . 1977); Umatilla Waterquality Prot . 
Ass’n, Inc . v . Smith Frozen Foods, Inc ., 962 F . Supp . 1312, 1319, 27 ELR 
21411 (D . Or . 1997) (groundwater at issue was tributary, but EPA rule did 
not cover it); United States v . GAF Corp ., 389 F . Supp . 1379, 1388, 5 ELR 
20581 (S .D . Tex . 1975) .
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Instead, the Agency’s proposed amendment to its defini-
tion of waters of the United States simply excludes ground-
water even if it otherwise meets the definition of waters of 
the United States .382 This exclusion is unnecessary to meet 
the Supreme Court’s concerns: It has never considered a 
case in which a defendant added pollutants to groundwater 
that was tributary to nearby navigable water, evading the 
CWA’s regulatory program . The majority of the Court in 
Rapanos (that is, all of the Justices other than those in the 
plurality) was not fixated on surface connections and might 
be persuaded that such groundwater could be a tributary 
to waters of the United States . Even if groundwater flowing 
into nearby navigable water is not itself navigable, adding 
pollutants to that groundwater could be an indirect addi-
tion of the pollutants to navigable water, a proposition with 
which the plurality in Rapanos might conceivably agree . 
In any event, if the pollutants are hazardous, many of the 
discharges to groundwater would be subject to RCRA .383
D. EPA’s Unitary Navigable Waters Theory and 
Water Transfer Rule
A water transfer is the diversion of some or all of the 
water from one water body to another for intervening or 
subsequent human use . Water transfers are often accom-
plished by point sources: pumps; pipes; canals; and ditches . 
Assuming that the first water body is heavily polluted and 
the second is pristine, under traditional CWA analysis, 
the discharge of the polluted water into the pristine water 
through a point source would require a §402 permit . Under 
EPA’s recently promulgated water transfer rule, however, 
the discharge is exempted from requiring a permit unless 
pollutants are added by human use (except for agricultural 
purposes) of the water between diversion and discharge .
EPA justified the rule with two theories . The first and 
better-articulated theory is that when viewed as a whole, 
the CWA strikes a grand balance between its federal pro-
gram to improve and protect water quality and preexist-
ing state programs to allocate the uses of scarce water 
resources, highly developed private property systems, at 
least in the western United States .384 Water resource man-
agement in the arid West, where water diversions are criti-
382 . 79 Fed . Reg . 22188, 22269 (proposed Apr . 21, 2014), to be codified at 40 
C .F .R . §122 .2, Waters of the United States, (b)(5)(vi) . At the same time, it 
defines waters of the United States to include wetlands and other waters 
“adjacent” to navigable waters; defines “adjacent” to include “neighboring”; 
and defines “neighboring” to include a “shallow subsurface hydrologic con-
nection” between a wetland and navigable water . See (a)(6), (c)(1) & (2) . 
Query: Is that an exception to the exclusion of groundwater? Does the shal-
low hydrological connection exception treat wetlands more favorably than 
traditional tributaries?
383 . 42 U .S .C . §6925(a) .
384 . Western water law provides that the right of the first person to divert and 
use water from a particular water source is superior to the rights of persons 
later diverting and using water from the same source . Subsequent diverters 
may exercise their rights only when the senior diverter has used his full al-
location of water . Eastern water law, based on common law, traditionally 
limits the right to divert and use water to landowners adjoining a water body 
and requires them to share and share alike during times of water scarcity . For 
a detailed descriptions of both western and eastern water law, see Tarlock, 
supra note 32 .
cal to irrigated agriculture and municipal water supplies, 
is an important aspect of the area’s economy and state 
legal systems . This is the Agency’s “holistic theory” of the 
CWA . EPA’s second theory supporting the water transfer 
rule is that all navigable waters are one, so that when pol-
luted navigable water is discharged into a pristine navigable 
water, the polluted navigable water adds no pollutants to 
the pristine water because both waters are the same water . 
This is the Agency’s “unitary navigable water theory .”
The Agency bases its holistic theory on four brief pas-
sages in the CWA, which it argues create a balance between 
water quality and water quantity, thereby removing water 
transfers from the definition of “addition” and exempting 
them from requiring CWA permits .385 None of the four 
passages suggests that “addition” excludes water transfers 
or that water transfers are exempt or can be exempted from 
requiring a CWA permit when they add pollutants from 
one water body to another water body . EPA’s water transfer 
rule is such a significant departure from the pattern and 
concerns of the CWA that it should not be upheld unless 
Congress clearly intended it . That intent is not clear from 
the four brief statutory passages proffered by EPA, consist-
ing of three subsections and one paragraph in a 200-page 
statute with more than 500 subsections and 800 para-
graphs, the rest of which are unambiguously focused on 
promoting pollution control .
The Southern District of New York recently heard a 
consolidated challenge to the rule and vacated it in Catskill 
Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency.386 The Eleventh Circuit, how-
ever, in Friends of the Everglades v. South Florida Water 
Management District,387 had earlier accorded Chevron def-
erence to the rule when it was raised as a defense in a citi-
zen suit against an unpermitted water transfer of polluted 
water . Catskill Mountains is the most recent, and also the 
most comprehensive, decision on the water transfer issue . 
It has been appealed to the U .S . Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit .388
EPA enunciated its unitary navigable waters theory in 
its amicus brief in South Florida Water Management Dis-
trict v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida .389 Although 
its brief suggested that the Agency had always subscribed 
to the theory, the earlier instances it cited merely foreshad-
owed the theory rather than articulating it .390 Indeed, for-
mer EPA officials including former Administrator Carol 
Browner filed an amicus brief indicating that EPA had 
385 . The four passages are CWA §§101(b), 101(g), 304(f ) & 510(2); 33 U .S .C . 
§§1251 (b), 1251(g), 1314(f ) & 1370(2) .
386 . 8 F . Supp . 3d 500 (S .D .N .Y . 2014), 2014 WL 128544 .
387 . 570 F .3d 1210 (11th Cir . 2009) .
388 . The Second Circuit is already on record as holding that the CWA unambig-
uously requires permits for water transfers, Catskill Mtns. Chapter of Trout 
Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 102 F .3d 1273 (2d Cir . 1996), making 
it likely that it will affirm the district court’s decision . If it does so, then be-
cause that would create a circuit split between the Second Circuit in Catskill 
Mtns . and the Eleventh Circuit in Friends of the Everglades, and because the 
Supreme Court left the unitary navigable water theory open in Miccosukee, 
the Court may well grant certiorari .
389 . 541 U .S . 95, 105-06, 34 ELR 20021 (2004) .
390 . Id. at 107-08 .
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not subscribed to the theory during their tenures there .391 
EPA did not evoke the theory in its Water Transfer Inter-
pretation392 or in its proposed Water Transfer Rule or the 
preamble accompanying it393; additionally, some of the 
wording used in the preamble to the proposed rule394 and 
repeated more than once in the preamble to the final rule 
are inconsistent with the theory .395
Moreover, the Water Transfer Interpretation and the 
preamble to the proposed rule both stated that the “pre-
cise legal question addressed” was whether a water trans-
fer was an addition; nowhere was it suggested that the 
definition of navigable waters was at issue . Finally, the 
Interpretation stated explicitly that it did “not address 
the meaning of  .   .   . navigable waters .”396 Although all 
three documents reiterated that the precise397 or princi-
pal398 legal issue was the definition of addition, none of 
them enunciated the meaning of addition . Instead, all 
three justified the water transfer policy or rule’s exclusion 
of water transfers from the requirement of a CWA §402 
permit on the basis of a holistic interpretation of the stat-
ute favoring water transfers being regulated by authorities 
other than federal and state pollution control authori-
ties .399 EPA’s frequent shifting between the elements it is 
interpreting and the theories it uses to interpret them in 
this contest is a shell game .400
EPA’s preamble to its final rule embraces the unitary 
navigable waters theory as a justification for the water 
transfer rule, although as a subsidiary argument and in a 
conclusory manner:
Thus, there is no “addition”; nothing is being added “to” 
“the waters of the United States” by virtue of the water 
transfer, because the pollutant at issue is already part 
of “the waters of the United States” to begin with   .   .   .   . 
When a pollutant is conveyed along with, and already 
subsumed entirely within, navigable waters and the water 
is not diverted for an intervening use, the water never loses 
its status as “waters of the United States,” and nothing is 
added to those waters from the outside world .401
391 . See Brief for Carol Browner et al . as Amici Curiae Supporting Miccosukee 
Tribe of Indians of Fla ., South Fla . Water Mgmt . Dist ., v . Miccosukee Tribe 
of Indians of Fla . 541 U .S . 95, 34 ELR 20021 (2004), 2003 WL 22793539 . 
Former EPA Administrator Browner was joined in the amicus brief by two 
former assistant administrators for EPA’s Water Programs, and two former 
general counsels .
392 . EPA Interpretation on Applicability of CWA §402 to Water Transfers 
(2005) [hereinafter EPA Interpretation], available at http://www .epa .gov/
ogc/documents/water_transfers .pdf .
393 . 71 Fed . Reg . 32887 (June 6, 2006) .
394 . A water transfer “conveys waters of the United States to another water of the 
United States .” (Emphasis added .) Id. at 32891 .
395 . 73 Fed . Reg . 33697, 33699 (a water transfer “diverts a water of the United 
States to a second water of the United States .”) (emphasis added) . Id. at 
33704 .
396 . EPA Interpretation, supra note 392, at 18, n .19 .
397 . See Miller, Addition, supra note 4, at 10784-85 .
398 . Id.
399 . Id.
400 . Or perhaps it is evidence the documents were written by different mem-
bers of a committee with insufficient editorial control to produce consis-
tent documents .
401 . 73 Fed . Reg . 33697, 33701 .
This preamble is drawn directly from EPA’s brief in 
Friends of the Everglades v. South Florida Water Manage-
ment District,402 with no further authority or justification 
except an implicit reference to National Wildlife Federation 
v. Consumers Power Co.403
EPA’s unitary navigable waters theory is a startling and 
counterintuitive notion . If Congress intended to incorpo-
rate such an unexpected theory or policy into the CWA, 
surely it would have explicitly articulated it in the statute 
or at least discussed it in the legislative history . However, 
Congress did not mention or even hint at the theory in 
either the statute or its legislative history . The only wording 
EPA can point to in the statute to support the notion is an 
inference from the presence of the word “any” before the 
terms “addition,” “pollutant,” “point source,” and “person,” 
but not before the term “navigable waters” in §§301(a) and 
502(12) . EPA argues that, for example, “any” before “pol-
lutant” signifies there are many different pollutants, any 
one of which could support a violation of the CWA . By 
the same token, the Agency argues that the absence of the 
word “any” before “navigable waters” signifies that there is 
only one aggregate navigable waters that can support a vio-
lation, not many individual navigable waters . EPA argues 
that this is consistent with use of the singular nouns “addi-
tion,” “pollutant,” and “point source,” and of the plural 
noun “waters” in §§301(a) and 502(12) . Congress did not 
explain why it used the plural form of navigable waters and 
the singular forms of the other elements .
The difference between “navigable water” and “navi-
gable waters” is not at all clear . Indeed, in his plurality 
opinion in Rapanos, Justice Scalia used dictionary defini-
tions to argue that the singular “water” is more extensive 
than the plural “waters .”404 However, Congress used the 
words water and waters interchangeably in the statute,405 
and elsewhere provided that unless “the context indicates 
otherwise,” the use of a singular noun in a statute incorpo-
rates the plural of that noun, and the use of a plural noun 
in a statute incorporates the singular of that noun .406 This 
parallels the canon of statutory construction that absent 
a contrary indication in a statute, “the singular includes 
the plural (and vice versa) .”407 Nothing in the definitions of 
“discharge of a pollutant” or “navigable waters” indicates 
differently .408 Indeed, the CWA’s water quality standards 
and §404 programs would be rendered meaningless by 
EPA’s unitary navigable water theory .409 The argument that 
402 . See id.; Friends of the Everglades v . South Fla . Water Mgmt . Dist ., 570 F .3d 
1210 (11th Cir . 2009) .
403 . 862 F .2d 580, 19 ELR 20235 (6th Cir . 1988) .
404 . Rapanos v . United States, 547 U .S . 715, 732, 36 ELR 20116 (2006) .
405 . For example, CWA §101(a) uses “waters” in (1) and “water” in (2) .
406 . 1 U .S .C . §1 .
407 . See Scalia & Garner, supra note 17, at 129-31 .
408 . CWA §502(7) & (12); 33 U .S .C . §1362(7) & (12) .
409 . It is most likely that Congress used “navigable waters” in the CWA defini-
tion of “discharge of a pollutant” only because it consciously adopted the 
jurisdiction and the permit program from the Refuse Act, and the Refuse 
Act forbade the discharge of refuse into the plural “navigable waters” with-
out a permit from the Corps . Congress most likely used “navigable waters” 
in the Refuse Act because Congress used the term throughout the Rivers 
and Harbors Act of 1899 . See, e.g., 33 U .S .C . §407 .
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the absence of “any” before “navigable waters” in §502(12) 
exempts water transfers from §402 or creates one unitary 
body of water from all navigable waters is countered by 
Justice Scalia’s comment that Congress does not “hide ele-
phants in mouse holes .”410
The CWA is premised on treating navigable waters into 
which pollutants are discharged as singular waters rather 
than as one whole navigable water . This is most evident 
in the CWA’s water quality standards program and in the 
§404 permit program for filling wetlands . The CWA’s 
water quality standards program is based on the strategy of 
the earlier FWPCA to regulate the discharge of pollutants 
to interstate waters . The basic strategy of this program is for 
states to designate how they desire particular waterways to 
be used—for example, drinking water without treatment, 
body contact sports, fish propagation, non-body contact 
sports, or agricultural and industrial use . Next, the state 
designates pollutant criteria for each use, primarily con-
centrations of pollutants in the water that are safe for the 
particular use designated . Thus, different water bodies will 
have different uses designated and different criteria for the 
pollutants found in them . The states are then to reduce 
pollution from point and nonpoint sources in a particular 
water body sufficiently to meet the criteria designated for 
that water body .
This is inherently a regulatory strategy that requires 
treating each water body as a separate entity rather than as 
a part of one whole unitary water body . Treating navigable 
waters as unitary navigable water suggests one use and one 
set of criteria . The CWA is replete with requirements for 
states to regulate the water pollution of separate water bod-
ies or portions thereof rather than of one whole body of 
water .411 EPA’s unitary navigable water theory is inconsis-
tent with this strategy of water pollution control . Because 
Congress established the water quality standards strategy 
but did not mention the incompatible unitary navigable 
waters theory, that theory is a chimera .
If the unitary navigable water theory is inconsistent 
with the water quality strategy, it reads much of §404 out 
of the CWA . Section 404 requires a permit for adding 
dredged or fill material to navigable waters . The provision 
was enacted to regulate the disposal of dredged spoil by 
Corps-permitted projects to enhance waterborne transpor-
tation by deepening navigation channels and harbors . The 
dredged spoil was most easily and economically disposed 
of in water or low-lying coastal wetlands . If all navigable 
waters were one, no §404 permit would be needed to rede-
posit dredged spoil from one navigable water to another 
because both navigable waters would be one . Most recent 
§404 enforcement actions arise from unpermitted wetland 
clearing activities . In the typical wetland clearing case, a 
developer removes vegetation, levels the land, and perhaps 
digs a drainage ditch, redepositing the vegetative mate-
410 . See Whitman v . American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U .S . 457, 468, 31 ELR 
20512 (2001) .
411 . See CWA §302(a), 33 U .S .C . §1312(a), providing for “attainment or main-
tenance of  .  .  . water quality in a specific portion of the navigable waters . . . .” 
(emphasis added) . See also Miller, Addition, supra note 4, at 10789-90 .
rial and soil on other parts of the wetland . This redeposit 
is held to be the addition of material to navigable waters 
from a point source that requires a permit .412 If all navi-
gable waters are one, however, no §404 permit would be 
needed for redeposit of material in landclearing operations, 
because all parts of the wetland would be the same navi-
gable water .
In the wetlands land-filling cases, another EPA theory 
would thwart prosecution: the Agency’s theory that “addi-
tion” must be from the “outside world .” Removing mate-
rial from a wetland and redepositing it elsewhere in the 
same wetland does not add it from elsewhere .413 Together, 
these two EPA theories could narrow §404 jurisdiction 
only to cases in which fill material from dry land is dis-
charged into water .
EPA contends that because “Congress explicitly forbade 
discharges of dredged material except in compliance with” 
a §404 permit, the unitary navigable water theory and the 
outside world theory have no effect on the §404 program .414 
But its contention only tells us that dredged material is a 
pollutant, not whether the water into which it is deposited 
is navigable or whether the deposit is an addition . Perhaps 
the Agency is suggesting that its theory does not apply to 
§404, but only to §402 . But EPA does not explicitly make 
that argument, and the argument cannot survive either the 
canon of statutory interpretation that one word or term 
must be interpreted to have the same meaning through-
out a statute unless the statute provides otherwise,415 or the 
statement to the same effect in the lead-in to the CWA’s 
definition of navigable waters in §502 .416
VI. Conclusion
Congress defined navigable waters as the waters of the 
United States, intending that the jurisdiction of the CWA 
extend as far as constitutionally possible . At first, courts 
followed EPA’s lead and legislative history to interpret the 
terms expansively under both §§402 and 404 . The Supreme 
Court, however, gradually narrowed the CWA’s navigable 
waters jurisdiction, mindful of the fact that the Court itself 
had developed the meaning of that term as a highway of 
interstate and foreign waterborne commerce under the 
Commerce Clause over the course of more than one-and-a-
half century of its opinions . By basing the CWA’s jurisdic-
tion on a term with an already-developed meaning under 
the Commerce Clause, Congress invited courts to interpret 
the CWA’s jurisdiction with some regard to its traditional 
connection with waterborne commerce . That effectively 
narrowed “navigable waters” under the CWA to the first of 
the three Lopez prongs of interstate and foreign commerce 
412 . Miller, Addition, supra note 4, at 10800-01 .
413 . Id. at 10778-79 .
414 . 73 Fed . Reg . 33697, 33703 (June 13, 2008) .
415 . Eskridge, supra note 17, at 324, Scalia & Garner, supra note 17, at 
167-69 .
416 . 33 U .S .C . §1362 (“Except as otherwise specifically provided, when used 
in this chapter:  .  .  . (7) the term ‘navigable waters,’ means the waters of the 
United States .  .  .  .”) .
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jurisdiction: use as a highway of commerce . The tension 
between congressional intent and judicial interpretation 
has been particularly acute under §404, where agricultural 
landclearing activities in wetlands sometimes appear to be 
moving dirt on or to dry land, rather than placing it on the 
nation’s waters .
A less textual Supreme Court could reach a more expan-
sive interpretation of navigable waters . Congress could 
erase any mention of navigable water from the CWA and 
explicitly state in the legislative history that it is using all of 
the jurisdiction it has under the Commerce Clause under 
any of the three prongs of Lopez, as well as its treaty pow-
ers, which it has used to protect migratory birds and their 
habitats . None of these changes is likely in the near future . 
In the meantime, EPA and the Corps have no choice but 
to amend their regulatory definitions of navigable waters, 
acknowledging some limitations to their jurisdiction .
The agencies have proposed a new regulatory definition 
of waters of the United States that includes traditionally 
navigable waters, their tributaries, and adjacent wetlands . 
It defines tributaries and adjacent wetlands and provides 
scientific justifications for the definitions . The scientific 
justifications may justify judicial deference .417 The agencies 
also abandon any claim to jurisdiction over groundwater 
that is tributary to navigable waters or to waters within 
the second and third prongs of Lopez Commerce Clause 
jurisdiction, including isolated waters used by interstate 
travelers for purposes related to interstate commerce . EPA 
could recapture some of those waters on a case-by-case 
basis by demonstrating that, alone or in combination with 
similarly situated waters in the same watershed, they have 
a significant nexus in terms of flow and water quality to 
other waters defined as waters of the United States . Finally, 
because EPA does not mention its unitary navigable water 
theory in its proposed new, comprehensive definition or in 
the preamble, it can be argued that the Agency has aban-
doned the theory .
417 . EPA’s study is a monumental review by its Office of Research and Develop-
ment of modern, peer-reviewed literature on the hydrology of water quality 
and water pollution . It is presently in draft form and in the process of review 
by EPA’s SAB . See infra note 277 . EPA will not promulgate the final version 
of its rule until the SAB’s review is complete and the study is in final form . 
See 79 Fed . Reg . 22188, 22190 . A cynical reader may find some of the sci-
ence little more than “most water is connected in the hydrological cycle”; 
“surface water flows downhill”; “groundwater flows downgradient”; “organ-
isms that live in water can’t live on dry land”; and “organisms that live in 
pristine water can’t live in polluted or muddy water .”
Appendix I
Note to readers: The body of this text is the definition of 
“waters of the United States” as it currently appears in 40 
C .F .R . §122 . The portion of the text in brackets indicates 
text that is deleted in EPA’s proposed revision of the defini-
tion, published at 79 Fed . Reg . 22188 (proposed Apr . 21, 
2014) . The italicized portion identifies text that is added in 
EPA’s proposed revision .
Waters of the United States or waters of the U .S . means:
(a) For purposes of all sections of the Clean Water Act, 
33 U .S .C . 1251 et seq. and its implementing regulations, 
subject to the exclusion in paragraph (b) of this definition, 
the term “waters of the United States” means:
([a]1) All waters which are currently used, were used in 
the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or for-
eign commerce, including all waters which are subject to 
the ebb and flow of the tide;
([b]2) All interstate waters, including interstate 
“wetlands;”
(3) The territorial sea;
[(c) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, 
streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sand-
flats, “wetlands,” sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, 
playa lakes, or natural ponds the use, degradation, or 
destruction of which would affect or could affect interstate 
or foreign commerce including any such waters;
(1) Which are or could be used by interstate of foreign 
travelers for recreational or other purposes;
(2) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken 
and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(3) Which are used or could be used for industrial pur-
poses by industries in interstate commerce;]
([d]4)] All impoundments of waters [otherwise defined 
as waters of the United States under] identified in para-
graphs (a)(1) through (3) and (5) of this definition”
([e]5)] [All] [T]tributaries of waters identified in para-
graphs (a)(1) through [(d)] (4) of this definition;
[(f) The territorial sea; and]
(6) All waters, including wetlands, adjacent to a water 
identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (5) of this defini-
tion; and
(7) On a case by case basis, other waters, including wet-
lands, provided that those waters alone, or in combination 
with similarly situated waters, including wetlands, located in 
the same region, have a significant nexus to a water identified 
in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this definition.
[(g) “Wetlands” adjacent to waters (other than waters 
that are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a) 
through (f) of this definition .] The proposed definition 
lists eleven specific exclusions, including groundwater, and 
defines “adjacent,” “neighboring,” “riparian area,” “ flood-
plain,” “tributary,” “wetland” and “significant nexus .”
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TABLE A
Decisions Interpreting “Navigable Waters” 
U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
1. Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 133 S. Ct. 710, 43 ELR 20004 (2013)
2. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 36 ELR 20116 (2006)
3. South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 34 ELR 20021 (2004)
4. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 31 ELR 20382 (2001)
5. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 16 ELR 20086 (1985)
U.S. Circuit Court Decisions
6. United States v. Donovan, 2011 WL 5120605, 42 ELR 20328 (3d Cir. 2011)
7. Precon Development Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 633 F.3d 278, 41 ELR 20071 (4th Cir. 2011)
8. United States v. Agosto-Vega, 617 F.3d 541, 40 ELR 20222 (1st Cir. 2010)
9. United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174, 39 ELR 20232 (9th Cir. 2009)
10. Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2009)
11. United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2009)
12. Friends of the Everglades v. South Florida Water Management District, 570 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009)
13. Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 17l7 (4th Cir. 2009)
14. United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 39 ELR 20025 (6th Cir. 2009)
15. United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2008)
16. United States v. Robinson, 505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007)
17. North California Water Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007)
18. United States v. Moses, 496 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2007)
19. San Francisco Baykeeper v. Cargill Salt Division, 481 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2007)
20. United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006)
21. United States v. Gerke Excavation, Inc., 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006)
22. Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2006)
23. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 451 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2006)
24. United States v. Hubenka, 438 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 2006)
25. Baccarat Freemont Development, LLC v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 425 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2005)
26. Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 2004)
27. United States v. Phillips, 367 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2004)
28. In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2003)
29. Treacy v. Newdunn Associates, LLP, 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003)
30. United States v. Rueth Development Co., 335 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2003)
31. United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003)
32. Community Assn. for Restoration of the Environment v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002)
33. United States v. Krilich, 303 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2002)
34. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001)
35. Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 261 F.3d 810, 32 ELR 20011 (9th Cir. 2001)
36. Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 31 ELR 20599 (5th Cir. 2001)
37. Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation District, 243 F.3d 526, 31 ELR 20535 (9th Cir. 2001)
38. Driscoll v. Adams, 181 F.3d 1285, 29 ELR 21387 (11th Cir. 1999)
39. United States v. TGR Corp., 171 F.3d 762, 29 ELR 21059 (2d Cir. 1999)
40. United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 28 ELR 20299 (4th Cir. 1997)
41. United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 27 ELR 20853 (11th Cir. 1997)
42. Dubois v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 102 F.3d 1273, 27 ELR 20622 (1st Cir. 1996)
43. Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.2d 962, 24 ELR 21080 (7th Cir. 1994)
44. United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 23 ELR 21012 (3d Cir. 1993)
45. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 999 F.2d 256, 23 ELR 21139 (7th Cir. 1993)
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46. Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 968 F.2d 1438, 22 ELR 21337 (1st Cir. 1992)
47. Inland Steel Co. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 901 F.2d 1419, 20 ELR 20889 (7th Cir. 1990)
48. Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 863 F.2d 1420, 19 ELR 20225 (9th Cir. 1988)
49. National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 19 ELR 20235 (6th Cir. 1988)
50. Conant v. United States, 786 F.2d 1008, 16 ELR 20453 (11th Cir. 1986)
51. Quivira Mining Co. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 765 F.2d 126, 15 ELR 20530 (10th Cir. 1985)
52. United States v. City of Fort Pierre, 747 F.2d 464, 15 ELR 20177 (8th Cir. 1984)
53. Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 14 ELR 20683 (10th Cir. 1984)
54. Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 13 ELR 20942 (5th Cir. 1983)
55. United States v. Tilton, 705 F.2d 429, 13 ELR 20583 (11th Cir. 1983)
56. Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 11 ELR 20905 (Ct. Cl. 1981)
57. United States v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345, 10 ELR 20184 (10th Cir. 1979)
58. United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 9 ELR 20757 (7th Cir. 1979)
59. United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 9 ELR 20542 (10th Cir. 1979)
60. Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehilke, 578 F.2d 742, 8 ELR 20480 (9th Cir. 1978)
61. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 7 ELR 20419 (7th Cir. 1977)
62. Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 7 ELR 20594 (5th Cir. 1977)
63. California v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 511 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1975)
64. United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 4 ELR 20784 (6th Cir. 1974)
U.S. District Court Decisions
65. Stillwater of Crown Point Homeowners Association v. Kovich, 2011 WL 4818511 (N.D. Ind. 2011)
66. Deerfield Plantation Phase II-B Property Owners Association v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2011 WL 2746232 (D.S.C. 2011)
67. United States v. Brink, 2011 WL 2412577 (S.D. Tex. 2011)
68. San Francisco Baykeeper v. West Bay Sanitary District, 791 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
69. United States v. Freedman Farms, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D.N.C. 2011)
70. Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, Inc. v. Coal-Mac, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 2d 900, 41 ELR 20141 (S.D. W. Va. 2011)
71. United States v. Vierstra, 2011 WL 1064526 (D. Idaho 2011)
72. Gulf Restoration Network v. Hancock County Development, LLC, 772 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. Miss. 2011)
73. United States v. Donovan, 2010 WL 3000058 (D. Del. 2010)
74. National Association of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 699 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D.D.C. 2010)
75. Benjamin v. Douglas Ridge Rifle Club, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Or. 2009)
76. Stephens v. Koch Foods, LLC, 667 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Tenn. 2009)
77. Precon Development Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 658 F. Supp. 2d 752 (E.D. Va. 2009)
78. Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co. (Puerto Rico), 599 F. Supp. 2d 175 (D.P.R. 2009)
79. American Petroleum Institute v. Johnson, 541 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D.D.C. 2008)
80. United States v. Fabian, 522 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 37 ELR 20083 (D. Ind. 2007)
81. United States v. Robison, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2007)
82. United States v. Bailey, 516 F. Supp. 2d 990 (D. Minn. 2007)
83. United States v. Cundiff, 480 F. Supp. 2d 940 (W.D. Ky. 2007)
84. Simsbury-Avon Preservation Society, LLP v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D. Conn. 2007)
85. Environmental Protection Information Center v. Pacific Lumber Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 803 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
86. United States v. Marion L. Kincaid Trust, 3 F. Supp. 2d 680 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
87. United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605 (N.D. Tex. 2006)
88. United States v. Adam Bros. Farming, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
89. North Carolina Shellfish Growers Association v. Holly Ridge Associates, LLC, 278 F. Supp. 2d 654 (E.D.N.C. 2003)
90. FD & P Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 239 F. Supp. 2d 509 (D.N.J. 2003)
91. United States v. RGM Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. Va. 2002)
92. California Sportfishing Protecting Alliance v. Diablo Grande, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (E.D. Cal. 2002)
93. United States v. Newdunn Associates, LLP, 195 F. Supp. 2d 751 (E.D. Va. 2002)
94. United States v. Rueth Development Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 874 (N.D. Ind. 2002)
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95. United States v. Interstates General Co., 152 F. Supp. 2d 843 (D. Md. 2001)
96. Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (D. Idaho 2001)
97. United States v. Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Mont. 2001)
98. Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven, 136 F. Supp. 2d 81 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
99. United States v. Hallmark Construction Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 28 ELR 21438 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
100. United States v. Gulf Park Water Co., Inc., 972 F. Supp. 1056 (S.D. Miss. 1997)
101. Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D. Iowa 1997)
102. Umatilla Waterquality Protective Association, Inc. v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312, 27 ELR 21411 (D. Or. 1997)
103. Georgia v. City of East Ridge, Tenn., 949 F. Supp. 1571, 27 ELR 20782 (N.D. Ga. 1996)
104. Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp. 1168, 26 ELR 20639 (D. Mont. 1995)
105. Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 26 ELR 20135 (D.N.M. 1995)
106. United States v. Banks, 873 F. Supp. 650, 25 ELR 20776 (S.D. Fla. 1995)
107. Washington Wilderness Coalition v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 25 ELR 20661 (E.D. Wash. 1994)
108. Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428, 24 ELR 20749 (D. Colo. 1993)
109. Golden Gate Audubon Society, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 796 F. Supp. 1306, 23 ELR 20267 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
110. United States v. Zanger, 767 F. Supp. 1030, 22 ELR 20231 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
111. McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Cheney, 763 F. Supp. 431, 20 ELR 20870 (E.D. Cal. 1989)
112. West Virginia Coal Association v. Reilly, 728 F. Supp. 1276, 20 ELR 20642 (S.D. W. Va. 1989)
113. United States v. Malibu Beach, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 1301, 19 ELR 21247 (D.N.J. 1989)
114. Hanson v. United States, 710 F. Supp. 1105, 19 ELR 21074 (E.D. Tex. 1989)
115. McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 1182, 19 ELR 20124 (E.D. Cal. 1988)
116. United States v. Larkins, 657 F. Supp. 76, 17 ELR 20783 (W.D. Ky. 1987)
117. Kelley v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 1103, 16 ELR 20080 (W.D. Mich. 1985)
118. Track 12, Inc. v. District Engineer, 618 F. Supp. 448, 16 ELR 20163 (D. Minn. 1985)
119. United States v. Saint Bernard Parish, 589 F. Supp. 617, 14 ELR 20794 (E.D. La. 1984)
120. United States v. Lambert, 589 F. Supp. 366, 14 ELR 20588 (M.D. Fla. 1984)
121. United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483 (D.N.J. 1984)
122. United States v. Robinson, 570 F. Supp. 1157, 14 ELR 20056 (M.D. Fla. 1983)
123. Bayou Des Familles Development Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 541 F. Supp. 1025, 13 ELR 20055 (E.D. La. 1982)
124. United States v. Bradshaw, 541 F. Supp. 880, 12 ELR 20629 (D. Md. 1981)
125. United States v. Lee Wood Contractors, Inc. 529 F. Supp. 119, 12 ELR 20421 (E.D. Mich. 1981)
126. United States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331, 10 ELR 20698 (M.D. Fla. 1980)
127. American Dredging Co. v. Dutchyshyn, 480 F. Supp. 957 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
128. United States v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 438 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Tenn. 1976)
129. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Alexander, 438 F. Supp. 90, 7 ELR 20751 (D.P.R. 1977)
130. Wyoming v. Hoffman, 437 F. Supp. 114, 8 ELR 20001 (D. Wyo. 1977)
131. Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Costanzo, 398 F. Supp. 653, 5 ELR 20666 (E.D.N.C. 1975)
132. Sun Enterprises, Inc. v. Train, 394 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
133. P.F.Z. Properties, Inc. v. Train, 393 F. Supp. 1370 (D.D.C. 1975)
134. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 5 ELR 20285 (D.D.C. 1975)
135. United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 5 ELR 20308 (D. Ariz. 1975)
136. United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379, 5 ELR 20581 (S.D. Tex. 1975)
137. United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 4 ELR 20710 (M.D. Fla. 1974)
Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.





Year +/-a Type of Caseb Type of 
Waterc






1 2013 + Jud. Rev. 1 1 2 402
2 2006 _ Enf. T, W 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 
11, 13
9 19 404
3 2004 + Cit. S. U 1, 4, 5, 6, 11 5 5 402
4 2001 - Jud. Rev. I 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 
11, 12
8 2 404
5 1985 + Enf. T, W 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 7 404
U.S. Circuit Court Decisions
6 2011 + Enf. T, W 1 1 5 404
7 2011 - Jud. Rev. W 1, 4 2 6 404
8 2010 + Crim. T 1, 2 2 4 402/404
9 2009 - Enf. 1, 2, 5, 7 4 5 404
10 2009 + Cit. S. W 1, 2, 4 3 5 402
11 2009 + Enf. W 1 1 6 404
12 2009 - Cit. S. U 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
11, 13
9 10 402
13 2009 - Cit. S. 1, 4, 7, 10 4 2 402
14 2009 + Enf. T, W 1 1 8 404
15 2008 + Crim. W 1 1 3 404
16 2007 - Crim. T 1 1 6 402
17 2007 + Cit. S. T, W 1, 2, 10 3 7 402
18 2007 + Crim. T 1, 4 2 9 402/404
19 2007 - Cit. S. W 1, 4, 16, 19 4 9 402
20 2006 + Enf. W 1 1 3 404
21 2006 - Enf. W 1 1 2 404
Rapanos
22 2006 + Cit. S. W 1, 10 2 6 402
23 2006 + Cit. S. U 1, 4, 6, 8, 11 5 4 402
24 2006 + Crim. T 1, 2, 4, 9, 13 5 17 404
25 2005 + Jud. Rev. W 1 1 5 404
26 2004 + Cit. S. T 1, 3 2 3 402
27 2004 + Crim. T 1, 3, 4, 20 4 7 402
28 2003 + Bankr. T, W 1, 4, 5, 9 4 7 OPA
29 2003 + Enf. T, W 1, 2 2 5 404
30 2003 + Enf. W 1, 14 2 6 404
31 2003 + Enf. T, W 1, 4, 9 3 13 404
32 2002 + Cit. S. T 1 1 3 402
33 2002 + Enf. W 1, 14 2 4 404
34 2001 + Cit. S. U 1, 4, 8 3 2 402
35 2001 +/- Enf. W 1 1 7 404
36 2001 - Cit. S. G 1, 3, 5, 7 4 8 OPA
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37 2001 + Cit. S. T 1, 5 2 8 402
38 1999 + Cit. S. T 1 1 2 402
39 1999 + Crim. T 1, 2, 10 3 5 402
40 1997 - Crim. T, W 1, 9 2 1 404
41 1997 + Crim. T 1, 2 2 9 402
42 1996 + Cit. S. U 1, 2, 6, 8 4 4 402
43 1994 - Cit. S. G, I 1, 2, 3, 4, 19 5 7 402
44 1993 + Enf. T, W 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 6 12 404
45 1993 - Jud. Rev. W 4 1 404
46 1992 - Jud. Rev. W 1 1 4 404
47 1990 - Enf. G 1, 4, 5, 8, 10 5 5 402
48 1988 + Jud. Rev. 1, 3, 5, 7 4 3 402
49 1988 - Cit. S. U 1, 4 2 3 402
50 1986 + Enf. W 1, 2, 10 3 1 404
51 1985 + Jud. Rev. G, T 1, 2, 4 3 3 402
Riverside Bayview
52 1984 - Enf. W 2, 8, 17 3 1 404
53 1984 + Decl. Jud. T 1, 2 2 12 404
54 1983 + Cit. S. W 1, 2, 3, 4 4 8 404
55 1983 + Enf. W 1, 3, 5 3 1 404
56 1981 + Taking W 1, 2 2 7 404
57 1980 + Enf. T 1 1 1 402
58 1979 + Enf. W 1, 2, 3 3 4 404
59 1979 + Enf. T 1, 2, 3 3 2 402
60 1978 + Enf. W 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 5 2 404
61 1977 + Jud. Rev. G 3, 4, 6, 10, 13 5 1 402
62 1977 - Jud. Rev. G 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12 7 1 402
63 1975 + Jud. Rev. T 1, 3 2 2 402
64 1974 + Enf. T 1, 2, 3 3 4 402
U.S. District Court Decisions
65 2011 + Cit. S. T, W 1 1 4 404
66 2011 - Jud. Rev. I, W 1, 4 2 3 404
67 2011 + Enf. T 1 1 7 404
68 2011 + Cit. S. T 1 1 5 402
69 2011 - Crim. W 1 1 7 404
70 2011 + Cit. S. T 1, 6 2 3 402
71 2011 + Crim. T 1, 2, 5, 6 4 10 402
72 2011 + Cit. S. T, W 1 1 5 404
73 2010 + Enf. T, W 1 1 8 404
74 2010 + Jud. Rev. T 1, 6, 15 3 3 404
75 2009 + Cit. S. T, W 1, 2 2 7 402
76 2009 + Cit. S. T 1, 2 2 2 402
77 2009 + Jud. Rev. W 1, 4 2 7 404
78 2009 + Cit. S. G 1, 2, 3, 4 4 14 402
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79 2008 - Jud. Rev. 1 1 5 404
80 2007 + Enf. T, W 1, 4 2 9 404
81 2007 + Crim. W 1 1 6 404
82 2007 + Enf. W 1, 4 2 8 404
83 2007 + Enf. W 1 1 4 404
84 2007 - Cit. S. W 1 1 1 404
85 2007 - Cit. S. T 1 1 4 402
86 2006 + Enf. W 1 1 6 404
87 2006 - Enf. T 1, 2, 5, 9 4 8 402
Rapanos
88 2003 + Enf. T, W 1, 2 2 6 404
89 2003 + Cit. S. T, W 1 1 10 402/404
90 2003 - Jud. Rev. W 1, 2, 4 3 12 404
91 2002 - Enf. W 1, 3, 4, 8, 9 5 2 404
92 2002 + Cit. S. G, T 1 1 6 402
93 2002 - Enf. T, W 1, 3, 4, 5, 9 5 2 404
94 2002 + Enf. W 1, 14 2 3 404
95 2002 + Enf. W 1, 14 2 1 402
96 2001 + Cit. S. G, T 1, 2, 3 3 9 404
97 2001 + Crim. T, W 1, 2, 3 3 8 404
98 2001 + Cit. S. T 1, 5 2 6 402
SWANCC
99 1998 _ Enf. W 1 1 2 404
100 1997 + Enf. T 1, 2 2 1 402
101 1997 + Cit. S. G, W 1, 2 2 4 402
102 1997 - Cit. S. G 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 18 7 11 402
103 1996 + Cit. S. T 1, 2 2 4 402
104 1995 + Cit. S. T 1 1 3 402
105 1995 +/- Cit. S. G 1, 2, 5 3 13 402
106 1995 + Enf. W 1 1 3 404
107 1994 + Cit. S. G 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 6 9 402
108 1993 + Cit. S. G 1, 2 2 9 402
109 1992 + Cit. S. W 4 1 404
110 1991 + Enf. T 1 1 3 404
111 1989 + Cit. S. G 2 1 402
112 1989 + Jud. Rev. T 4, 6 2 404
113 1989 + Enf. W 1 1 2 404
114 1989 + Enf. T, W 1 1 1 404
115 1988 + Cit. S. G 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 6 7 402
116 1987 + Enf. W 4 1 1 404
117 1985 - Cit. S. G 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 5 4 402
Riverside Bayview
118 1985 + Jud Rev. W 1, 5 2 2 404
119 1984 + Enf. T, W 1, 2, 3 3 7 404
120 1984 + Enf. W 1, 4 2 3 404
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121 1984 + Enf. W 1, 2, 3 3 3 404
122 1983 + Enf. W 1, 2 2 8 404
123 1982 + Jud. Rev. W 1, 3, 4, 7 4 3 404
124 1981 + Enf. W 1 1 1 404
125 1981 + Enf. W 1, 2 2 2 404
126 1980 + Enf. W 1, 2, 3 3 5 404
127 1979 + Jud. Rev. 1 1 10 404
128 1976 + Enf. T 2, 3 2 402
129 1977 + Jud. Rev. W 1, 2, 3, 7 4 2 404
130 1977 + Jud Rev. T 1, 2, 3 3 8 404
131 1975 + Cit. S. W 1, 4 2 5 404
132 1975 + Cit. S. W 1, 2 2 2 404
133 1975 + Jud. Rev. W 3 1 404
134 1975 + Jud. Rev. W 13 1 402
135 1975 + Crim. T 1, 2, 5 3 1 402
136 1975 - Enf. G 2, 3, 5, 6 4 2 402
137 1974 + Enf. W 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 5 5 404
a. Plus (+) indicates an expansive interpretation of “navigable waters”; minus (-) indicates a restrictive interpretation. Although an interpretation of navigable 
waters may be expansive, the environmental party may have lost the case for other reasons.
b. Cit. S. means citizen suit; Crim. means criminal prosecution; Enf. means civil enforcement; Jud. Rev. means judicial review.
c. G means groundwater; I means isolated water; T means tributary; U means unitary navigable water; W means wetlands.
d. Canons used to interpret “navigable waters”: (1) precedent; (2) broad interpretation to achieve statutory purpose; (3) legislative history; (4) deference; 
(5) plain meaning; (6) structure of statute; (7) harmonize with other statutes; (8) avoid absurd results; (9) avoid constitutional issues; (10) interpret excep-
tions narrowly; (11) honor federalism; (12) exception proves the rule; (13) give every word meaning; (14) interpret waivers narrowly (finality); (15) inclusive-
ness of definition; (16) exclusiveness of definition; (17) equity; (18) avoid administrative difficulties; (19) inclusion of one implies exclusion of another; and 
(20) rule of lenity.
e. Refers only to Supreme Court precedent interpreting navigable waters or lower court precedent interpreting navigable waters in the CWA.
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